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Study 1

Supplemental Measures

Managerial Bias

After providing their personal ratings of the candidates, participants provided their perceptions of how positively an actual manager would view the candidate by responding to the item, “How positive do you think an actual manager will feel about hiring [candidate]?” on a 0 (*not at all*) to 100 (*extremely*) slider scale.

To examine whether there was a significant difference in participant’s ratings of candidates compared to how they believed an actual manager would rate the candidates, a continuous outcome variable was computed by subtracting the perceived manager’s rating from that of the participant rating. Higher scores indicate that participants believe managers would underrate the candidate, whereas lower scores indicate that participants believe managers would overrate the candidate.

Favored Qualifications

After ranking the four prospective candidates, participants indicated the relative importance of the four pieces of information given in the qualification profile (i.e., education level, years of experience, resume rating, and screening interview rating; see Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). Participants were instructed that the “most important factor should be at the top as #1” and the “least important factor should be at the bottom as #4”. A binary variable was computed to indicate whether participants favored qualifications that would benefit the White matched candidate (0) or the Black matched candidate (1).

Discrimination Concerns (Replication Checks)

At the end of the survey, participants answered questions about the organization in general. Several items from Dover et al. (2016) were included to assess whether the impact of the Diversity Manipulation replicated past work in this area regarding concerns about discrimination. Perceptions of anti-White discrimination were assessed with the item “I think the company discriminates against White employees.” Perceptions of anti-minority discrimination were assessed with the item “I think the company discriminates against ethnic minority employees.” Concerns about personal discrimination were assessed with the item, “If I was working at (or applying to) the company, I would worry that my race/ethnicity would put me at a disadvantage.” Participants responded to these items on a 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) Likert scale.

Supplementary Results

Discrimination Concerns (Replication Checks). See Table S1 for means of replication checks.

Table S1

Study 1 Means of Replication Checks

Outcome	Mean (SD)	Diversity Manipulation	
		Neutral Condition Mean (SD)	Diversity Condition Mean (SD)
Anti-White Discrimination	2.12 (1.39)	2.01 (1.31)	2.23 (1.46)
Anti-Minority Discrimination	1.94 (1.18)	2.07 (1.23)	1.81 (1.11)
Disadvantaged by Race	2.41 (1.58)	2.19 (1.38)	2.63 (1.73)

Note. **Bolded** values indicate a main effect of the Diversity Manipulation.

As seen in past work, participants in the Diversity (vs. Neutral) Condition were more likely to believe the organization discriminates against White individuals, $F(1, 870) = 5.31, p = .021, \eta_p^2 = .006$, less likely to believe the organization discriminates against minorities, $F(1, 870) = 10.62, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .012$, and more likely to believe their own race would put them at a disadvantage at the organization, $F(1, 870) = 17.07, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .019$. For all outcomes, the

effects of the Diversity Manipulation were present even after controlling for the Hiring Manipulation. See Table S1 for means.

Pre-Hiring Manipulation Outcomes

See Table S2 for means of the supplemental pre-hiring manipulation measures.

Table 2

Study 1 Means for Supplemental Pre-Hiring Manipulation Outcomes

	Diversity Manipulation					
	Mean (SD)		Neutral Condition Mean (SD) / %		Diversity Condition Mean (SD) / %	
	Black Candidate	White Candidate	Black Candidate	White Candidate	Black Candidate	White Candidate
Managerial Bias	1.39 (7.17)	1.06 (7.07)	1.55 (6.79)	0.53 (6.62)	1.24 (7.53)	1.57 (7.44)
Favored Qualifications	48.5%	51.5%	50.2%	49.8%	46.9%	53.1%

Note. **Bolded** values indicate a main effect of the Diversity Manipulation. For “Managerial Over/Underrating” outcome, higher scores indicated perceptions of managerial underrating.

Managerial Bias

A mixed factorial ANOVA indicated a significant Candidate Race x Diversity Manipulation interaction, $F(1, 867) = 4.06$, $p = .044$, $\eta_p^2 = .005$. Pairwise comparisons indicated a significant effect of the Diversity Manipulation, but only for the White candidate, $p = .031$. Participants in the Diversity Condition were more likely than participants in the Neutral Condition to believe the White candidate would be underrated by a manager.

A moderated regression analysis revealed that unlike with participants’ ratings of the candidates, the effect of the Diversity Manipulation on perceived managerial bias did not depend on political orientation, $B = .17$, $\beta = .01$, $SE = .61$, $p = .785$, 95% CI [-1.04, 1.37]. Rather, there were only main effects of both the Diversity Manipulation and Political Orientation. Specifically, higher levels of conservatism were associated with greater perceptions of managerial underrating of the White candidate, $B = 1.25$, $\beta = .15$, $SE = .31$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.65, 1.85]; and participants

in the Diversity (vs. Neutral) Condition reported greater perceptions of managerial underrating of the White candidate, $B = 1.33$, $\beta = .07$, $SE = .66$, $p = .045$, 95% CI [.03, 3.04].


Favored Qualifications

A logistic regression revealed that the Diversity Manipulation did not significantly influence the likelihood of favoring the White candidate's qualifications over the Black candidate's, $X^2(1) = .96$, $p = .327$, $B = -.13$, $SE = .14$, OR = .874, 95% CI [.67, 1.14], Nagelkerke pseudo- $R^2 = .002$.

There was, however, a significant Diversity Manipulation x Political Orientation interaction, $B = -.27$, $\beta = -.09$, $SE = .11$, $p = .017$, OR = .762, 95% CI [-.50, -.05] (see Figure S1). As seen with the previous outcomes, follow-up analyses revealed an effect of political orientation in the Diversity Condition, such that higher conservatism among White participants predicted a 25% increased likelihood of favoring qualifications that benefitted the White candidate, $B = -.23$, $SE = .08$, $p = .006$, OR = .797, 95% CI [-.39, -.07]. There was no effect of political orientation in the Neutral Condition ($p = .569$). Looked at the other way, there was an effect of the Diversity Manipulation among conservatives but not liberals, with conservatives showing a 58% increase in the likelihood of favoring qualifications that benefitted the White candidate in the Diversity (vs. Neutral) Condition, $B = -.46$, $SE = .20$, $p = .019$, OR = .631, 95% CI [-.85, -.08].

Figure S1

Diversity Manipulation x Political Orientation Interaction for Differences in Favored Qualifications



Note. Higher values indicate favoring qualifications that benefit the Black candidate.

Study 2

Supplemental Measures

Supplemental measures used in Study 2 were identical to those used in Study 1.

Supplemental Results

Discrimination Concerns (Replication Checks). See Table S3 for means for the replication checks.

Table S3*Study 2 Means of Replication Checks*

Replication Checks	Mean (SD)	Diversity Manipulation	
		Neutral Condition Mean (SD)	Diversity Condition Mean (SD)
Anti-White Discrimination	2.16 (1.40)	<u>2.11 (1.42)[†]</u>	<u>2.20 (1.38)[†]</u>
White Participants	<i>2.06 (1.30)</i>	<i>1.95 (1.25)</i>	<i>2.16 (1.34)</i>
BIPOC Participants	<i>2.39 (1.59)</i>	<i>2.48 (1.69)</i>	<i>2.30 (1.49)</i>
Anti-Minority Discrimination	2.22 (1.46)	<u>2.39 (1.57)[†]</u>	<u>2.06 (1.32)[†]</u>
White Participants	<i>2.02 (1.29)</i>	<i>2.12 (1.37)</i>	<i>1.93 (1.21)</i>
BIPOC Participants	<i>2.70 (1.71)</i>	<i>2.99 (1.81)</i>	<i>2.39 (1.53)</i>
Disadvantaged by Race	2.58 (1.64)	<u>2.48 (1.60)</u>	<u>2.67 (1.67)</u>
White Participants	<i>2.40 (1.55)</i>	<i>2.16 (1.36)</i>	<i>2.62 (1.68)</i>
BIPOC Participants	<i>3.02 (1.76)</i>	<i>3.21 (1.85)</i>	<i>2.81 (1.64)</i>

Note. **Bolded** values indicate a main effect of the Diversity Manipulation. *Italicized* values indicate an effect of Participant Race. Underlined values indicate a Diversity Manipulation x Participant Race interactive effect. An inequality sign indicates a difference by Diversity Manipulation among White participants or BIPOC participants. [†] $p < .10$.

There was no main effect of the Diversity Manipulation on perceptions of anti-White discrimination, but there was a main effect of Participant Race, $F(1, 878) = 10.52, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .012$, such that BIPOC participants anticipated more anti-White discrimination than White participants. There was also a marginally significant Diversity Manipulation x Participant Race interaction, $F(1, 878) = 3.57, p = .059, \eta_p^2 = .004$. Compared to White participants in the Neutral Condition, White participants in the Diversity Condition were marginally more likely to anticipate anti-White discrimination ($p = .063$). There was no effect of the Diversity Manipulation among BIPOC participants ($p = .294$).

For perceptions of anti-minority discrimination, there was a main effect of the Diversity Manipulation, $F(1, 878) = 14.24, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .016$, such that participants in the Diversity Condition anticipated less anti-minority discrimination than participants in the Neutral Condition. There was also a main effect of Participant Race, $F(1, 878) = 40.05, p < .001, \eta_p^2 =$

.044, with BIPOC participants anticipated significantly more anti-minority discrimination than White participants. Main effect findings were qualified by a marginally significant Diversity Manipulation x Participant Race interaction, $F(1, 878) = 3.55, p = .060, \eta_p^2 = .004$. Specifically, compared to BIPOC participants in the Neutral Condition, BIPOC participants in the Diversity Condition were significantly less likely to anticipate anti-minority discrimination ($p < .001$). This effect of Diversity Condition was smaller and marginal among White participants ($p = .082$).

There was no main effect of the Diversity Manipulation on concerns that a participant's race would put them at a disadvantage at the organization. There was, however, a main effect of Participant Race, $F(1, 878) = 27.42, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .030$, such that BIPOC participants reported higher perceived likelihood of their race putting them at a disadvantage than White participants. This was qualified by a significant Diversity Manipulation x Participant Race interaction, $F(1, 878) = 13.22, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .015$. Pairwise comparisons indicated a significant effect of the Diversity Manipulation among White participants, such that White participants in the Diversity Condition endorsed this statement significantly more than White participants in the Neutral Condition ($p < .001$). The Diversity Manipulation also had an effect among BIPOC participants, though in the opposite direction, with BIPOC participants in the Diversity Condition endorsing this statement significantly less than BIPOC participants in the Neutral Condition ($p = .044$).

For all outcomes, results did not differ after controlling for the Hiring Manipulation. Overall, results for these manipulation and replication checks mirrored findings from Study 1 for White participants. See Table 4 for means.

Pre-Hiring Manipulation Outcomes

See Table S4 for means of the supplemental pre-hiring manipulation measures.

Table S4*Study 2 Means for Supplemental Pre-Hiring Manipulation Outcomes*

			Diversity Manipulation			
Mean (SD)			Neutral Condition Mean (SD) / %		Diversity Condition Mean (SD) / %	
	Black Candidate	White Candidate	Black Candidate	White Candidate	Black Candidate	White Candidate
Managerial Bias						
All Participants	<u>1.26 (7.62)</u>	<u>.52 (7.29)</u>	<u>1.88 (8.22)</u>	<u>-.06 (7.68)</u>	<u>.68 (6.95)</u>	<u>1.08 (6.85)</u>
White Participants	1.53 (7.80)	.93 (7.31)	2.21 (8.49)	.47 (7.72)	.90 (7.06)	1.35 (6.90)
BIPOC Participants	.64 (7.15)	-.47 (7.14)	1.13 (7.57)	-1.25 (7.48)	.10 (6.65)	.37 (6.69)
Favored Qualifications						
All Participants	54.4%	45.6%	55.1%	44.9%	53.7%	46.3%
White Participants	54.3%	45.7%	55.8%	44.2%	53.0%	47.0%
Black Participants	54.4%	45.5%	53.4%	46.6%	55.6%	44.4%

Note. Underlined values indicate a main effect of Candidate Race. **Bolded and underlined** values indicate a Candidate Race x Diversity Manipulation interactive effect. For “Managerial Over/Underrating” outcome, higher scores indicated perceptions of managerial underrating.

Managerial Bias

Similar to Study 1, results of the mixed factorial ANOVA indicated a significant Candidate Race x Diversity Manipulation interaction, $F(1, 878) = 11.01, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .012$. Across Participant Race, participants in the Diversity Condition believed an actual manager would significantly underrate the White candidate more ($p = .020$) and underrate the Black candidate less ($p = .037$) compared to participants in the Neutral Condition. The Candidate Race x Diversity Manipulation x Participant Race interaction was not significant, $F(1, 878) = .10, p = .750, \eta_p^2 = .000$.

A moderated regression analysis indicated a nonsignificant three-way Diversity Manipulation x Political Orientation x Participant Race interaction, $B = -.42, \beta = -.01, SE = 1.38, p = .762, 95\% \text{ CI } [-3.12, 2.29]$. The pattern of findings mirrored Study 1: there was a main effect of the Diversity Manipulation such that both White and BIPOC participants in the Diversity

Condition reported greater perceptions of managerial underrating of the White candidate than in the Neutral Condition, $B = 2.26, \beta = .11, SE = .67, p = .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [.96, 3.57]$. Additionally, there was a main effect of political orientation, $B = .79, \beta = .10, SE = .30, p = .008, 95\% \text{ CI } [.20, 1.37]$, such that conservatives were more likely than liberals to believe the White candidate was underrated, regardless of the Diversity Manipulation or Participant Race.

Favored Qualifications

Results indicated that the Diversity Manipulation did not significantly influence the qualifications participants favored, $X^2(1) = .13, p = .723, B = .09, SE = .25, \text{OR} = 1.09, 95\% \text{ CI } [.67, 1.79]$, Nagelkerke pseudo- $R^2 = .001$. This did not differ depending on Participant Race, $X^2(1) = .46, p = .496, B = -.20, SE = .30, \text{OR} = .816, 95\% \text{ CI } [.45, 1.47]$, Nagelkerke pseudo- $R^2 = .001$. In addition, the three-way Diversity Manipulation x Political Orientation x Participant Race interaction was nonsignificant, $B = .07, SE = .26, p = .799, \text{OR} = 1.07, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.44, .57]$.

Study 3

Supplemental Measures

Supplemental measures used in Study 2 were identical to those used in Studies 1 and 2.

Supplemental Results

Discrimination Concerns (Replication Checks). See Table S5 for means for the replication checks.

Table S5*Study 3 Means of Replication Checks*

Replication Checks	Mean (SD)	Diversity Manipulation	
		Neutral Condition Mean (SD)	Diversity Condition Mean (SD)
Anti-White Discrimination	2.06 (1.32)	<u>1.90 (1.15)</u>	<u>2.21 (1.44)</u>
White Participants	<i>2.14 (1.37)</i>	1.95 (1.16)	< 2.32 (1.51)
Black Participants	<i>1.94 (1.33)</i>	1.95 (1.30)	1.93 (1.36)
Latine Participants	<i>1.84 (1.17)</i>	1.76 (1.11)	1.92 (1.24)
Asian Participants	<i>2.06 (1.16)</i>	1.78 (.97)	< 2.33 (1.27)
Anti-Minority Discrimination	1.96 (1.17)	2.06 (1.21)	1.88 (1.12)
White Participants	<i>1.89 (1.11)</i>	2.00 (1.16)	< 1.79 (1.06)
Black Participants	<i>2.26 (1.39)</i>	2.43 (1.44)	< 2.11 (1.33)
Latine Participants	<i>1.86 (1.13)</i>	1.91 (1.21)	1.82 (1.05)
Asian Participants	<i>2.06 (1.17)</i>	2.06 (1.13)	2.06 (1.13)
Disadvantaged by Race	2.47 (1.59)	<u>2.34 (1.44)</u>	<u>2.60 (1.70)</u>
White Participants	<i>2.38 (1.57)</i>	2.09 (1.24)	< 2.64 (1.78)
Black Participants	<i>2.88 (1.75)</i>	3.02 (1.68)	2.76 (1.81)
Latine Participants	<i>2.29 (1.45)</i>	2.27 (1.46)	2.32 (1.46)
Asian Participants	<i>2.61 (1.52)</i>	2.72 (1.63)	2.51 (1.39)

Note. **Bolded** values indicate a main effect of the Diversity Manipulation. *Italicized* values indicate an effect of Participant Race. Underlined values indicate a Diversity Manipulation x Participant Race interactive effect. An inequality sign indicates a difference by Diversity Manipulation among White, Black, Latine, or Asian participants.

A main effect of the Diversity Manipulation was also found on perceptions of anti-White discrimination, $F(1, 1882) = 13.53, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .007$, such that participants in the Diversity Condition (vs. Neutral Condition) anticipated greater anti-White discrimination. There was also a main effect of Participant Race, $F(3, 1882) = 4.42, p = .004, \eta_p^2 = .007$, with White participants anticipating greater anti-White discrimination compared to Black ($p = .021$) and Latine ($p = .001$), but not Asian ($p = .375$) participants. These main effects were qualified by a significant Diversity Manipulation x Participant Race interaction, $F(3, 1882) = 2.74, p = .042, \eta_p^2 = .004$. Pairwise comparisons indicated a significant effect of the Diversity Manipulation among White ($p < .001$) and Asian ($p < .001$) participants, but not among Black or Latine participants ($ps >$

.325), with White and Asian participants anticipating significantly greater anti-White discrimination in the Diversity (vs. Neutral) Condition.

Results also revealed a main effect of the Diversity Manipulation on perceptions of anti-minority discrimination, $F(1, 1882) = 5.71, p = .017, \eta_p^2 = .003$, such that participants in the Diversity Condition anticipated significantly less anti-minority discrimination than participants in the Neutral Condition. A main effect of Participant Race was also found, $F(3, 1882) = 8.92, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .014$, with Black participants anticipating significantly more anti-minority discrimination compared to White ($p < .001$), Latine ($p < .001$), and Asian ($p = .038$) participants. The Diversity Manipulation x Participant Race interaction was not significant, $F(3, 1882) = 1.00, p = .390, \eta_p^2 = .002$.

Finally, mirroring Study 2, there was no main effect of the Diversity Manipulation on concerns that a participant's race would put them at a disadvantage at the organization ($p = .741$). There was, however, a main effect of Participant Race, $F(3, 1882) = 10.22, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .016$, with Black participants anticipating a significantly greater likelihood of their race putting them at a disadvantage at the organization compared to White ($p < .001$), Latine ($p < .001$), and Asian ($p = .044$) participants. This was qualified by a significant Diversity Manipulation x Participant Race interaction, $F(3, 1882) = 7.91, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .012$. Pairwise comparisons indicated a significant effect of the Diversity Manipulation among White participants ($p < .001$), but not among Black, Latine, or Asian participants ($ps > .158$), with White participants in the Diversity Condition endorsing this statement significantly more than White participants in the Neutral Condition.

For all outcomes, results did not differ after controlling for the Hiring Manipulation.

Overall, results for these manipulation and replication checks mirrored findings from Studies 1 and 2 for White participants.

Pre-Hiring Manipulation Outcomes

See Table S6 for means of the supplemental pre-hiring manipulation measures.

Table S6

Study 3 Means for Supplemental Pre-Hiring Manipulation Outcomes

Mean (SD)			Diversity Manipulation			
			Neutral Condition Mean (SD) / %		Diversity Condition Mean (SD) / %	
	Black Candidate	White Candidate	Black Candidate	White Candidate	Black Candidate	White Candidate
Managerial Bias						
All Participants	1.48 (7.37)	.92 (7.28)	<u>1.36 (6.98)</u>	<u>.83 (7.59)</u>	<u>1.59 (7.74)</u>	<u>1.00 (6.98)</u>
White Participants	1.07 (6.80)	.75 (6.26)	1.06 (6.38)	.79 (6.48)	1.09 (7.19)	.72 (6.05)
Black Participants	2.73 (8.70)	.49 (9.64)	<u>1.93 (7.96)</u>	<u>-.02 (9.74)</u>	<u>3.44 (9.28)</u>	<u>.95 (9.56)</u>
Latine Participants	1.91 (7.82)	1.84 (7.35)	1.77 (8.08)	1.98 (7.93)	2.06 (7.56)	1.69 (6.68)
Asian Participants	1.43 (7.59)	1.19 (8.28)	1.62 (7.12)	.70 (8.96)	1.25 (8.05)	1.68 (7.57)
Favored Qualifications						
All Participants	53.9%	46.1%	52.6%	47.4%	55.3%	44.7%
White Participants	53.9%	46.1%	52.1%	47.9%	55.7%	44.3%
Black Participants	51.6%	48.4%	48.1%	51.9%	54.7%	45.3%
Latine Participants	53.0%	47.0%	48.1%	51.9%	58.3%	41.7%
Asian Participants	57.8%	42.2%	64.5%	35.5%	51.2%	48.8%

Note. Underlined values indicate a main effect of Candidate Race.. Underline and italicized values indicate a Candidate Race x Participant Race effect.

Managerial Bias

Similar to Studies 1 and 2, results of the mixed factorial ANOVA indicated a significant main effect of candidate race, $F(1, 1882) = 7.08, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = .004$, such that participants anticipated greater managerial underrating of the Black (vs. White) candidate. This effect of candidate race depended on Participant Race, $F(3, 1882) = 3.30, p = .019, \eta_p^2 = .005$, with

pairwise comparisons revealing a significant difference in perceived managerial bias toward the White versus Black candidate among Black participants (who anticipated greater managerial underrating of the Black candidate, $p < .001$), but not among the other groups of participants ($ps > .268$). Unlike in Studies 1 and 2, however, the effect of Candidate Race did not depend on the Diversity Manipulation, $F(3, 1882) = .004$, $p = .951$, $\eta_p^2 = .000$. In addition, the Candidate Race x Diversity Manipulation x Participant Race interaction was nonsignificant, $F(3, 1882) = .56$, $p = .644$, $\eta_p^2 = .001$.

Three-way Diversity Manipulation x Political Ideology x Participant Race

Interactions. As in Studies 1 and 2, for analyses exploring the moderating role of political ideology, we computed a difference score of participants' perceptions of managerial bias to simplify analyses. With this difference score, higher levels indicate a stronger belief that an actual manager would underrate the White (vs. Black) candidate. We used the same dummy-coding methods, with White participants serving as the reference group.

Political Orientation. Results indicated a significant effect of political orientation, $B = .73$, $\beta = .09$, $SE = .21$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [.33, 1.13], indicating that among White participants (reference group), higher levels of conservatism predicted significantly greater perceptions of managerial underrating of the White candidate.

The effect of conservatism was qualified by the focal and marginally significant three-way Diversity Manipulation x Political Orientation x Participant Race interaction between White (reference group) and Latine participants, suggesting that differences in perceptions of managerial bias between White and Latine participants was dependent on both the Diversity Manipulation and political orientation, $B = -2.52$, $\beta = -.06$, $SE = 1.47$, $p = .087$, 95% CI [-5.39, .36] (see Figure S2). Follow-up analyses revealed that among White participants, higher levels of


conservatism were associated with greater perceptions of managerial underrating of the White candidate in the Neutral Condition, $B = .68, \beta = .04, SE = .30, p = .024, 95\% CI [.09, 1.26]$, and to a greater extent, in the Diversity Condition, $B = .78, \beta = .04, SE = .28, p = .006, 95\% CI [.23, 1.33]$. Among Latine participants, political orientation was not significantly associated with perceptions of managerial bias in either condition ($ps > .213$).

Looked at the other way, there was a marginally significant effect of the Diversity Manipulation among Latine conservatives, but not White liberals or conservatives, such that Latines in the Diversity (vs. Neutral) Condition reported greater perceptions of managerial underrating of the Black candidate, $B = -3.47, \beta = -.18, SE = 1.89, p = .067, 95\% CI [-7.18, .24]$.

There was no evidence that patterns of results among Black or Asian participants differed significantly from patterns among White participants.

Figure S2

Three-Way Interaction of Diversity Manipulation x Political Orientation x Participant Race for Differences in Perceptions of Managerial Bias



Note. Positive values indicate managerial underrating of White candidate; negative values indicate managerial underrating of Black candidate.

Symbolic Political Ideology. Mirroring the results found with political orientation as a moderator, a significant effect of symbolic conservatism was found, $B = 3.02, \beta = .08, SE = .93,$

$p = .001$, 95% CI [1.20, 4.84], indicating that among White participants (reference group), higher symbolic conservatism predicted significantly greater perceptions of managerial underrating of the White candidate.


The effect of symbolic conservatism was qualified by the focal and marginally significant three-way Diversity Manipulation x Symbolic Political Ideology x Participant Race interaction between White (reference group) and Latine participants, suggesting that differences in perceptions of managerial bias between White and Latine participants was dependent on both the Diversity Manipulation and symbolic conservatism, $B = -10.93$, $\beta = -.05$, $SE = 6.50$, $p = .093$, 95% CI [-23.68, 1.81] (see Figure S3). Follow-up analyses revealed that among White participants, higher symbolic conservatism was associated with marginally greater perceptions of managerial underrating of the White candidate in the Neutral Condition ($B = 2.51$, $\beta = .13$, $SE = 1.37$, $p = .068$, 95% CI [-.19, 5.20]), and significantly greater perceptions of managerial underrating of the White candidate in the Diversity Condition, $B = 3.51$, $\beta = .18$, $SE = 1.25$, $p = .005$, 95% CI [1.05, 5.96]. The effect of symbolic political ideology was not significant for Latines in the Diversity or Neutral Conditions ($ps > .200$).

Looked at the other way, there was an effect of the Diversity Manipulation among Latine symbolic conservatives, but not White symbolic liberals or conservatives, such that Latine conservatives in the Diversity (vs. Neutral) Condition reported greater perceptions of managerial underrating of the Black candidate, $B = -3.30$, $\beta = -.17$, $SE = 1.95$, $p = .091$, 95% CI [-7.13, .53].

There was no evidence that patterns of results for Black or Asian participants differed significantly from patterns for White participants.

Figure S3

Three-Way Interaction of Diversity Manipulation x Symbolic Political Ideology x Participant Race for Differences in Perceptions of Managerial Bias



Note. Positive values indicate managerial underrating of White candidate; negative values indicate managerial underrating of Black candidate.

Economic Operational Political Ideology. Results revealed a significant effect of economic conservatism, $B = .04, \beta = .08, SE = .01, p = .001, 95\% CI [.02, .07]$, indicating that among White participants (reference group), higher economic conservatism predicted greater perceptions of managerial underrating of the White candidate. This did not depend on Participant Race ($ps > .273$) or the Diversity Manipulation ($p = .454$). In addition, there were no significant focal three-way Diversity Manipulation x Economic Operational Political Ideology x Participant Race interactions ($ps > .355$).

Social Operational Political Ideology. Results revealed a significant effect of social conservatism, $B = .04, \beta = .08, SE = .01, p = .003, 95\% CI [.01, .06]$, indicating that among White participants (reference group), higher social conservatism predicted greater perceptions of managerial underrating of the White candidate. This did not depend on Participant Race ($ps > .295$) or the Diversity Manipulation ($p = .346$). In addition, there were no significant focal three-

way Diversity Manipulation x Social Operational Political Ideology x Participant Race interactions ($ps > .255$).

Favored Qualifications

A logistic regression was conducted, specifying Participant Race as an indicator variable and White participants as the reference group. Results revealed a significant Diversity Manipulation x Participant Race interaction, $X^2(3) = 8.19, p = .042$. Specifically, favored qualifications differed significantly by the Diversity Manipulation between White (reference group) and Asian participants, $X^2(1) = .5.75, p = .016, B = -.69, SE = .29, OR = .501, 95\% CI [.29, .88]$. Results did not indicate differences in favored qualification between White (reference group) and Black ($p = .660$) or Latine participants ($p = .342$) that depended on the Diversity Manipulation.

Three-way Diversity Manipulation x Political Ideology x Participant Race Interactions.


Political Orientation. Results revealed marginal significance of the focal three-way Diversity Manipulation x Political Orientation x Participant Race interaction between White (reference group) and Asian participants, $B = .48, SE = .29, OR = 1.61, p = .098, 95\% CI [-.09, 1.04]$ (see Figure S4). Follow-up analyses revealed that among White participants, political orientation was not significantly associated with favored qualifications in the Diversity Condition or Neutral Condition ($ps > .162$). Among Asian participants, higher conservatism predicted a 48% increased likelihood of favoring qualifications that benefitted the White candidate in the Neutral Condition, $B = -.39, SE = .20, OR = .675, p = .049, 95\% CI [-.78, -.003]$, but did not predict favored qualifications in the Diversity Condition ($p = .258$).

Looked at the other way, there was a significant effect of the Diversity Manipulation among Asian liberals ($B = -1.14$, $SE = .38$, $OR = .32$, $p = .003$, 95% CI $[-1.88, -.39]$) and a marginal effect among White conservatives ($B = .28$, $SE = .16$, $OR = 1.33$, $p = .079$, 95% CI $[-.03, .60]$). Asian liberals in the Diversity Condition were 213% more likely to favor qualifications that benefitted the White candidate. Surprisingly, White conservatives in the Diversity Condition were 33% more likely to favor qualifications that benefitted the Black candidate.

There was no evidence that patterns for Latine or Black participants differed significantly from patterns for White participants.

Figure S4

Three-Way Interaction of Diversity Manipulation x Political Orientation x Participant Race for Differences in Favored Qualifications



Note. Higher values indicate favoring qualifications that benefitted the Black candidate.

Symbolic Political Ideology. Results revealed no significance of the focal three-way Diversity Manipulation x Symbolic Political Ideology x Participant Race interactions ($ps > .132$).

Economic Political Operational Ideology. Results revealed no significance of the focal three-way Diversity Manipulation x Economic Political Operational Ideology x Participant Race interactions ($ps > .666$).

Social Political Operational Ideology. Again, results revealed no significance of the focal three-way Diversity Manipulation x Social Political Operational Ideology x Participant Race interactions ($ps > .146$).

Pre-Hiring Manipulation Outcomes: Detailed Results by Symbolic, Economic Operational, and Social Operational Political Ideology

Candidate Ratings

Symbolic Political Ideology – White Reference Group. Results with the measure of symbolic political ideology revealed an almost identical pattern to that of political orientation: a significant effect of symbolic conservatism was found, indicating that higher symbolic conservatism among White participants predicted significantly greater favorability toward the White candidate, $B = -3.75, \beta = -.09, SE = 1.39, p = .007, 95\% CI [-6.48, -1.02]$. Unlike with the political orientation measure, this analysis also revealed a marginally significant Diversity Manipulation x Symbolic Political Ideology interaction, indicating that among White participants, the effect of the Diversity Manipulation depended on Symbolic Political Ideology, $B = -4.99, \beta = -.06, SE = 2.77, p = .071, 95\% CI [-10.41, .43]$.

This was qualified by the focal and significant three-way Diversity Manipulation x Symbolic Political Ideology x Participant Race interaction between White (reference group) and Black participants, $B = 12.65, \beta = .05, SE = 5.65, p = .025, 95\% CI [1.59, 23.72]$ (see Figure 9). Follow-up analyses revealed that among White participants, symbolic conservatism was associated with greater pro-White ratings in the Diversity Condition, $B = -6.20, \beta = -.29, SE =$

2.24, $p = .006$, 95% CI [-10.58, -1.82], but not in the Neutral Condition ($p = .460$). For Black participants, symbolic conservatism was associated with more pro-White ratings in the *Neutral Condition*, $B = -9.04$, $\beta = -.42$, $SE = 3.75$, $p = .016$, 95% CI [-16.39, -1.70], but not in the Diversity Condition ($p = .665$).

Again, there was no evidence that Latine or Asian participants exhibited a significantly different pattern from White participants.

Symbolic Political Ideology – Black Reference Group. Results revealed a significant effect of the Diversity Manipulation, $B = 3.11$, $\beta = .14$, $SE = 1.22$, $p = .011$, 95% CI [.71, 5.51], indicating that pro-diversity messaging among Black participants was associated with significantly greater favorability toward the Black candidate. Additionally, a significant effect of symbolic conservatism, $B = -5.13$, $\beta = -.12$, $SE = 2.45$, $p = .036$, 95% CI [-9.94, -.33], indicated that higher symbolic conservatism among Black participants (reference group) was associated with significantly greater favorability toward the White candidate. Aside from the focal and significant three-way Diversity Manipulation x Symbolic Political Ideology x Participant Race interaction between Black (reference group) and White participants, there were no significant 3-way interactions. This lack of significant 3-way interactions comparing Black participants (reference group) to Asian and Latine participants suggests that the interactive effect of symbolic political ideology and the Diversity Manipulation did not differ significantly between Black and Asian or Black and Latine participants.

Economic Operational Political Ideology – White Reference Group. When looking at economic operational political ideology as a moderator, results indicated a marginally significant effect of economic operational political ideology, $B = -.04$, $\beta = -.06$, $SE = .02$, $p = .095$, 95% CI [-.08, .01], with higher economic conservatism among White participants predicting marginally

greater favorability toward the White candidate. Results also indicated a marginally significant Diversity Manipulation x Participant Race interaction between White (reference group) and Black participants, $B = 3.01, \beta = .05, SE = 1.65, p = .069, 95\% CI [-.23, 6.25]$; and a significant Diversity Manipulation x Economic Operational Political Ideology interaction, $B = -.08, \beta = -.07, SE = .04, p = .049, 95\% CI [-.16, .00]$, indicating that for White participants, the effect of the Diversity Manipulation depended on economic conservatism.

This was qualified by the focal and significant three-way Diversity Manipulation x Economic Operational Political Ideology x Participant Race interaction between White (reference group) and Black participants, $B = .28, \beta = .07, SE = .12, p = .024, 95\% CI [.04, .52]$ (see Figure 10). Follow-up analyses revealed that among White participants, higher economic conservatism was associated with more favorable pro-White ratings in the Diversity Condition, $B = -.08, \beta = -.003, SE = .04, p = .031, 95\% CI [-.14, -.01]$, but not in the Neutral Condition ($p = .767$). For Black participants, economic conservatism was not significantly associated with candidate ratings in either the Neutral or Diversity Conditions ($ps > .187$); however, an effect of the Diversity Manipulation was found among economically conservative (and not liberal) Black participants, such that the presence of pro-diversity messaging predicted greater favorability toward the Black candidate, $B = 8.93, \beta = .36, SE = 3.37, p = .008, 95\% CI [2.31, 15.54]$.

As before, there was no evidence that patterns among Asian or Latine participants differed significantly from patterns among White participants.

Economic Operational Political Ideology – Black Reference Group. Results revealed a significant effect of the Diversity Manipulation, $B = 4.02, \beta = .18, SE = 1.51, p = .008, 95\% CI [1.07, 6.98]$, indicating that the presence of pro-diversity messaging among Black participants was associated with significantly greater favorability toward the Black candidate. This analysis

also revealed a marginally significant Diversity Manipulation x Economic Operational Political Ideology interaction, indicating that among Black participants, the effect of the Diversity Manipulation depended on economic conservatism, $B = .20, \beta = .17, SE = .12, p = .090, 95\% CI [-.03, .43]$. Aside from the focal and significant three-way Diversity Manipulation x Economic Operational Political Ideology x Participant Race interaction between Black (reference group) and White participants discussed above, there were no other significant 3-way interactions. This, again, indicates that the interactive effect of economic operational political ideology and the Diversity Manipulation did not differ significantly between Black and Asian or Black and Latine participants.

Social Operational Political Ideology – White Reference Group. As with the previous operationalizations of political ideology, results indicated a significant effect of social operational political ideology, $B = -.06, \beta = -.10, SE = .02, p = .002, 95\% CI [-.09, -.02]$, with higher levels of social conservatism among White participants predicting higher favorability toward the White candidate. This was qualified by the focal and marginally significant three-way Diversity Manipulation x Social Operational Political Ideology x Participant Race interaction between White (reference group) and Black participants, indicating that differences in candidate ratings between Black and White participants were dependent on both the Diversity Manipulation and social conservatism, $B = .15, \beta = .04, SE = .08, p = .068, 95\% CI [-.01, .30]$ (see Figure 11).

Follow-up analyses revealed that among White participants, higher social conservatism was associated with more favorable pro-White ratings in the Diversity Condition, $B = -.09, \beta = -.004, SE = .03, p = .001, 95\% CI [-.15, -.04]$, but not in the Neutral Condition ($p = .507$). For Black participants, social conservatism was marginally associated with more favorable pro-

White ratings in the *Neutral Condition*, $B = -.09$, $\beta = -.004$, $SE = .05$, $p = .087$, 95% CI $[-.19, -.01]$, but not in the Diversity Condition ($p = .670$).

Again, there was no evidence that patterns among Asian or Latine participants differed significantly from patterns among White participants.

Social Operational Political Ideology – Black Reference Group. Results revealed a significant effect of the Diversity Manipulation, $B = 2.87$, $\beta = .13$, $SE = 1.21$, $p = .018$, 95% CI $[.50, 5.24]$, indicating that the presence of pro-diversity messaging among Black participants was associated with significantly greater favorability toward the Black candidate. Aside from the focal and significant three-way Diversity Manipulation x Social Operational Political Ideology x Participant Race interaction between Black (reference group) and White participants discussed above, there were no other significant 3-way interactions. This, again, indicates that the interactive effect of social operational political ideology and the Diversity Manipulation did not differ significantly between Black and Asian or Black and Latine participants.

Candidate Ranking

Symbolic Political Ideology – White Reference Group. Results revealed a significant effect of symbolic political ideology, $B = -.83$, $SE = .23$, $OR = .438$, $p < .001$, 95% CI $[-1.27, -.39]$, with a 1SD increase in symbolic conservatism among White participants predicting a 128% increased likelihood of ranking the White candidate over the Black candidate. A significant Diversity Manipulation x Symbolic Political Ideology interaction was also found, $B = -.92$, $SE = .45$, $OR = .400$, $p = .040$, 95% CI $[-1.80, -.03]$, such that among White participants (reference group), the effect of symbolic conservatism depended on the Diversity Manipulation.

These findings were qualified by the focal and marginally significant three-way Diversity Manipulation x Symbolic Political Ideology x Participant Race interaction between White

(reference group) and Black participants, $B = 2.19$, $SE = 1.12$, $OR = 8.96$, $p = .051$, 95% CI [- .01, 4.40] (see Figure 13). Follow-up analyses revealed that among White participants, a 1SD increase in symbolic conservatism was associated with a 257% increased likelihood of ranking the White candidate over the Black candidate in the Diversity Condition, $B = -1.28$, $SE = .31$, $OR = .280$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-1.89, -.66], but was not associated with candidate ranking in the Neutral Condition ($p = .266$). For Black participants, a 1SD increase in symbolic conservatism was associated with a 403% increased likelihood of ranking the White candidate over the Black candidate in the Neutral Condition, $B = -1.61$, $SE = .80$, $OR = .199$, $p = .041$, 95% CI [-3.16, -.07], but was not associated with candidate rankings in the Diversity Condition ($p = .611$).

There was no evidence that patterns for Asian or Latine participants differed significantly from patterns for White (reference group) participants.

Symbolic Political Ideology – Black Reference Group. Results revealed a marginally significant effect of symbolic political ideology, $B = -.96$, $SE = .51$, $OR = .382$, $p = .061$, 95% CI [-1.97, .04], with a 1SD increase in symbolic conservatism among Black participants predicting a 162% greater likelihood of ranking the White candidate over the Black candidate. In addition to the marginally significant focal three-way Diversity Manipulation x Symbolic Political Ideology x Participant Race interaction between Black (reference group) and White participants discussed above, there was a significant three-way interaction between Black (reference group) and Latine participants, $B = -3.42$, $SE = 1.46$, $OR = .033$, $p = .019$, 95% CI [-6.28, -.56].

Follow-up analyses indicated that a 1SD increase in symbolic conservatism among Latine participants was associated with a 301% increased likelihood of ranking the Black candidate over the White candidate in the *Neutral Condition*, $B = 1.39$, $SE = .70$, $OR = 4.01$, $p = .046$, 95%

CI [.03, 2.75], but was not associated with candidate ranking in the Diversity Condition ($p = .323$).

There was no evidence that patterns for Asian participants differed significantly from patterns for Black (reference group) participants.

Economic Operational Political Ideology – White Reference Group. Results revealed a significant effect of economic operational political ideology, $B = -.01$, $SE = .003$, $OR = .988$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.02, -.01], with a 1SD increase in economic conservatism among White participants predicting a 1% increased likelihood of ranking the White candidate over the Black candidate. This effect of economic conservatism was marginally dependent on the Diversity Manipulation, $B = -.01$, $SE = .01$, $OR = .989$, $p = .085$, 95% CI [-.02, .001]. These findings were qualified by the focal and significant three-way Diversity Manipulation x Economic Operational Political Ideology x Participant Race interaction between White (reference group) and Black participants ($B = .05$, $SE = .02$, $OR = 1.05$, $p = .029$, 95% CI [.01, .10]) and a marginally significant three-way interaction when comparing White (reference group) and Asian participants, $B = .03$, $SE = .02$, $OR = 1.03$, $p = .088$, 95% CI [-.004, .07] (see Figure 14).

Follow-up analyses revealed that among White participants, a 1SD increase in economic conservatism was associated with a 2% increased likelihood of ranking the White candidate over the Black candidate in the Diversity Condition, $B = -.02$, $SE = .004$, $OR = .983$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.03, -.01], but was not associated with candidate rankings in the Neutral Condition ($p = .137$). A 1SD increase in economic conservatism was associated with a respective 5% and 2% increased likelihood of ranking the White candidate over the Black candidate among Black ($B = -.05$, $SE = .02$, $OR = .954$, $p = .014$, 95% CI [-.09, -.01]) and Asian ($B = -.02$, $SE = .01$, $OR = .976$, $p =$

.047, 95% CI [-.05, .00]) participants in the *Neutral Condition*. This effect was not found in Diversity Condition among Black ($p = .541$) or Asian ($p = .809$) participants.

There was no evidence that the pattern of results for Latine participants differed significantly from the pattern for White (reference group) participants.

Economic Operational Political Ideology – Black Reference Group. Results revealed a marginally significant effect of the Diversity Manipulation, $B = .51$, $SE = .27$, $OR = 1.66$, $p = .061$, 95% CI [-.02, 1.04], indicating that the presence of pro-diversity messaging among Black participants was associated with a 66% increased likelihood of ranking the Black candidate over the White candidate. There was also a significant main effect of economic operational political ideology, $B = -.03$, $SE = .01$, $OR = .973$, $p = .016$, 95% CI [-.05, -.01], indicating that a 1SD increase in economic conservatism among Black participants predicted a 3% greater likelihood of ranking the White candidate over the Black candidate. The effect of economic conservatism was marginally dependent on the Diversity Manipulation, $B = .04$, $SE = .02$, $OR = 1.04$, $p = .074$, 95% CI [-.004, .09].

These were qualified by the significant focal three-way Diversity Manipulation x Economic Operational Political Ideology x Participant Race interaction between Black (reference group) and White participants discussed above, and a significant interaction between Black (reference group) and Latine participants, $B = -.06$, $SE = .03$, $OR = .942$, $p = .025$, 95% CI [-.11, -.01]. Follow-up analyses for Latine participants did not indicate an effect of economic conservatism on candidate rankings in either the Neutral or Diversity Conditions ($ps > .143$); however, a marginal effect of the Diversity Manipulation was found among economically conservative (and not liberal) Latine participants, such that the presence of pro-diversity messaging among economically conservative Latine participants predicted a 92% increased

likelihood of ranking the White candidate over the Black candidate, $B = -.65$, $SE = .39$, $OR = .520$, $p = .092$, 95% CI [-1.41, .11].

There was no evidence that the pattern of results for Asian participants differed significantly from the pattern for Black (reference group) participants.

Social Operational Political Ideology – White Reference Group. Results revealed a significant effect of social operational political ideology, $B = -.01$, $SE = .003$, $OR = .988$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [-.02, -.01], with a 1SD increase in social conservatism among White participants predicting a 1% increased likelihood of ranking the White candidate over the Black candidate. There were no significant focal three-way Diversity Manipulation x Social Operational Political Ideology x Participant Race interactions ($ps > .109$).

Social Operational Political Ideology – Black Reference Group. Results revealed a significant three-way Diversity Manipulation x Social Operational Political Ideology x Participant Race interactions when comparing Black participants (reference group) to Latine participants, $B = -.05$, $SE = .02$, $OR = .956$, $p = .023$, 95% CI [-.09, -.01] (see Figure 15). Follow-up analyses revealed no simple effects of social conservatism among Black participants in either the Diversity ($p = .692$) or Neutral Condition ($p = .135$). There were also no simple effects of the Diversity Manipulation among Black participants ($ps > .130$).

Among Latine participants, a 1SD increase in social conservatism was associated with a 2% increased likelihood of ranking the Black candidate over the White candidate in the *Neutral Condition*, $B = .02$, $SE = .01$, $OR = 1.02$, $p = .009$, 95% CI [.01, .04]. Social conservatism was not associated with candidate ranking in the Diversity Condition ($p = .366$).

There was no evidence that the pattern of results for White or Asian participants differed significantly from the pattern for Black (reference group) participants.

Post-Hiring Manipulation Outcomes: Detailed Results by Symbolic, Economic Operational, and Social Operational Political Ideology

Symbolic Political Ideology – White Reference Group. Results indicated a significant Diversity Manipulation x Hiring Manipulation x Symbolic Political Ideology interaction, $B = -1.23, \beta = -.07, SE = .54, p = .022, 95\% \text{ CI } [-2.28, -.18]$, suggesting that among White participants (reference group), the effect of both the Diversity and Hiring Manipulations depended on symbolic political ideology. Follow-up analyses revealed that higher levels of symbolic conservatism among White participants who learned the White candidate was hired were associated with significantly higher perceptions of fairness in the Diversity Condition, $B = .79, \beta = .35, SE = .29, p = .006, 95\% \text{ CI } [.22, 1.36]$, but not in the Neutral Condition ($p = .625$). Conversely, when White participants learned that the Black candidate was hired, higher symbolic conservatism was associated with significantly lower perceptions of fairness in the Diversity Condition, $B = -.95, \beta = -.43, SE = .26, p < .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [-1.45, -.44]$, but not in the Neutral Condition ($p = .101$).

Results indicated no evidence of significance of the focal four-way Diversity Manipulation x Hiring Manipulation x Symbolic Political Ideology x Participant Race interactions, which suggests that there are no significant differences in perceptions of fairness of the hiring decision when comparing Black ($p = .257$), Latine ($p = .874$), and Asian ($p = .377$) participants to White (reference group) participants.

Symbolic Political Ideology – Black Reference Group. Results indicated no evidence of significance of the focal four-way Diversity Manipulation x Hiring Manipulation x Symbolic Political Ideology x Participant Race interactions, which suggests that there were no significant

differences in perceptions of fairness of the hiring decision when comparing White ($p = .257$), Latine ($p = .316$), and Asian ($p = .868$) participants to Black (reference group) participants.

Economic Political Operational Ideology – White Reference Group. Results indicated a significant Diversity Manipulation x Hiring Manipulation x Economic Political Operational Ideology, $B = -.02, \beta = -.08, SE = .01, p = .009, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.03, -.01]$, suggesting that among White participants (reference group), the effect of the Diversity and Hiring Manipulations depended on economic conservatism.

Follow-up analyses revealed that among White participants who learned that the White candidate was hired, economic conservatism was associated with significantly higher perceptions of fairness in the Diversity Condition, $B = .01, \beta = .01, SE = .004, p = .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [.01, .02]$, but not in the Neutral Condition ($p = .532$). When White participants learned that the Black candidate was hired, economic conservatism was associated with significantly lower perceptions of fairness in the Diversity Condition, $B = -.01, \beta = -.004, SE = .003, p = .001, 95\% \text{ CI } [-.02, -.01]$, but not in the Neutral Condition ($p = .207$).

Results indicated no evidence of significance of the focal four-way Diversity Manipulation x Hiring Manipulation x Economic Political Operational Ideology x Participant Race interactions, which suggests that there were no significant differences in perceptions of fairness of the hiring decision when comparing Black ($p = .230$), Latine ($p = .980$), and Asian ($p = .251$) participants to White (reference group) participants.

Economic Political Operational Ideology – Black Reference Group. Results indicated no evidence of significance of the focal four-way Diversity Manipulation x Hiring Manipulation x Economic Political Operational Ideology x Participant Race interactions, which suggests that there were no significant differences in perceptions of fairness of the hiring decision when

comparing White ($p = .230$), Latine ($p = .297$), and Asian ($p = .831$) participants to Black (reference group) participants.

Social Political Operational Ideology – White Reference Group. Results indicated a marginally significant Diversity Manipulation x Hiring Manipulation x Social Political Operational Ideology, $B = -.01, \beta = -.05, SE = .01, p = .093$, 95% CI $[-.03, .002]$, suggesting that among White participants (reference group), the effect of the Diversity and Hiring Manipulations depended on social conservatism. Follow-up analyses indicated that social conservatism among White participants who learned of the White candidate's hiring predicted significantly higher perceptions of fairness when in the Diversity Condition, $B = .01, \beta = .004, SE = .004, p = .002$, 95% CI $[.004, .02]$, but not in Neutral Condition ($p = .185$). Conversely, when White participants learned that the Black candidate was hired, higher social conservatism was associated with significantly lower perceptions of fairness both in the *Neutral Condition*, $B = -.007, \beta = -.002, SE = .003, p = .029$, 95% CI $[-.01, -.001]$, and to a greater extent, in the Diversity Condition, $B = -.012, \beta = -.004, SE = .003, p < .001$, 95% CI $[-.02, -.01]$.

This finding was qualified by the focal and significant four-way Diversity Manipulation x Hiring Manipulation x Social Political Operational Ideology x Participant Race interaction between White (reference group) and Asian participants, suggesting that differences in perceptions of fairness between White and Asian participants was dependent on the Diversity Manipulation, the Hiring Manipulation, and social political operational ideology, $B = .05, \beta = .07, SE = .02, p = .006$, 95% CI $[.01, .08]$ (see Figure 16). Aside from the effects for White participants described above, follow-up analyses revealed that among Asian participants who learned that the White candidate was hired, higher social conservatism was associated with marginally higher perceptions of fairness in the *Neutral Condition*, $B = .02, \beta = .01, SE = .01, p =$

.087, 95% CI [-.002, .03], but not in the Diversity Condition ($p = .392$). When Asian participants were told that the Black candidate was hired, social conservatism was associated with marginally lower perceptions of fairness in the *Neutral Condition*, $B = -.01$, $\beta = -.004$, $SE = .01$, $p = .096$, 95% CI [-.02, .002], but not in the Diversity Condition ($p = .615$).

There was no evidence that the pattern of results for Black or Latine participants differed significantly from the pattern for White (reference group) participants.

Social Political Operational Ideology – Black Reference Group. Results indicated a marginally significant four-way Diversity Manipulation x Hiring Manipulation x Social Political Operational Ideology x Participant Race interaction between Black (reference group) and Asian participants, suggesting that differences in perceptions of fairness between Asian and Black participants were dependent on both the Diversity Manipulation and social conservatism, $B = .05$, $\beta = .06$, $SE = .02$, $p = .056$, 95% CI [-.001, .09].

Aside from the effects for White and Asian participants described above, follow-up analyses did not reveal an effect of social conservatism ($ps > .742$) or the Diversity Manipulation for Black participants ($ps > .130$).

There was no evidence that the pattern of results for White or Latine participants differed significantly from the pattern for Black (reference group) participants.