

Supplementary Materials:

Children and adults think truth-seeking should prevail over partisanship

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Supplementary Replication Study

Method

Participants

A total of 498 American adults completed the study online via Prolific. They were required to have at least a 95% prior approval rate. For half of participants (250 of 500), we required that they had previously reported a Democratic political affiliation, while we required that the other 250 participants had previously reported a Republican political affiliation. We excluded 58 of these participants, either for having missing data ($n = 2$), for reporting that their views did not align more with either Democrats or Republicans ($n = 19$), for missing more than one Winograd Schema question—a type of “bot check” (Levesque et al., 2012)—($n = 6$), or for missing more than one comprehension or attention check ($n = 31$).

The final sample consisted of 440 participants (mean age = 44.59; 218 men, 216 women, 3 non-binary individuals, 2 self-described, 1 not disclosed; 370 White, 29 Black or African American, 17 Asian, 16 Hispanic or Latino, 1 American Indian or Alaska Native, 1 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, 4 biracial, 2 not disclosed; 226 Democrat, 214 Republican).

Materials and Procedure

This study used the same materials and methods from Study 1, with a few minor exceptions. First, Study 1, which was conducted after this supplementary study, included a few minor edits to the scenarios to increase clarity (for details, see the materials on the Open Science Framework).¹ In addition to indicating their stance on the issue at hand prior to each vignette,

¹ There was also a small error in the survey design of this supplementary study, which was corrected in Study 1. Specifically, participants who initially saw the scenario about tuition-free college with a Republican protagonist in the first-person condition ($n = 7$) were then assigned to two separate scenarios, whereas participants who initially saw the scenario about corporate carbon tax with a Republican protagonist in the first-person condition ($n = 8$) were not assigned to any additional scenarios. Before data analysis began, we decided to exclude data from the third vignette evaluated by the seven people who were inadvertently assigned to three separate scenarios. Of the eight participants who were inadvertently assigned only one scenario, we decided to analyze the data from the six participants who

participants were also asked seven additional questions about the issue: three related to their factual understanding of the issue (their confidence, their relevant knowledge, and the degree to which they viewed the issue as a factual issue), and four related to their ideological commitment to the issue (the degree to which they viewed issue as a moral issue, the personal importance of the issue, the political divisiveness of the issue, and the riskiness of changing their belief on the issue). All ratings were on a five-point scale ranging from *not at all* to *extremely*.² After each of the four primary questions, participants were prompted to provide an open-ended explanation of their rating in a text box (rather than endorsing the relevance of possible considerations as in Study 1). In place of the Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale from Study 1, we used an 11-item Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale (Baron et al., 2023). For the partisan identity measure, we instead asked “Is your political party affiliation part of your personal identity?”. This study also did not include the six-item ostracism scale, or the questions about whether participants *would* and *should* change their own beliefs in a similar situation.

Results

Overall, the scenarios were rated as believable, with only minimal variance across scenarios (range = 3.53 to 3.84, on a 1–5 scale). Therefore, all scenarios were retained for analyses.

Condition differences

We first investigated whether the Political Match between the participant and the protagonist (Same Political Party vs. Opposing Political Party) and the participant’s Perspective (First-Person vs. Third-Person) influenced evaluations of our four primary questions. To do this, we fit four cumulative link mixed models predicting evaluations for each of the primary questions

answered both of the comprehension/attention checks correctly for this scenario (as they did not meet any of the other exclusion criteria), and we decided to exclude the data from the other two participants who each missed a comprehension check.


² These questions were removed from Study 1 based on length considerations, and because they were not robust predictors in the Supplementary Replication Study.

from the fixed effects of the two condition variables and the random intercepts of Scenario and Participant. We initially included the two-way interactions, but subsequently removed these to examine only main effects, as no significant interaction effects emerged in any of the first three models ($ps > .3$), and only a weak interaction effect emerged for the fourth model, $b = -0.50$, $SE = 0.25$, $p = .042$.

Results for the four primary questions were clearly influenced by the political party of the protagonist, such that participants were especially inclined to endorse truth-seeking tendencies when evaluating a protagonist who was a political outgroup member and relatively more inclined to endorse partisan tendencies when evaluating a protagonist who was a political ingroup member. A significant effect of Political Match emerged for all four questions: Information-Seeking, $b = -0.84$, $SE = 0.16$, $p < .001$; Belief Change, $b = -1.18$, $SE = 0.13$, $p < .001$; Belief Stasis, $b = 1.24$, $SE = 0.13$, $p < .001$; Outgroup Belief Endorsement, $b = -0.79$, $SE = 0.13$, $p < .001$. There was much less of an influence of whether participants were judging *another person* or attempting to *imagine themselves* in the other person's shoes; an effect of Perspective emerged only for the Information-Seeking question, $b = -0.91$, $SE = 0.23$, $p < .001$, such that participants endorsed information-seeking to a greater extent in the third-person condition (all other $ps > .05$). We therefore split the data by Political Match for all comparisons to the midpoint, but we additionally split the data by Perspective only for the Information-Seeking question.

Primary analyses

Even with our focus on politically divisive issues, Figure S1 clearly shows that participants generally endorsed truth-seeking over partisanship. To test whether responses were significantly different from the scale midpoints (for the first three questions, “not bad or good”; for the fourth question, “He/she should say that he/she doesn’t know whether it would be good or bad”), we conducted one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank tests.

**Figure S1**

Responses for the four primary questions in Study 2a, split by Political Match (i.e., whether or not the protagonist belonged to the same political party as the participant). For the first three questions, 1 (dark orange) corresponds to “Very Bad”, 2 (light orange) corresponds to “Sort of Bad”, 3 (gray) corresponds to “Not Bad or Good”, 4 (light green) corresponds to “Sort of Good”, and 5 (dark green) corresponds to “Very Good”. For the final question, the scale ranges from 1 (dark orange), indicating a strong endorsement of the ingroup belief, to 5 (dark green), indicating a strong endorsement of the outgroup belief, with 3 (grey) indicating an expression of uncertainty.

Ratings of Information-Seeking were very positive (i.e., well above the scale midpoint) when there was a Political Mismatch, both for the Third-Person condition (95% above the midpoint), $V = 22,822$, $p < .001$, $r = .90$, and for the First-Person condition (87% above the midpoint), $V = 19,098$, $p < .001$, $r = .84$. This was also true even when there was a Political Match, both for the Third-Person condition (88% above the midpoint), $V = 20,750$, $p < .001$, $r =$

.84, and for the First-Person condition (79% above the midpoint), $V = 15,790$, $p < .001$, $r = .78$.

For Belief Change, participants gave higher-than-chance ratings both when there was a Political Mismatch, $V = 61,195$, $p < .001$, $r = .70$, and when there was a Political Match, $V = 36,026$, $p < .001$, $r = .22$. However, while both tests were significant, participants were much less consistently enthusiastic about belief change among like-minded individuals; only 50% of ratings were above the midpoint for political ingroup members, as compared to 73% of ratings for political outgroup members.

For Belief Stasis, participants gave lower-than-chance ratings when there was a Political Mismatch, $V = 9,671$, $p < .001$, $r = .57$, with 66% of evaluations indicating that it would be bad for a member of the opposing political party to retain their existing beliefs after encountering compelling evidence to the contrary. However, participants' ratings did not differ from the neutral midpoint when there was a Political Match, $V = 26,134$, $p = .488$, $r = .004$; only 38% of ratings indicated that it would be "very bad" or "sort of bad" for a member of one's own political party to retain their existing beliefs after encountering compelling evidence to the contrary, while 28% indicated that this would be neither good nor bad.

For Outgroup Belief Endorsement, participants gave ratings that were higher than the midpoint both when there was a Political Mismatch, $V = 49,942$, $p < .001$, $r = .50$, and when there was a Political Match, $V = 28,587$, $p = .042$, $r = .14$. Although results differed from the midpoint in both conditions, there was a large effect for political outgroup members (63% above the midpoint) and only a weak effect for political ingroup members (44% above the midpoint, with 28% of ratings at the midpoint).

Overall, adults clearly endorsed epistemic tendencies that prioritized truth-seeking over partisanship when those behaviors were favorable towards their own ingroup. They remained somewhat inclined to endorse those tendencies when they involved a shift in belief away from their own ingroup, but endorsement was notably lower in these cases, with much smaller effect sizes.

Explanations of responses

We attempted to code the open-ended responses to examine patterns, but multiple pairs of coders could not establish sufficient reliability, due to the complexity and variability of the responses. We therefore did not proceed to analyze the justification types, but instead noted some overall patterns that were used for the categories employed in Study 1.

Investigation of individual differences

We conducted a factor analysis to reduce the number of the seven questions asked about each issue, before determining the extent to which they predicted the four primary variables.³ A parallel analysis suggested a two-factor solution. This yielded three items related to Understanding of the issues (“How confident are you in your stance on [issue]?”; “How knowledgeable are you about the reasons for and against [issue]?”; “How much is your stance on [issue] informed by the objective facts?”) to load onto one factor explaining 24% of the variance ($\alpha = .86$; loadings ranged from .60 to .90) and four items related to Commitment to the issues (“How much is your stance on [issue] informed by your moral values?”; “How important is [issue] to you?”; “How politically divisive is [issue]?”; “How risky would it be for you to change your stance on [issue]?”) to load onto a second factor explaining 23% of the variance ($\alpha = .71$; loadings ranged from .50 to .81).

We conducted four cumulative link mixed effects models predicting evaluations of each of the primary variables from the fixed effects of Stance (re-coded to indicate the degree to which the participant’s stance on the issue matched the dominant stance of their political ingroup), Issue Commitment, Issue Understanding, Partisan Identity⁴, Intellectual Humility, Actively

³ Although we preregistered including Issue Stance in the factor analysis, it struck us as unlikely to load with the other items (upon further reflection prior to conducting the analyses). Indeed, including it in the factor analysis yields a much less interpretable solution (for which Stance does not load with other items). We therefore decided to remove it from the exploratory factor analysis.

⁴ We inadvertently omitted Partisan Identity from our preregistration, but decided to include it in our analyses as this was our original plan.

Open-Minded Thinking, Social Conservatism, and Economic Conservatism, alongside the fixed effects of Political Match and Perspective and random intercepts for Scenario and Participant. Due to the large number of predictors, we used backward stepwise regression, in which we iteratively eliminated the predictor with the highest p -value until we had systematically removed all non-significant predictors from the model. Results, presented in Table [S1](#), show that Actively Open-Minded Thinking consistently predicted stronger endorsements of prioritizing accuracy, while other predictors were less reliable.

We also conducted exploratory analyses in which we reran the backward stepwise regressions with Political Match as a possible moderator of all other variables (i.e., we entered an interaction term with Political Match for all variables). The results are presented in Table [S2](#).

Table S1

Significant predictors that emerged from the backward stepwise mixed effects models in the Supplementary Replication Study (non-significant predictors were removed from the model), for each of the four primary dependent variables. Random intercepts were included for Scenario and Participant.

Information-Seeking	<i>b</i>	<i>SE(b)</i>	<i>p</i>
Perspective	-0.91	0.21	<.001
Political Match	0.87	0.16	<.001
Issue Commitment	0.25	0.10	.012
Actively Open-Minded Thinking	1.93	0.23	<.001
Belief Change	<i>b</i>	<i>SE(b)</i>	<i>p</i>
Political Match	1.19	0.13	<.001
Issue Understanding	-0.14	0.06	.023
Actively Open-Minded Thinking	0.87	0.14	<.001
Partisan Identity	0.18	0.07	.005
Economic Conservatism	0.08	0.03	.014
Belief Stasis	<i>b</i>	<i>SE(b)</i>	<i>p</i>
Political Match	-1.24	0.13	<.001
Actively Open-Minded Thinking	-0.87	0.13	<.001
Outgroup Belief Endorsement	<i>b</i>	<i>SE(b)</i>	<i>p</i>
Political Match	0.80	0.13	<.001
Actively Open-Minded Thinking	0.68	0.14	<.001
Social Conservatism	0.10	0.03	.001

Table S2

Significant predictors that emerged from the backward stepwise mixed effects models in the Supplementary Replication Study, when Political Match was included as a possible moderator of all variables. Random intercepts were included for Scenario and Participant. In the case of significant interactions, main effects are not included in the Table.

Information-Seeking	<i>b</i>	<i>SE(b)</i>	<i>p</i>
Perspective	-0.91	0.21	<.001
Actively Open-Minded Thinking	1.88	0.23	<.001
Issue Commitment	0.25	0.10	.014
Political Match*Stance	-0.43	0.13	<.001
Belief Change	<i>b</i>	<i>SE(b)</i>	<i>p</i>
Actively Open-Minded Thinking	0.93	0.15	<.001
Issue Understanding	-0.22	0.09	.012
Social Conservatism	0.08	0.04	.038
Political Match*Stance	-1.35	0.11	<.001
Political Match*Issue Commitment	-0.49	0.15	.001
Political Match*Identity	-0.45	0.13	<.001
Belief Stasis	<i>b</i>	<i>SE(b)</i>	<i>p</i>
Issue Understanding	0.18	0.08	.030
Political Match*Stance	1.04	0.11	<.001
Political Match*Issue Commitment	0.47	0.15	.001
Political Match*Actively Open-Minded Thinking	-0.53	0.26	.044
Political Match*Identity	0.37	0.13	.003
Outgroup Belief Endorsement	<i>b</i>	<i>SE(b)</i>	<i>p</i>
Actively Open-Minded Thinking	0.69	0.14	<.001
Social Conservatism	0.11	0.03	.002
Political Match*Stance	-1.05	0.11	<.001
Political Match*Issue Understanding	-0.43	0.13	<.001

Discussion

Our overall effects were influenced by a number of individual differences. Most notably, praise for prioritizing accuracy was especially high among people who self-reported being more open-minded themselves. Although Stance and Partisan Identity were not the strong predictors we had anticipated them to be, exploratory analyses indicated that these effects were moderated by Political Match in some cases.

Supplementary Baseline Study

Method

Participants

A total of 253 American adults completed the study online via Prolific. They were required to have at least a 95% prior approval rate, and could not have participated in the Supplementary Replication Study. For half of participants (125 of 250), we required that they had previously reported a Democratic political affiliation, while we required that the other 125 participants had previously reported a Republican political affiliation. We excluded 57 of these participants, either for reporting that their views did not align more with either Democrats or Republicans ($n = 11$), for missing more than one Winograd Schema question ($n = 11$), or for missing more than one comprehension or attention check ($n = 35$).

The final sample consisted of 196 participants (mean age = 42.45; 87 men, 108 women, 1 non-binary individual; 133 White, 47 Black or African American, 4 Asian, 5 Hispanic or Latino, 1 American Indian or Alaska Native, 6 biracial; 101 Democrat, 95 Republican).

Materials and Procedure

This study mostly used the same materials and methods from the Supplementary Replication Study, with a few exceptions. Most importantly, the final paragraph of each vignette was altered to indicate that no firm conclusions could be drawn on the basis of the evidence on ProCon.org. An example is provided in the main text, and the other paragraphs are accessible on the Open Science Framework.

The comprehension check questions were also changed, such that participants were asked whether or not there was clear knowledge about the impacts of a change to the policy. In all cases, the correct answer was that there is no clear knowledge.

Additionally, the study was streamlined such that participants were not asked the seven issue-related questions from the Supplementary Replication Study, and they were not prompted to provide open-ended explanations for the four primary questions. The only additional measures collected were the 11-item Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale and the demographics questionnaire.

Results

Condition differences

We first investigated whether the Political Match between the participant and the protagonist (Same Political Party vs. Opposing Political Party) and the participant's Perspective (First-Person vs. Third-Person) influenced evaluations of our four primary questions. To do this, we fit four cumulative link mixed models predicting evaluations for each of the primary questions from the fixed effects of the two condition variables and the random intercepts of Scenario and Participant.

Evaluations of Information-Seeking were not significantly predicted by either Political Match, $b = -0.19$, $SE = 0.24$, $p = .443$, or Perspective, $b = -0.75$, $SE = 0.43$, $p = .080$.

A significant effect of Political Match emerged for Belief Change, $b = -1.02$, $SE = 0.19$, $p < .001$; Belief Stasis, $b = 1.24$, $SE = 0.19$, $p < .001$; and Outgroup Belief Endorsement, $b = -0.58$, $SE = 0.20$, $p = .003$, such that participants were more likely to endorse epistemic tendencies that favored their political ingroups' beliefs. There was much less of an influence of whether participants were judging *another person* or attempting to *imagine themselves* in the other person's shoes; an effect of Perspective emerged only for Belief Stasis, $b = 0.46$, $SE = 0.19$, $p = .013$, such that participants endorsed maintaining an existing belief to a greater extent in the first-person condition (all other $ps > .05$). We therefore split the data by Political Match for the Belief Change and Outgroup Belief Endorsement questions, and we additionally split the data by

Perspective only for the Belief Stasis question.


Primary analyses

The uncertainty of the evidence in the Supplementary Baseline Study led participants to respond at the midpoint much more often than in Study 1 or the Supplementary Replication Study. However, as can be seen in Figure S2, participants whose responses diverged from the midpoint did so in ways that demonstrated a partisan bias. To test whether responses were significantly different from the scale midpoints (for the first three questions, “not bad or good”; for the fourth question, “He/she should say that he/she doesn’t know whether it would be good or bad”), we conducted one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank tests.

As in Studies 1 and the Supplementary Replication Study, ratings of Information-Seeking were extremely positive, with 89.54% of responses above the midpoint, $V = 65,978$, $p < .001$, $r = .85$. Although we did not uncover the condition differences we found in the previous studies, the similarity of the overall ratings provide assurance that participants were comparably enthusiastic about seeking additional information. Since the vignettes were identical up to the point at which this question was asked, this serves as a successful replication of the previous findings.

For Belief Change, participants gave higher-than-chance ratings when there was a Political Mismatch, $V = 6,339$, $p < .001$, $r = .39$, and lower-than-chance ratings when there was a Political Match, $V = 2,956$, $p = .015$, $r = .14$. Whereas participants tended to evaluate belief change as being *good* for political outgroup members (48.47% of ratings), they were most likely to evaluate belief change as *bad* among political ingroup members (35.71% of ratings). In both conditions, however, slightly over one-third of participants thought that belief change was neither good nor bad.

For Belief Stasis, when there was a Political Mismatch, participants’ responses were not significantly different from the neutral midpoint in the First-Person condition, $V = 998$, $p = .524$, $r = .10$, but they dipped below the midpoint in the Third-Person condition, with 42.27% of responses indicating that it would be bad for a member of the opposing political party to retain their existing beliefs, $V = 453$, $p = .001$, $r = .33$. On the other hand, participants gave

**Figure S2**

Responses for the four primary questions in the Supplementary Baseline Study, split by Political Match (i.e., whether or not the protagonist belonged to the same political party as the participant). For the first three questions, 1 (dark orange) corresponds to “Very Bad”, 2 (light orange) corresponds to “Sort of Bad”, 3 (gray) corresponds to “Not Bad or Good”, 4 (light green) corresponds to “Sort of Good”, and 5 (dark green) corresponds to “Very Good”. For the final question, the scale ranges from 1 (dark orange), indicating a strong endorsement of the ingroup belief, to 5 (dark green), indicating a strong endorsement of the outgroup belief, with 3 (grey) indicating an expression of uncertainty.

higher-than-chance ratings when there was a Political Match, both in the First-Person condition, with 52.53% of responses above the midpoint, $V = 1,769$, $p < .001$, $r = .55$, and in the Third-Person condition, with 50.52% of responses above the midpoint, $V = 1,572$, $p < .001$, $r = .49$. Therefore, the majority of participants indicated that it would be “sort of good” or “very good” for a member of one’s own political party to retain their existing beliefs, while they were less positive about belief stasis among members of the opposing political party.

For Outgroup Belief Endorsement, most participants endorsed espousing uncertainty (58.67% for political outgroup members and 50.51% for political ingroup members). Participants’ responses were not different from the neutral midpoint when there was a Political Mismatch, $V = 1,333$, $p = .109$, $r = .10$. However, ratings diverged from the midpoint when there was a Political Match, $V = 991$, $p < .001$, $r = .36$, with 36.73% of responses endorsing telling others that the political ingroup belief is true.

Investigation of individual differences

We additionally conducted four cumulative link mixed effects models predicting evaluations of each of the primary variables from the fixed effects of Political Match, Stance (re-coded to indicate the degree to which the participant’s stance on the issue matched the dominant stance of their political ingroup), the interaction between Stance and Political Match, Actively Open-Minded Thinking, Social Conservatism, and Economic Conservatism, alongside random intercepts for Scenario and Participant. Due to the large number of predictors, we used backward stepwise regression, in which we iteratively eliminated the predictor with the highest p -value until we had systematically removed all non-significant predictors from the model. Results, presented in Table S3, show that there was a consistent interaction between Political Match and Stance, such that participants’ own beliefs about the issues exacerbated their partisan tendencies.

Table S3

Significant predictors that emerged from the backward stepwise mixed effects models in the Supplementary Baseline Study (non-significant predictors were removed from the model), for each of the four primary dependent variables. Random intercepts were included for Scenario and Participant.

Information-Seeking	<i>b</i>	<i>SE(b)</i>	<i>p</i>
Political Match*Stance	0.53	0.21	.014
Actively Open-Minded Thinking	2.36	0.53	<.001
Belief Change	<i>b</i>	<i>SE(b)</i>	<i>p</i>
Political Match*Stance	1.07	0.14	<.001
Belief Stasis	<i>b</i>	<i>SE(b)</i>	<i>p</i>
Political Match*Stance	-0.86	0.14	<.001
Economic Conservatism	0.12	0.05	.010
Outgroup Belief Endorsement	<i>b</i>	<i>SE(b)</i>	<i>p</i>
Political Match*Stance	0.85	0.15	<.001

Discussion

This study found that, in the absence of clear indications that an outgroup belief is correct, people are more often neutral about whether others should change or retain their existing beliefs, and they frequently endorse the communication of uncertainty. However, among participants who made valenced evaluations in these cases, they often endorsed partisan biases.

Replicating our other studies, we also found that information-seeking is considered positive even in partisan contexts. Even when evaluating ingroup members, people approve of seeking out additional evidence.

Additional information for Study 1

Method

Participants

Qualtrics implemented quotas for the following demographics to achieve a nationally representative sample: Age (approximately 30% between the ages of 18 and 34, 32% between the ages of 35 and 54, and 38% over the age of 55); Race (approximately 75% White, 13% Black/African-American, 6% Asian or Pacific Islander, 6% American Indian, Alaskan Native, or Other); Ethnicity (approximately 18% Hispanic, 82% Non-Hispanic); Gender (approximately 48% men, 52% women); Education (approximately 65% with no college degree, 35% with a 4-year degree or higher); Political Ideology (approximately 50% Democratic, 50% Republican). They came within 5% of each quota.

Beyond the participants in our final dataset who we excluded from analyses (as described in the main text), 1,429 began but did not complete the study. An additional 890 participants completed the study in less than 8.5 minutes, and those responses were terminated by Qualtrics and not recorded. There were also at least 68 additional participants whose data were inadvertently deleted by the Qualtrics project manager, which were unable to be recovered and restored.

Procedure

The full set of questions that participants were asked for each scenario were as follows. In the First-Person condition, they were additionally asked to put themselves in the character's shoes before each question.

- How good or bad would it be for [protagonist] to want to learn more about [information]? (Options: Very bad, sort of bad, not bad or good, sort of good, very good)
- How good or bad would it be for [protagonist] to start believing [outgroup belief] like [outgroup members] believe? (Options: Very bad, sort of bad, not bad or good, sort of good, very good)

- How good or bad would it be for [protagonist] to keep believing [ingroup belief] like other [ingroup members] believe? (Options: Very bad, sort of bad, not bad or good, sort of good, very good)
- If [another group member] asked [protagonist] [which belief is correct], what should [protagonist] say? (Options: He/she should definitely say that it would be good to [support the policy], He/she should probably say that it would be good to [support the policy], He/she doesn't know whether it would be good or bad to [support the policy], He/she should probably say that it would be bad to [support the policy], He/she should definitely say that it would be bad to [support the policy])

Results

Overall, the scenarios were rated as believable, with only minimal variance across scenarios (range = 3.24 to 3.69, on a 1–5 scale).

Additional information for Study 2

Method

Participants

Because there are not straightforward ways of conducting power analyses for mixed effects models, we used G*Power 3.1 to estimate the sample size required for detecting a medium effect size ($f^2 = .15$) with 95% power, given our preregistered analyses. This power analysis suggested testing a minimum of 153 participants, which we rounded up to 160 participants.

Procedure

After the scenarios, six additional questions were asked to investigate individual differences in accuracy motives, in order to examine whether participants' own epistemic virtues related to their evaluation of others' epistemic virtues. First, in a selective trust task, we provided conflicting testimony about four different issues (about history, science, morality, and taste) from an informant described as knowledgeable and from an informant described as popular, to see which character trait is favored by participants when assessing new information. We then

prompted participants to self-report their own fallibility and openness to diverging points of view, by asking them to rate the extent to which they are more like an intellectually humble person or an intellectually arrogant person across two trials. To supplement children's self-attributions, we additionally asked parents to complete the final two items with regard to their child.

Results

There was very low internal consistency across the four trials in the selective trust task ($\alpha = .30$), and there was low consistency across the two self-attribution trials ($\tau = .22$), so all trials were examined individually. We examined Kendall rank correlations between our four primary questions and each of the six questions in the trust task and in the self-attribution task, separately for each age group. Overall, there were no reliable correlations between the measures of individual differences and the primary questions that were asked of participants, either for children or for adults; across all tests, $\tau_s \leq |.25|$. Overall, given that the individual differences items were not previously validated and did not show strong internal consistency, and given that even modest associations were sporadic and irregular, we do not believe any clear conclusions can be drawn from these analyses.

To explore whether there was evidence of concordances in evaluations within families, we examined whether average responses of parents were correlated with average responses of their children on each of the four primary questions. We did not uncover any significant associations ($\tau_s < .15$, $p_s \geq .2$).

Finally, although this was not preregistered, we examined participants' justifications for their responses. Two coders independently classified responses into single categories ($\kappa = .75$), and disagreements were resolved through discussion. Chi-squared tests indicated that children and adults differed in their patterns of justification for each of the four questions ($p_s \leq .001$). Patterns of justifications are displayed in Figure S3 for Information-Seeking, Figure S4 for Belief Change, Figure S5 for Belief Stasis, and Figure S6 for Outgroup Belief Endorsement.




Figure S3
Proportions of response categories for open-ended justifications of Information Seeking ratings.




Figure S4
Proportions of response categories for open-ended justifications of Belief Change ratings.




Figure S5
Proportions of response categories for open-ended justifications of Belief Stasis ratings.




Figure S6
Proportions of response categories for justifications of Outgroup Belief Endorsement ratings.

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