Replication materials are available at the GESIS data repository: https://doi.org/10.7802/2607

Online Supplement - Part A: Details on Measurement Models for Study 1 and Study 2

Study 1: We conducted a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis using the lavaan package in R (Rosseel, 2012) to evaluate if pro-mixing norms, individual preferences, and positive contact, can be considered empirically distinct latent factors across four groups: Togolese Muslims, Togolese Christians, Sierra Leonean Muslims, and Sierra Leonean Christians. We used maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors (MLR) to account for non-normally distributed variables. We pre-registered a measurement model in which a latent pro-mixing norms factor would be inferred by four (descriptive and injunctive) pro-mixing norms indicators, a latent preferences measure by two indicators, and a latent positive contact factor by three indicators (positive casual contact and two close contact items). We did not include a pre-registered latent wealth measure due to many missing values (75-97%). We fixed the error variance of one preference indicator to zero for all groups because its estimates were negative or non-significant. Our preregistered multi-group three-factor model had a suboptimal fit ($\chi 2(100) = 227.521$, p<.001, comparative fit index (CFI) = .827, Tucker–Lewis coefficient (TLI) = 0.750, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .087, 90% CI [.072, .102]).

For Togolese Muslims, we could not identify any meaningful factor structure regarding the four norms indicators. A comparison of correlations between the four indicators for pro-mixing ingroup norms across groups (Tables A1-4) showed that for Togolese Muslims several correlations were negative whereas they were positive for the other groups. Therefore, we excluded Togolese Muslims from further analyses.

The fit of the preregistered model when applied to the remaining three groups (N = 585) was still suboptimal, $\chi 2(75) = 183.965$, p < .001, CFI = .840, TLI = 0.769, RMSEA = .086, 90% CI [.071, .102]. We considered instead a four-factor model for these three groups,

differentiating between descriptive and injunctive norms and including a modified version of the positive contact factor by keeping only the two close contact items and dropping the positive casual contact item. These adjustments are in line with the distinctions made in the literature between different types of norms (Cialdini et al., 1991) and different types of contact (Allport, 1954; Keil & Koschate, 2020). We additionally fixed the non-significant error variance of the indicator of injunctive norms about interreligious marriages for all groups to zero. This model had an acceptable fit for both Sierra Leonean groups and for Togolese Christians, $\chi 2(48) = 77.990$, p = .004, CFI = .954, TLI = 0.920, RMSEA = .057, 90% CI [.032, .080]. Moreover, we established partial scalar invariance, meaning that we can quantitatively compare regression coefficients. A model with all factor loadings and intercepts constrained to be equal across the three groups, apart from the intercept for the indicator of descriptive norms about interreligious marriages, had a similar fit as the configural model $(\Delta SB\chi^2(14) = 13.09, p = .520$, fit: $\chi 2(62) = 93.015$, p = .007, CFI = .952, TLI = 0.936, RMSEA = .051, 90% CI [.028, .072]).

Study 2: Using multigroup confirmatory factor analysis with MLR, we evaluated if pro-mixing norms captured by all eight norms indicators, and preferences for similar others captured by two indicators, can be considered empirically distinct latent factors across four groups. For correlations between the norms indicators see Table A5. In Study 2, we only had one item predicting close contact, so we did not estimate a latent factor. A model with two factors had a suboptimal fit, $\chi 2(137) = 2053.759$, p < .001, CFI = .693, TLI = 0.596, RMSEA = .175 [.168, .182].

A model that differentiated between descriptive and injunctive norms as separate factors had a significantly better fit ($\Delta SB\chi^2(7) = 365.68$, p < .001), however, the fit remained suboptimal. Note that we fixed the error variance of a preference predictor for Sierra Leonean Muslims and Christians to zero in that model, because its estimate was not significantly different from zero for both groups (smallest p = .666). Subsequently, we additionally freed

three error covariances between observed norms indicators. This model had a significantly better and acceptable fit ($\Delta SB\chi^2(14) = 254$, p < .001; $\chi 2(116) = 208.898$, p < .001, CFI = .985, TLI = 0.977, RMSEA = .042 [.033,.051]). We allowed the following norms indicators to covary: (1) descriptive pro-mixing ingroup norms conveyed by religious leaders and typical members of the congregation, (2) injunctive pro-mixing ingroup norms conveyed by religious leaders and typical members of the congregation, and (3) descriptive and injunctive norms conveyed by family members.

We established metric invariance (fit similar to the unconstrained model, $\Delta SB\chi^2(21) = 26.402$, p = .192) and can quantitatively compare regression coefficients across four groups (including Togolese Muslims). However, we could not establish scalar invariance ($\Delta SB\chi^2(21) = 138.930$, p < .001), so latent means cannot be compared across groups.

We conducted a second CFA adding a latent factor for wealth to identify a measurement model for a structural model with controls that fits all four groups. For details on the structural model with controls, see Part B of the online supplement. We first tested a model in which the latent wealth factor was inferred by all twelve items measuring household assets (i.e. beds, bicycles, buildings, cars, (laptop) computers, generators, mobile phones, motorbikes, refrigerators, sofa sets, tables and chairs, and televisions). This model was not identified for all groups. For Togolese groups the number of generators owned by the household did not load well onto the latent factor (largest loading b = 0.129, p = .045) whereas the indicator for the number of bicycles owned by the household had small loadings in the Sierra Leonean groups (largest loading b= 0.247, p < .001). Considering the context in which data were collected, most neighborhoods in Lomé have electricity 24 hours a day which makes owning a generator not necessary whereas the steep hills of Freetown can explain why people may not invest in bicycles even if they had the money for it. We therefore excluded these two indicators for both countries in a subsequent model. This model was identified across groups and its fit was acceptable (χ 2(644) =1205.069, p < .001, CFI = .947,

TLI = 0.937, RMSEA = .044 [.040, .047], AIC: 96933.413, BIC: 98454.895). However, there was a large standardized residual covariance between the indicator for (laptop) computers and mobile phones owned by the household (sr = -4.475). Thus, we decided to additionally remove the laptop indicator from the model. This model was identified across groups and had an acceptable fit (fit: $\chi 2(572) = 999.602$, p < .001, CFI = .957, TLI = 0.948, RMSEA = .040 [.036, .045], AIC: 93589.826, BIC: 95045.157). Since the models relied on different sets of observed variables, a Chi-square difference test could not be used to compare the models. However, the lower AIC and BIC in the latter model convinced us to choose it above the former. The chosen model was not metrically invariant as fixing the loadings across groups resulted in significantly worse fit ($\Delta SB\chi^2(45) = 174.73$, p < .001). Removing equality constrains for the asset indicators for buildings, motorbikes, refrigerators, sofas as well as tables and chairs resulted in a partial metric model, in which all loadings for the main variables of our analysis remained equivalent across groups, and only the latent factor wealth showed partial metric invariance. The fit of this model was not significantly different from the model without equality constraints ($\Delta SB\chi^2(30) = 41.33$, p = .082).

Table A1 Descriptive Results and Correlations, Study 1, Togolese Christian sample (*N*= 299)

Table AT Descriptive Results an		,	<u> </u>	Correlation			,						_
Variable	Valid N	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Favorable Interreligious attitudes	198	63.43	29.14										
2. Negative casual contact	290	1.32	0.79	04									
3. Positive casual contact	287	2.91	1.82	.07	.14*								
4. Outgroup acquaintances	264	2.81	0.75	.04	04	.11							
5. Outgroup friends	263	2.84	0.74	.10	07	.12	.63***						
6. Preference for similar others (1)	272	2.91	1.33	05	.08	15*	16*	15*					
7. Preference for similar others (2)	273	2.41	1.23	16*	.03	10	20**	19**	.50***				
8. Descriptive pro-mixing ingroup norms supportive of interreligious friendships	232	2.76	0.64	.05	.09	.13*	.43***	.47***	12	23***			
9. Descriptive norms supportive of interreligious marriage	273	2.20	1.05	.06	.16*	.03	.19**	.22***	.01	07	.16*		
10.Injunctive norms supportive of interreligious friendships	283	4.29	0.78	.09	03	14*	10	11	.04	08	.02	.05	
11.Injunctive norms supportive of interreligious marriage	275	3.50	1.10	.14	02	11	.01	.08	03	17**	.03	.26***	.37***

Table A2 Descriptive Results and Correlations, Study 1, Sierra Leonean Muslim sample (*N*= 104)

				Correlati	ons		·						
Variable	Valid N	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Favorable Interreligious attitudes	83	67.46	31.10										
2. Negative casual contact	98	1.64	1.24	07									
3. Positive casual contact	101	3.48	1.80	08	.14								
4. Outgroup acquaintances	96	3.22	0.84	06	.13	00							
5. Outgroup friends	97	3.24	0.86	14	.18	02	.48***						
6. Preference for similar others (1)	98	3.24	1.18	28*	.05	19	.08	.00					
7. Preference for similar others (2)	99	2.72	1.22	34**	.02	16	00	.05	.65***				
8. Descriptive norms supportive of interreligious friendships	88	3.02	0.69	16	.06	.15	.29**	.47***	03	06			
9. Descriptive norms supportive of interreligious marriage	100	2.76	1.07	15	.16	.19	.14	.36***	02	11	.34**		
10.Injunctive norms supportive of interreligious friendships	98	4.30	0.74	14	23*	06	.05	.23*	20*	16	.23*	.16	
11.Injunctive norms supportive of interreligious marriage	98	3.85	0.93	03	01	.14	.20	.34***	11	20*	.26*	.39***	.38***

 Table A3 Descriptive Results and Correlations, Study 1, Sierra Leonean Christian sample (N= 182)

*		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	· · ·	Correlati	ons								
Variable	Valid N	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Favorable Interreligious attitudes	146	69.36	32.74										
2. Negative casual contact	180	1.76	1.44	14									
3. Positive casual contact	182	3.98	1.93	.09	.19**								
4. Outgroup acquaintances	173	2.89	0.84	.19*	15*	.22**							
5. Outgroup friends	172	2.84	0.87	.06	.03	.18*	.29***						
6. Preference for similar others (1)	170	3.24	1.21	18*	.17*	07	12	13					
7. Preference for similar others (2)	166	2.72	1.24	21*	.17*	22**	14	25**	.54***				
8. Descriptive norms supportive of interreligious friendships	153	2.80	0.72	.02	.10	.21**	.18*	.37***	16*	28***			
9. Descriptive norms supportive of interreligious marriage	166	2.45	1.02	.02	06	.14	.20*	.10	06	23**	.30***		
10.Injunctive norms supportive of interreligious friendships	172	4.26	0.81	.02	09	08	.03	.25**	03	09	08	.06	
11.Injunctive norms supportive of interreligious marriage	171	3.80	1.01	.12	.00	02	.04	.14	.08	11	.02	.20*	.37***

Table A4 Descriptive Results and Correlations, Study 1, Togolese Muslim sample (*N*= 93)

				Correlati	ons								
Variable	Valid N	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Favorable Interreligious attitudes	62	63.61	33.34										
2. Negative casual contact	87	1.61	1.23	.16									
3. Positive casual contact	87	3.51	2.21	.34**	.14								
4. Outgroup acquaintances	82	3.18	0.94	.44***	29**	06							
5. Outgroup friends	85	3.26	0.85	.19	.17	07	.42***						
6. Preference for similar others (1)	78	3.32	1.26	.09	.02	11	.22	.12					
7. Preference for similar others (2)	79	2.52	1.32	09	.23*	20	13	03	.16				
8. Descriptive norms supportive of interreligious friendships	72	3.12	0.75	.12	01	20	.41***	.43***	.05	.04			
9. Descriptive norms supportive of interreligious marriage	84	2.37	1.08	.11	09	.23*	09	07	.06	03	22		
10.Injunctive norms supportive of interreligious friendships	83	4.43	0.63	.07	18	.01	.27*	.17	.31**	09	.18	22*	
11.Injunctive norms supportive of interreligious marriage	76	3.20	1.25	13	.05	.07	19	02	.17	.16	12	.20	.16

Table A5 Descriptive Results for Pro-mixing Ingroup Norms Indicators, Study 2 (*N*= 1,831)

					.62*** .28*** .43*** .23*** .29*** .41***								
Variable	Valid N	Range	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Descriptive Pro-mixing Ingr	roup Norms												
1. Religious Leader	1,564	1-7	2.3	1.2									
2. Congregation Member	1,573	1-7	2.6	1.2	.62***								
3. Ingroup Friends	1,721	1-7	3.1	1.2	.28***	.43***							
4. Family	1,796	1-7	3.2	1.2	.23***	.29***	.41***						
5. Mean score	1,823	1-7	2.8	0.9	.73***	.80***	.74***	.70***					
Injunctive Pro-mixing Ingro	oup Norms												
6. Religious Leader	1,653	1-5	3.8	1.1	.13***	.12***	.09***	.08***	.15***				
7. Congregation Member	1,647	1-5	3.8	1.1	.12***	.11***	.12***	.09***	.15***	.79***			
8. Ingroup Friends	1,804	1-5	3.9	1.0	.10***	.07**	.15***	.11***	.15***	.60***	.67***		
9. Family	1,822	1-5	4.0	1.0	.10***	.09***	.15***	.21***	.18***	.55***	.58***	.67***	
10. Mean score	1,827	1-5	3.9	0.9	.13***	.12***	.15***	.15***	.18***	.87***	.89***	.86***	.82***

Note. ** p < .01; *** p < .01

Part B: Multigroup Sequential Mediation Models with Controls for Study 1 and Study 2

Study 1: We estimated a second multigroup sequential mediation model in which we additionally controlled for gender, age, and education in relation to preferences, contact measures, and interreligious attitudes. A model with partial structural invariance, whereby we freed the constraints for the Togolese Christian group on regression coefficients of education predicting close contact and gender predicting preferences for similarity had a similar fit as an unconstrained model ($\Delta SB\chi^2(77) = 92.581$, p = .109, fit of partially constrained model: $\chi^2(83) = 97.082$, p = .138, CFI = .935, TLI = 0.894, RMSEA = .031, 90% CI [.000, .054]). With regards to the control variables, we found that older participants had less, and the lower educated ones had more negative casual contact. Furthermore, women and older participants had more close contact. For the Sierra Leonean groups, those with a lower level of education also had more close contact and women had weaker preferences for similar others.

Study 2: We estimated a second multigroup sequential mediation model in which we additionally controlled for gender, age, education and wealth in relation to preferences, contact measures, and interreligious attitudes. To attain partial structural invariance, we lifted several constraints on regression coefficients for control variables in addition to those constraints lifted in the main model ($\Delta SB\chi^2(124) = 148.47$, p = .066). Equality constraints were lifted for the following regression coefficients: associations between gender and negative casual contact and preferences lifted per country, associations between age and interreligious attitudes and preferences lifted per country, associations between education and negative and positive casual contact and preferences lifted per country, association between education and interreligious attitudes for Togolese Christians, association between education and close contact for Sierra Leonean Muslims, association between wealth and positive casual contact for Sierra Leonean Christians.

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With regards to the service attendance control, the results of both models showed some country differences and particularities of the Togolese Christian and Muslims (see Table B1). For Togolese Christians service attendance was negatively related to interreligious relations: Service attendance had a positive relation with preferences for similar others, a negative association with positive casual and close contact, a non-significant association with negative casual contact and a negative association with interreligious attitudes. For Togolese Muslims, service attendance had a more ambivalent association with interreligious relations as the associations with preferences for similar others, close contact and negative casual contact were non-significant, and the association with positive causal contact was negative but the one with interreligious attitudes was positive. For Sierra Leonean groups, service attendance was negatively associated with interreligious attitudes and was not related to contact or preferences.

Women held more favorable attitudes across groups and had a stronger preference for similar others in Togo but weaker preferences for similar others in Sierra Leone. For Togolese participants, age was positively associated with interreligious attitudes and education was negatively associated with negative casual contact and positively associated with positive casual contact. Education was further associated with more close contact for Sierra Leonean Muslims and weaker preferences for similar others across groups. Wealth was positively related to positive casual contact for Sierra Leonean Christians and negatively related to close contact across groups.

Table B1 Regression coefficients for the religious service attendance variable in the main multigroup sequential mediation model, Study 2

	Togolese Muslims	Togolese Christians	Sierra Leonean Muslims	Sierra Leonean Christians
	B (S.E)	B (S.E)	B (S.E)	B (S.E)
Religious service attendance				
→ outgroup attitudes	3.01 (1.41)*	-1.50 (0.50)**	-1.50 (0.50)**	-1.50 (0.50)**
→ negative casual contact	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
→ positive casual contact	-0.16 (0.05)**	-0.16 (0.05)**	0.20 (0.05)***	0.20 (0.05)***
\rightarrow close contact	0.02 (0.03)	-0.10 (0.04)**	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
\rightarrow preferences	0.03 (0.03)	0.22 (0.04)***	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)

Note. Group-specific estimates that had to be freed are highlighted in bold.

Table B2 Monte Carlo estimates and confidence intervals of total and indirect effects for the main multigroup sequential mediation models, Study 1 and Study 2

	Study 1		Stu	dy 2	
	(N = 539)		(N=1)	1,830)	
	All groups	Togolese	Togolese	Sierra Leonean	Sierra Leonean
	B [CI]	Muslims B [CI]	Christians B [CI]	Muslims B [CI]	Christians B [CI]
Total effects	B [CI]	Б[СІ]	D [CI]	D [CI]	D [CI]
Preferences → interreligious attitudes	-5.19 [-8.01, -2.37]*	-4.89 [-6.78, -3.00]*	-7.17 [-10.45, -3.91]*	-4.89 [-6.78, -3.00]*	-5.67 [-8.20, -3.17]*
Descriptive norms → interreligious attitudes	-3.68 [-10.97, 3.56]	8.92 [7.04, 10.80]*	8.19 [6.13, 10.34]*	10.12 [7.86, 12.53]*	10.36 [7.93, 13.03]*
Descriptive norms → negative casual contact	2.99 [2.97, 3.00]*	-3.32 [-4.42, -2.20]*	-3.32 [-4.42, -2.20]*	-3.88 [-5.08, -2.66]*	-3.88 [-5.08, -2.66]*
Descriptive norms → positive casual contact	0.45 [0.25, 0.66]*	0.49 [0.37, 0.61]*	0.49 [0.37, 0.61]*	0.49 [0.37, 0.61]*	0.40 [0.27, 0.52]*
Descriptive norms \rightarrow close contact	0.33 [0.24, 0.43]*	0.81 [0.7, 0.92]*	0.81 [0.7, 0.92]*	0.81 [0.7, 0.92]*	0.81 [0.7, 0.92]*
Injunctive norms → interreligious attitudes	3.62 [-0.33, 7.54]	6.20 [3.86, 8.82]*	6.65 [4.05, 9.65]*	6.20 [3.86, 8.82]*	6.34 [3.91, 9.13]*
Injunctive norms → negative casual contact	-0.11 [-0.21, -0.01]*	-3.00 [-4.31, -1.69]*	-3.00 [-4.31, -1.69]*	-3.00 [-4.31, -1.69]*	-3.00 [-4.31, -1.69]*
Injunctive norms → positive casual contact	-0.26 [-0.47, -0.05]*	0.07 [-0.03, 0.16]	0.07 [-0.03, 0.16]	0.07 [-0.03, 0.16]	0.01 [-0.09, 0.11]

^{*}*p* < .05, ** *p* < .01, *** *p* < .001

Injunctive norms → close contact	0.03 [-0.06, 0.11]	0.02 [-0.04, 0.08]	0.02 [-0.04, 0.08]	0.02 [-0.04, 0.08]	0.02 [-0.04, 0.08]
Indirect Effects					
Preferences → interreligious attitudes					
Via negative casual contact	-0.11 [-0.46, 0.09]	-27.68 [-46.23, -9.67]*	-27.68 [-46.23, -9.67]*	-27.68 [-46.23, -9.67]*	-27.68 [-46.23, -9.67]*
Via positive casual contact	-0.15 [-0.71, 0.37]	-0.42 [-0.75, -0.15]*	0.07 [-0.16, 0.33]	-0.42 [-0.75, -0.15]*	0.18 [-0.24, 0.61]
Via close contact	-0.19 [-0.70, 0.24]	-0.12 [-0.36, 0.1]	-0.12 [-0.36, 0.1]	-0.12 [-0.36, 0.1]	-0.12 [-0.36, 0.1]
Descriptive norms → interreligious attitudes					
Via preferences	0.78 [0.13, 1.68]*	0.89 [0.43, 1.42]*	0.89 [0.43, 1.42]*	0.89 [0.43, 1.42]*	0.89 [0.43, 1.42]*
Via negative casual contact	-31.54 [-75.51, 11.74]	10.42 [3.4, 18.8]*	10.42 [3.4, 18.8]*	11.20 [3.70, 20.08]*	11.20 [3.70, 20.08]*
Via positive casual contact	0.24 [-0.55, 1.10]	0.98 [0.54, 1.45]*	-0.17 [-0.72, 0.36]	0.98 [0.54, 1.45]*	0.80 [0.42, 1.24]*
Via close contact	0.73 [-0.91, 2.51]	0.49 [-0.46, 1.45]	0.49 [-0.46, 1.45]	0.49 [-0.46, 1.45]	0.49 [-0.46, 1.45]
Injunctive norms → interreligious attitudes					
Via preferences	0.50 [-0.12, 1.34]	0.56 [0.23, 0.96]*	0.56 [0.23, 0.96]*	0.56 [0.23, 0.96]*	0.56 [0.23, 0.96]*
Via negative casual contact	0.25 [-0.10, 0.80]	8.30 [2.48, 16.01]*	8.30 [2.48, 16.01]*	8.30 [2.48, 16.01]*	8.30 [2.48, 16.01]*
Via positive casual contact	-0.14 [-0.68, 0.34]	0.13 [-0.06, 0.36]	-0.02 [-0.15, 0.06]	0.13 [-0.06, 0.36]	0.02 [-0.19, 0.25]
Via close contact	0.06 [-0.22, 0.46]	0.01 [-0.04, 0.09]	0.01 [-0.04, 0.09]	0.01 [-0.04, 0.09]	0.01 [-0.04, 0.09]
Descriptive norms \rightarrow negative casual contact					
Via preferences	-0.01 [-0.03, 0.005]	-11.43 [-15.21, -7.57]*	-11.43 [-15.21, -7.57]*	-11.43 [-15.21, -7.57]*	-11.43 [-15.21, -7.57]*
Descriptive norms \rightarrow positive casual contact					
Via preferences	0.05 [0.01, 0.10]*	0.06 [0.03, 0.10]*	0.06 [0.03, 0.10]*	0.06 [0.03, 0.10]*	-0.03 [-0.09, 0.03]
Descriptive norms → close contact					
Via preferences	0.01 [0.002, 0.03]*	0.06 [0.03, 0.08]*	0.06 [0.03, 0.08]*	0.06 [0.03, 0.08]*	0.06 [0.03, 0.08]*
Injunctive norms \rightarrow negative casual contact					
Via preferences	-0.01 [-0.02, 0.004]	-7.86 [-11.28, -4.42]*	-7.86 [-11.28, -4.42]*	-7.86 [-11.28, -4.42]*	-7.86 [-11.28, -4.42]*
Injunctive norms \rightarrow positive casual contact					
Via preferences	0.03 [-0.01, 0.08]	0.04 [0.01, 0.07]*	0.04 [0.01, 0.07]*	0.04 [0.01, 0.07]*	-0.02 [-0.06, 0.02]

Injunctive norms → close contact					
Via preferences	0.01 [-0.002, 0.02]	0.04 [0.02, 0.06]*	0.04 [0.02, 0.06]*	0.04 [0.02, 0.06]*	0.04 [0.02, 0.06]*
Sequential Indirect Effects					
Descriptive norms → interreligious attitudes					
Via preferences and neg. casual contact	0.02 [-0.01 ,0.08]	19.15 [6.25, 34.63]*	19.15 [6.25, 34.63]*	19.15 [6.25, 34.63]*	19.15 [6.25, 34.63]*
Via preferences and pos. casual contact	0.03 [-0.07 ,0.13]	0.13 [0.05, 0.23]*	-0.05 [-0.19, 0.07]	0.13 [0.05, 0.23]*	-0.02 [-0.1, 0.05]
Via preferences and close contact	0.03 [-0.04 ,0.14]	0.03 [-0.03, 0.11]	0.03 [-0.03, 0.11]	0.03 [-0.03, 0.11]	0.03 [-0.03, 0.11]
Injunctive norms → interreligious attitudes					
Via preferences and neg. casual contact	0.01 [-0.01 ,0.06]	13.21 [3.96, 25.49]*	13.21 [3.96, 25.49]*	13.21 [3.96, 25.49]*	13.21 [3.96, 25.49]*
Via preferences and pos. casual contact	0.02 [-0.05 ,0.10]	0.08 [0.02, 0.15]*	-0.03 [-0.12, 0.05]	0.08 [0.02, 0.15]*	-0.01 [-0.07, 0.03]
Via preferences and close contact	0.02 [-0.03 ,0.10]	0.02 [-0.02, 0.07]	0.02 [-0.02, 0.07]	0.02 [-0.02, 0.07]	0.02 [-0.02, 0.07]

Note. Monte Carlo estimates with confidence intervals in parentheses. For Study 2, coefficients that differed significantly between groups are highlighted in bold. * indicates that the Monte Carlo confidence interval does not cross zero.

Table B3 Total, direct and indirect effects of multigroup sequential mediation models including controls, Study 1 and Study 2

	Study 1			tudy 2	
	(N = 538)			= 1,830)	
	All groups	Togolese Muslims	Togolese Christians	Sierra Leonean Muslims	Sierra Leonean Christians
	B (S.E)	B (S.E)	B (S.E)	B (S.E)	B (S.E)
Total effects					
Preferences → interreligious attitudes	-5.36 (1.44)***	-3.75 (0.77)***	3.39 (0.74)***	-3.75 (0.77)***	3.19 (0.78)***
Descriptive norms → interreligious attitudes	0.24 (2.21)	7.23 (0.86)***	6.21 (0.88)***	7.63 (0.83)***	7.48 (0.83)***
Descriptive norms → negative casual contact	0.20 (0.05)***	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.26 (0.07)***	-0.26 (0.07)***
Descriptive norms → positive casual contact	0.45 (0.10)***	0.49 (0.06)***	0.49 (0.06)***	0.49 (0.06)***	0.41 (0.06)***
Descriptive norms → close contact	0.34 (0.05)***	0.81 (0.06)***	0.81 (0.06)***	0.81 (0.06)***	0.81 (0.06)***
Injunctive norms → interreligious attitudes	3.72 (1.98)	4.20 (0.79)***	4.16 (0.78)***	4.20 (0.79)***	4.11 (0.79)***
Injunctive norms → negative casual contact	-0.13 (0.05)*	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Injunctive norms → positive casual contact	-0.27 (0.11)*	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)	0.003 (0.05)
Injunctive norms → close contact	0.04 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Direct effects					
→ Interreligious attitudes					
Neg. casual contact	-2.41 (1.61)	-1.45 (0.46)**	-1.45 (0.46)**	-1.45 (0.46)**	-1.45 (0.46)**
Pos. casual contact	0.57 (0.88)	2.06 (0.44)***	-0.03 (0.56)	2.06 (0.44)***	2.06 (0.44)***
Close contact	2.42 (2.49)	0.54 (0.60)	0.54 (0.60)	0.54 (0.60)	0.54 (0.60)
Preferences	-4.90 (1.46)***	-3.38 (0.75)***	-3.38 (0.75)***	-3.38 (0.75)***	-3.38 (0.75)***
Descriptive norms	-1.23 (2.24)	4.88 (1.11)***	4.88 (1.11)***	4.88 (1.11)***	4.88 (1.11)***
Injunctive norms	2.93 (2.02)	3.59 (0.77)***	3.59 (0.77)***	3.59 (0.77)***	3.59 (0.77)***
Female	2.42 (3.14)	3.98 (1.19)***	3.98 (1.19)***	3.98 (1.19)***	3.98 (1.19)***
Age	-0.04 (0.22)	0.36 (0.08)***	0.36 (0.08)***	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.03 (0.05)
Low education (ref. High education)	10.22 (8.14)				
Medium education (ref. High education)	-0.15 (3.15)				

Version answer scale (Study 1)	-2.85 (2.99)				
Education (original scale)		0.48 (0.81)	-0.12 (0.32)	-0.12 (0.32)	-0.12 (0.32)
Assets		-0.06 (0.82)	-0.06 (0.82)	-0.06 (0.82)	-0.06 (0.82)
Version questionnaire (Study 2)		2.24 (1.15)	2.24 (1.15)	2.24 (1.15)	2.24 (1.15)
Service attendance		3.22 (1.39)*	-1.52 (0.50)**	-1.52 (0.50)**	-1.52 (0.50)**
→ Neg. casual contact					
Preferences	0.04 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.02)**	-0.06 (0.02)**	-0.06 (0.02)**	-0.06 (0.02)**
Descriptive norms	0.21 (0.05)***	-0.002 (0.04)	-0.002 (0.04)	-0.28 (0.07)***	-0.28 (0.07)***
Injunctive norms	-0.13 (0.05)*	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.001 (0.02)
Female	0.03 (0.08)	-0.12 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)	0.15 (0.10)	0.15 (0.10)
Age	-0.01 (0.00)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Low education (ref. High education)	0.64 (0.30)*				
Medium education (ref. High education)	0.01 (0.08)				
Version answer scale (Study 1)	-0.13 (0.08)				
Education (original scale)		-0.03 (0.02)*	-0.03 (0.02)*	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Assets		-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Version questionnaire (Study 2)		0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)
Service attendance		-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	0.07 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)
→ Pos. casual contact					
Preferences	-0.31 (0.07)***	-0.17 (0.06)**	-0.17 (0.06)**	-0.17 (0.06)**	0.10 (0.11)
Descriptive norms	0.39 (0.10)***	0.44 (0.06)***	0.44 (0.06)***	0.44 (0.06)***	0.44 (0.06)***
Injunctive norms	-0.30 (0.11)**	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Female	-0.22 (0.16)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.09)	-0.08 (0.09)
Age	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)
Low education (ref. High education)	0.19 (0.38)				
Medium education (ref. High education)	-0.27 (0.16)				

Version answer scale (Study 1)	0.26 (0.16)				
Education (original scale)		0.15 (0.03)***	0.15 (0.03)***	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)
Assets		-0.16 (0.08)	-0.16 (0.08)	-0.16 (0.08)	0.23 (0.09)**
Version questionnaire (Study 2)		0.07 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)	0.07 (0.08)
Service attendance		-0.14 (0.05)**	-0.14 (0.05)**	0.20 (0.05)***	0.20 (0.05)***
→ Close contact					
Preferences	-0.08 (0.03)**	-0.20 (0.04)***	-0.20 (0.04)***	-0.20 (0.04)***	-0.20 (0.04)***
Descriptive norms	0.33 (0.05)***	0.75 (0.06)***	0.75 (0.06)***	0.75 (0.06)***	0.75 (0.06)***
Injunctive norms	0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Female	0.13 (0.06)*	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)
Age	0.01 (0.00)*	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Low education (ref. High education)	0.58 (0.27)* [-0.23 (0.19)]				
Medium education (ref. High education)	0.20 (0.09)* [-0.03 (0.07)]				
Education (original scale)	. , , , , ,	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)*	-0.01 (0.02)
Assets		-0.11 (0.04)*	-0.11 (0.04)*	-0.11 (0.04)*	-0.11 (0.04)*
Version questionnaire (Study 2)		0.09 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)
Service attendance		0.02 (0.03)	-0.10 (0.03)**	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
→ Preferences					
Descriptive norms	-0.18 (0.07)**	-0.28 (0.05)***	-0.28 (0.05)***	-0.28 (0.05)***	-0.28 (0.05)***
Injunctive norms	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.15 (0.04)***	-0.15 (0.04)***	-0.15 (0.04)***	-0.15 (0.04)***
Female	-0.34 (0.13)* [0.12 (0.14)]	0.37 (0.10)***	0.37 (0.10)***	-0.25 (0.09)**	-0.25 (0.09)**
Age	-0.002 (0.01)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)*	-0.01 (0.00)*
Low education (ref. High education)	0.40 (0.24)				
Medium education (ref. High education)	0.02 (0.10)				

Education (original scale)		-0.10 (0.02)***	-0.10 (0.02)***	-0.10 (0.02)***	-0.10 (0.02)***
Assets		0.003 (0.04)	0.003 (0.04)	0.003 (0.04)	0.003 (0.04)
Version questionnaire (Study 2)		-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)
Service attendance		0.03 (0.03)	0.17 (0.04)***	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Indirect Effects					
Preferences → interreligious attitudes					
Via negative casual contact	-0.09 (0.12)	0.09 (0.04)*	0.09 (0.04)*	0.09 (0.04)*	0.09 (0.04)*
Via positive casual contact	-0.18 (0.27)	-0.35 (0.14)*	0.01 (0.10)	-0.35 (0.14)*	0.21 (0.22)
Via close contact	-0.19 (0.21)	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.12)	-0.11 (0.12)
Descriptive norms → interreligious attitude	S				
Via preferences	0.87 (0.40)*	0.93 (0.25)***	0.93 (0.25)***	0.93 (0.25)***	0.93 (0.25)***
Via negative casual contact	-0.48 (0.34)	-0.02 (0.06)	-0.02 (0.06)	0.38 (0.14)**	0.38 (0.14)**
Via positive casual contact	0.25 (0.40)	1.00 (0.23)***	-0.02 (0.27)	1.00 (0.23)***	0.85 (0.22)***
Via close contact	0.83 (0.87)	0.43 (0.48)	0.43 (0.48)	0.43 (0.48)	0.43 (0.48)
Injunctive norms → interreligious attitudes					
Via preferences	0.54 (0.37)	0.52 (0.17)**	0.52 (0.17)**	0.52 (0.17)**	0.52 (0.17)**
Via neg. casual contact	0.31 (0.24)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)
Via pos. casual contact	-0.15 (0.24)	0.09 (0.10)	-0.002 (0.03)	0.09 (0.10)	0.01 (0.10)
Via close contact	0.09 (0.14)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Descriptive norms → negative casual contact	et				
Via preferences	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)*	0.02 (0.01)*	0.02 (0.01)*	0.02 (0.01)*
Descriptive norms → positive casual contact	t				
Via preferences	0.05 (0.02)*	0.05 (0.02)**	0.05 (0.02)**	0.05 (0.02)**	-0.03 (0.03)
Descriptive norms → close contact					
Via preferences	0.01 (0.01)*	0.05 (0.01)***	0.05 (0.01)***	0.05 (0.01)***	0.05 (0.01)***
Injunctive norms → negative casual contact					

Via preferences	-0.004 (0.005)	0.01 (0.00)*	0.01 (0.00)*	0.01 (0.00)*	0.01 (0.00)*
Injunctive norms → positive casual contact					
Via preferences	0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.01)*	0.03 (0.01)*	0.03 (0.01)*	-0.02 (0.02)
Injunctive norms → close contact					
Via preferences	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)**	0.03 (0.01)**	0.03 (0.01)**	0.03 (0.01)**
Sequential Indirect Effects					
Descriptive norms → interreligious attitudes					
Via preferences and neg. casual contact	0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)*	-0.02 (0.01)*	-0.02 (0.01)*	-0.02 (0.01)*
Via preferences and pos. casual contact	0.03 (0.05)	0.10 (0.04)*	-0.06 (0.06)	0.10 (0.04)*	0.002 (0.03)
Via preferences and close contact	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Injunctive norms → interreligious attitudes					
Via preferences and neg. casual contact	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Via preferences and pos. casual contact	0.02 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)*	-0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)*	0.001 (0.01)
Via preferences and close contact	0.02 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)

Note. Unstandardized coefficients, with standard errors presented in parentheses. In Study 1, N = 539, thereof 274 Togolese Christians, 97 Sierra Leonean Muslims and 167 Sierra Leonean Christians. In Study 2, N = 1,830, thereof 205 Togolese Muslims, 663 Togolese Christians, 616 Sierra Leonean Muslims and 346 Sierra Leonean Christians. For Study 1, values in square brackets indicate estimates and standard errors for Togolese Christians where they differ from the Sierra Leonean groups. For Study 2, coefficients that differed significantly between groups are highlighted in bold. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

Part C: Comparison of Multigroup Sequential Mediation Models for Friendship and Marriage Norms for Study 1

We estimated two additional multigroup sequential mediation models in which we included as predictors either only descriptive and injunctive norms about interreligious *friendships*, or only descriptive and injunctive norms about interreligious *marriages*. We estimated the same multiple group sequential mediation models as in the main analysis (i.e. using MLR and FIML and differentiating between Togolese Christians, Sierra Leonean Muslims and Sierra Leonean Christians). The only difference between the models is that instead of using mean scores for descriptive and injunctive norms, Model Friendship includes the observed indicators for descriptive and injunctive norms about interreligious friendships only, and Model Marriage about interreligious marriages only.

For Model Friendship we achieved partial structural invariance after freeing the parameter of injunctive norms on outgroup attitudes. The model fit of the freely estimated model was acceptable: $\chi 2(6) = 3.486$, p = .746, CFI = 1.000., TLI = 1.159, RMSEA = .000 [.000, .074]. The model fit of the partially constrained model was not significantly different ($\Delta SB\chi 2(38)$) = 49.843, p=.095; fit: $\chi 2(44) = 53.707$, p=.150, CFI = 0.951., TLI = 0.916, RMSEA = .038 [.000, .069]). We deleted 121 cases due to missing values in exogenous variables (N=464).

For Model Marriage we achieved full structural invariance. The model fit of the freely estimated model was acceptable: $\chi 2(6) = 2.401$, p =.879, CFI = 1.000., TLI = 1.388, RMSEA = .000 [.000, .048]. The model fit of the constrained model was not significantly different ($\Delta SB\chi 2(40) = 48.445$, p=.169; fit: $\chi 2(46) = 52.235$, p =.245, CFI = 0.946., TLI = 0.912, RMSEA = .028 [.000, .059]). We deleted 63 cases due to missing values in exogenous variables (N=522).

The total, direct and indirect effects are reported in Table C1 below. The pattern of findings was overall similar to those reported in Figure 1 and Table 2 in the manuscript, although

estimates for interreligious marriage norms were generally somewhat weaker than those for friendship norms.

Table C1 Total, direct and indirect effects in separate Models with Friendship norms and Marriage norms, Study 1

Table C1 Total, direct and indirect effects in separate Models	Model Friendship	Model Marriage	
	(N = 464)	(N = 522)	
	All groups	All groups	
	B (S.E)	B (S.E)	
Total effects			
Preferences → interreligious attitudes	-6.16 (1.53)***	-4.93 (1.45)***	
Descriptive norms → interreligious attitudes	0.14 (2.60)	-0.89 (1.56)	
Descriptive norms → negative casual contact	0.11 (0.07)	0.11 (0.04)* *	
Descriptive norms → positive casual contact	0.50 (0.12)***	0.21 (0.08)* *	
Descriptive norms → close contact	0.44 (0.06)***	0.15 (0.03)* * *	
Injunctive norms → interreligious attitudes	SLC: 0.57 (2.98) SLM: -7.44 (4.04) TC: 5.91 (2.73)*	3.35 (1.54)*	
Injunctive norms → negative casual contact	-0.13 (0.06)*	-0.05 (0.04)	
Injunctive norms → positive casual contact	-0.27 (0.11)*	-0.11 (0.08)	
Injunctive norms → close contact	0.03 (0.04)	0.05 (0.03)	
Direct effects			
→ Interreligious attitudes			
Neg. casual contact	-2.76 (1.61)	-2.07 (1.56)	
Pos. casual contact	0.93 (0.89)	0.37 (0.86)	
Close contact	2.97 (2.63)	1.66 (2.54)	
Preferences	-5.51 (1.53)***	-4.55 (1.46)**	
Descriptive norms	-2.94 (2.63)	-1.26 (1.55)	
Injunctive norms	SLC: 0.09 (2.98) SLM: -7.92 (4.04)* TC: 5.43 (2.68)*	2.92 (1.55)	
Version answer scale	-1.40 (3.11)	-2.94 (2.98)	

.13 (0.07) 0.12 (0.05)* 0.10 (0.10) 0.25 (0.08)**	0.05 (0.04) 0.12 (0.04)** -0.04 (0.04) -0.08 (0.08) -0.29 (0.07)***
.13 (0.07) 0.12 (0.05)* 0.10 (0.10) 0.25 (0.08)**	0.12 (0.04)** -0.04 (0.04) -0.08 (0.08)
.13 (0.07) 0.12 (0.05)* 0.10 (0.10) 0.25 (0.08)**	0.12 (0.04)** -0.04 (0.04) -0.08 (0.08)
0.12 (0.05)* 0.10 (0.10) 0.25 (0.08)**	-0.04 (0.04) -0.08 (0.08)
0.10 (0.10) 0.25 (0.08)**	-0.08 (0.08)
0.25 (0.08)**	
	-0.29 (0.07)***
	,
	0.19 (0.08)*
0.29 (0.11)**	-0.13 (0.08)
	0.25 (0.16)
0.08 (0.03)*	-0.10 (0.03)***
	0.14 (0.03)***
	0.04 (0.03)
0.29 (0.09)***	-0.06 (0.05)
0.06 (0.07)	-0.07 (0.05)
0.18 (0.17)	-0.10 (0.12)
0.23 (0.23)	-0.11 (0.25)
0.24 (0.23)	-0.17 (0.27)
.3).(,4 .0).().2	29 (0.11)** 66 (0.17)* 08 (0.03)* 22 (0.06)*** 92 (0.04) 29 (0.09)*** 96 (0.07) 18 (0.17) 23 (0.23)

Via preferences	1.60 (0.63)*	0.27 (0.24)
Via negative casual contact	-0.30 (0.24)	-0.23 (0.19)
Via positive casual contact	0.46 (0.46)	0.08 (0.18)
Via close contact	1.32 (1.18)	0.25 (0.39)
Injunctive norms → interreligious attitudes		
Via preferences	0.32 (0.38)	0.30 (0.25)
Via neg. casual contact	0.35 (0.25)	0.09 (0.11)
Via pos. casual contact	-0.25 (0.26)	-0.04 (0.10)
Via close contact	0.08 (0.14)	0.08 (0.13)
Descriptive norms → negative casual contact		
Via preferences	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.003)
Descriptive norms → positive casual contact		
Via preferences	0.07 (0.03)*	0.02 (0.01)
Descriptive norms → close contact		
Via preferences	0.02 (0.01)*	0.01 (0.01)
Injunctive norms → negative casual contact		
Via preferences	-0.004 (0.01)	-0.003 (0.004)
Injunctive norms → positive casual contact		
Via preferences	0.01 (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Injunctive norms → close contact		
Via preferences	0.005 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Sequential Indirect Effects		
Descriptive norms → interreligious attitudes		
Via preferences and neg. casual contact	0.05 (0.05)	0.01 (0.01)
Via preferences and pos. casual contact	0.07 (0.07)	0.01 (0.02)
Via preferences and close contact	0.07 (0.07)	0.01 (0.02)

Injunctive norms → interreligious attitudes			
Via preferences and neg. casual contact	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	
Via preferences and pos. casual contact	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	
Via preferences and close contact	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	

Note. $N_{Model\ Friendship} = 464$, thereof 226 Togolese Christians (TC), 86 Sierra Leone Muslims (SLM), 152 Sierra Leone Christians (SLC). $N_{Model\ Marriage} = 522$, thereof 261 TC, 96 SLM, 165 SLC. Positive and negative contact were free to covary with each other and with close contact. Unstandardized coefficients, with standard errors presented within parentheses; *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001