**Supplemental Materials**

**What Inverted U Can Do for Your Country: A Curvilinear Relationship Between Confidence in the Social System and Political Engagement**

**by A. Cichocka et al., 2017, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology***

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Table S1

*Results of an Ordered Logistic Regression Predicting Voting Intentions (Study 1)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | | Model 2 | | | Model 3 | |
| Predictor variable | *B* | 95% CI | *B* |  | 95% CI | *B* | 95% CI |
| System confidence | 0.28\*\*\* | [0.14, 0.41] | 0.33\*\*\* | | [0.18, 0.48] | 0.32\*\*\* | [0.16, 0.47] |
| System confidence2 |  |  | -0.09 | | [-0.20, 0.03] | -0.08 | [-0.20, 0.04] |
| Gender |  |  |  | |  | -0.28\* | [-0.53, -0.04] |
| Age |  |  |  | |  | 1.56\*\*\* | [0.80, 2.33] |
| Education |  |  |  | |  | 0.14\*\*\* | [0.09, 0.18] |
| Political conservatism |  |  |  | |  | 0.23\*\*\* | [0.12, 0.34] |
| Thresholds |  |  |  | |  |  |  |
| Cut 1 | -1.14\*\*\* | [-1.28, -0.99] | -1.21\*\*\* | | [-1.39, -1.03] | -1.30\*\*\* | [-1.48, -1.11] |
| Cut2 | 0.04 | [-0.09, 0.17] | -0.03 | | [-0.19, 0.13] | -0.05 | [-0.22, 0.11] |
| Nagelkerke’s *R2* | .02 | | .02 | | | .10 | |
| -2 log-likelihood | 157.11 | | 154.93 | | | 1877.91 | |
| Parallel slopes assumption test | χ2(1) = 5.78\* | | χ2(2) = 14.74\*\*\* | | | χ2(6) = 31.75\*\*\* | |

*Note*. All continuous predictors were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Gender coded -0.5 for men and 0.5 for women. Age divided by 100.

\* *p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S2

*Results of a Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Voting Intentions with Adjustment Variables (Study 1)*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Group and predictor variable | *B* | *OR* | *OR* 95% CI |
| I don’t know |  |  |  |
| Intercept | 0.38 |  |  |
| System confidence | 0.52\*\*\* | 1.67 | [1.33, 2.11] |
| System confidence2 | -0.33\*\*\* | 0.72 | [0.60, 0.87] |
| Gender | 0.10 | 1.10 | [0.76, 1.59] |
| Age | -1.10† | 0.33 | [0.11, 1.05] |
| Education | 0.01 | 1.01 | [0.95, 1.08] |
| Political conservatism | 0.14 | 1.15 | [0.97, 1.36] |
| I would participate |  |  |  |
| Intercept | 0.91\*\*\* |  |  |
| System confidence | 0.48\*\*\* | 1.62 | [1.32, 1.99] |
| System confidence2 | -0.17\* | 0.85 | [0.73, 0.99] |
| Gender | -0.30† | 0.74 | [0.53, 1.03] |
| Age | 1.51\*\* | 4.54 | [1.61, 12.79] |
| Education | 0.16\*\*\* | 1.17 | [1.11, 1.24] |
| Political conservatism | 0.28\*\*\* | 1.32 | [1.14, 1.53] |
| Nagelkerke’s *R2* | .13 | | |
| -2 log-likelihood | 1848.76 | | |

*Note*. DV’s category of reference = “I would not participate”. System confidence, age, education and political conservatism were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Gender coded -0.5 for men and 0.5 for women. Age divided by 100.


† *p* < .10. \* *p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S3

*Results of a Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Voting Intentions for Law and Justice (Challenger) and Civic Platform (Incumbent) with Adjustment Variables (Study 1)*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Group and predictor variable | *B* | *OR* | *OR* 95% CI |
| I don’t know |  |  |  |
| Intercept | 0.40\*\* |  |  |
| System confidence | 0.52\*\*\* | 1.68 | [1.33, 2.13] |
| System confidence2 | -0.34\*\*\* | 0.71 | [0.59, 0.86] |
| Gender | 0.10 | 1.10 | [0.76, 1.60] |
| Age | -1.06† | 0.35 | [0.11, 1.08] |
| Education | 0.02 | 1.02 | [0.96, 1.09] |
| Political conservatism | 0.17+ | 1.19 | [0.98, 1.45] |
| Challenger |  |  |  |
| Intercept | -1.20\*\*\* |  |  |
| System confidence | 0.28 | 1.32 | [0.92, 1.88] |
| System confidence2 | -0.29+ | 0.75 | [0.56, 1.00] |
| Gender | -0.27 | 0.76 | [0.44, 1.33] |
| Age | 2.07\* | 7.96 | [1.38, 45.89] |
| Education | 0.13\*\* | 1.14 | [1.04, 1.25] |
| Political conservatism | 1.11\*\*\* | 3.05 | [2.38, 3.90] |
| Incumbent |  |  |  |
| Intercept | -.13 |  |  |
| System confidence | 0.74\*\*\* | 2.09 | [1.58, 2.75] |
| System confidence2 | -0.24\* | 0.79 | [0.65, 0.95] |
| Gender | -0.49\* | 0.61 | [0.40, 0.94] |
| Age | 1.14† | 3.12 | [0.85, 11.48] |
| Education | 0.22\*\*\* | 1.24 | [1.15, 1.33] |
| Political conservatism | 0.37\*\*\* | 1.45 | [1.17, 1.81] |
| Nagelkerke’s *R2* | .28 | | |
| -2 log-likelihood | 1716.02 | | |

*Note*. DV’s category of reference = “I would not participate”. System confidence, age, education and political conservatism were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Gender coded -0.5 for men and 0.5 for women. Age divided by 100. † *p* < .10. \* *p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

**


*Figure S1.* Voting intentions (odds of responding “I don’t know” / voting for a challenger (Law and Justice)/incumbent (Civic Platform) political party relative to responding “I would not participate” with respect to upcoming elections) as a function of system confidence (Study 1).

Table S4

*Results of a Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Voting Intentions for Challenging and Incumbent Parties with Adjustment Variables (Study 1)*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Group and predictor variable | *B* | *OR* | *OR* 95% CI |
| I don’t know |  |  |  |
| Intercept | 0.39\*\* |  |  |
| System confidence | 0.52\*\*\* | 1.69 | [1.34, 2.13] |
| System confidence2 | -0.33\*\*\* | 0.72 | [0.59, 0.87] |
| Gender | 0.10 | 1.11 | [0.76, 1.60] |
| Age | -1.08† | 0.34 | [0.11, 1.06] |
| Education | 0.02 | 1.02 | [0.96, 1.09] |
| Political conservatism | 0.13 | 1.13 | [0.96, 1.34] |
| Challenger parties |  |  |  |
| Intercept | -0.20 |  |  |
| System confidence | 0.29\* | 1.33 | [1.03, 1.73] |
| System confidence2 | -0.15 | 0.86 | [0.71, 1.05] |
| Gender | -0.32 | 0.72 | [0.48, 1.10] |
| Age | 2.45\*\*\* | 11.55 | [3.19, 41.84] |
| Education | 0.18\*\*\* | 1.20 | [1.12, 1.29] |
| Political conservatism | 0.32\*\*\* | 1.37 | [1.15, 1.63] |
| Incumbent parties |  |  |  |
| Intercept | -.001 |  |  |
| System confidence | 0.77\*\*\* | 2.15 | [1.65, 2.80] |
| System confidence2 | -0.23\* | 0.80 | [0.66, 0.95] |
| Gender | -0.56\*\* | 0.57 | [0.38, 0.86] |
| Age | 1.17† | 3.23 | [0.94, 11.14] |
| Education | 0.19\*\*\* | 1.21 | [1.13, 1.30] |
| Political conservatism | 0.25\*\* | 1.29 | [1.08, 1.53] |
| Nagelkerke’s *R2* | .18 | | |
| -2 log-likelihood | 2137.34 | | |

*Note*. DV’s category of reference = “I would not participate”. System confidence, age, education and political conservatism were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Gender coded -0.5 for men and 0.5 for women. Age divided by 100. † *p* < .10. \* *p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

**

*Figure S2.* Voting intentions (odds of responding “I don’t know” / voting for challenger/incumbent political parties relative to responding “I would not participate” with respect to upcoming elections) as a function of system confidence (Study 1).

Table S5

*Results of Linear Regression Predicting Solidarity-Based Collective Action without Adjusting for Attitudes toward the Out-group (Study 2)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | | | Model 2 | | |
| Predictor variable | *B* | β | *B* 95% CI | *B* | β | *B* 95% CI |
| Intercept | 3.66\*\*\* |  | [3.53, 3.79] | 3.72\*\*\* |  | [3.55, 3.88] |
| System confidence | -0.01 | -.01 | [-0.11, 0.09] | -0.02 | -.01 | [-0.12, 0.08] |
| System confidence2 |  |  |  | -0.03 | -.04 | [-0.08, 0.02] |
| *R2* | .00 | | | .002 | | |
| *F* | *F*(1, 929) = 0.06 | | | *F*(2, 928) = 0.71 | | |
| Δ*R2* |  | | | .001 | | |
| Δ*F* |  | | | *F*(1, 928) = 1.37 | | |

*Note*. System confidence was mean-centered prior to conducting analyses.

\*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S6

*Results of Linear Regression Predicting Solidarity-Based Collective Action with Adjustment Variables (Study 2)*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictor variable | *B* | β | *B* 95% CI |
| Intercept | 3.79\*\*\* |  | [3.63, 3.94] |
| System confidence | -0.03 | -.02 | [-0.12, 0.07] |
| System confidence2 | -0.06\* | -.07 | [-0.11, -0.01] |
| Gender | -0.32\* | -.08 | [-0.57, -0.06] |
| Age | 0.39 | .03 | [-0.36, 1.14] |
| Education | -0.01 | -.01 | [-0.04, 0.03] |
| Political conservatism | 0.13\*\* | .09 | [0.04, 0.22] |
| Attitudes toward the out-group | 0.55\*\*\* | .34 | [0.45, 0.65] |
| *R2* | .13 | | |
| *F* | *F*(7, 915) = 20.05\*\*\* | | |

*Note*. All continuous predictors were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Gender coded -0.5 form men and 0.5 for women. Age divided by 100.

† *p* < .10. \* *p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S7

*Results of a Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting Participation in the Demonstration with Adjustment Variables (Study 3)*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictor variable | *B* | *OR* | *OR* 95% CI |
| Intercept | 1.08\*\*\* | 2.95 |  |
| Gender system confidence | -0.57\*\* | 0.56 | [0.38, 0.83] |
| Gender system confidence2 | -0.39\* | 0.68 | [0.50, 0.94] |
| Age | -2.59\*\* | 0.08 | [0.01, 0.47] |
| Education | -0.31 | 0.73 | [0.43, 1.25] |
| Social conservatism | -0.10 | 0.90 | [0.73, 1.13] |
| Economic conservatism | -0.07 | 0.93 | [0.78, 1.11] |
| Nagelkerke’s *R2* | .20 | | |
| -2 log-likelihood | 280.70 | | |

*Note*. Gender system confidence, age, education, social and economic conservatism were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Age divided by 100.

\* *p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S8

*Results of the Linear Regression Predicting Support for Collective Action with the Influential Case Included (Study 3)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | | | Model 2 | | |
| Predictor variable | *B* | β | *B* 95% CI | *B* | β | *B* 95% CI |
| Intercept | 6.29\*\*\* |  | [6.17, 6.41] | 6.41\*\*\* |  | [6.27, 6.55] |
| Gender system confidence | -0.39\*\*\* | -0.33 | [-0.52, -0.25] | -0.32\*\*\* | -.27 | [-0.46, -0.18] |
| Gender system confidence2 |  |  |  | -0.15\*\* | -.20 | [-0.24, -0.06] |
| *R2* | .11 | | | .15 | | |
| *F* | *F*(1, 255) = 31.92\*\*\* | | | *F*(2, 254) = 21.84\*\*\* | | |
| Δ*R2* |  | | | .04 | | |
| Δ*F* |  | | | *F*(1, 254) = 10.57\*\* | | |

*Note*. Gender system confidence was mean-centered prior to conducting analyses.

\* *p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S9

*Results of the Linear Regression Predicting Support for Collective Action with Adjustment Variables (Study 3)*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *B* | β | 95% CI |
| Intercept | 6.38\*\*\* |  | [6.24, 6.52] |
| Gender system confidence | -0.24\*\* | -.20 | [-0.40, -0.08] |
| Gender system confidence2 | -0.12\* | -.16 | [-0.22, -0.03] |
| Age | -0.19 | -.01 | [-0.90, 0.71] |
| Education | 0.002 | .001 | [-0.21, 0.22] |
| Social conservatism | -0.10\* | -.14 | [-0.19, -0.01] |
| Economic conservatism | -0.03 | -.04 | [-0.10, 0.05] |
| *R2* | .16 | | |
| *F* | *F*(6, 247) = 8.10\*\*\* | | |

*Note*. Gender system confidence, age, education, social and economic conservatism were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Age divided by 100. Influential case excluded.

\* *p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S10

*Results of the Linear Regression Predicting Normative Collective Actions Intentions with the Influential Case Included (Study 3)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Model 1 | | | Model 2 | | |
| Predictor variable | *B* | β | *B* 95% CI | *B* | β | *B* 95% CI |
| Intercept | 5.84\*\*\* |  | [5.66, 5.97] | 5.84\*\*\* |  | [5.66, 6.02] |
| Gender system confidence | -0.53\*\*\* | -0.36 | [-0.70, -0.36] | -0.51\*\*\* | -.34 | [-0.70, -0.33] |
| Gender system confidence2 |  |  |  | -0.03 | -.03 | [-0.15, 0.09] |
| *R2* | .13 | | | .13 | | |
| *F* | *F*(1, 255) = 46.66\*\*\* | | | *F*(2, 254) = 18.42\*\*\* | | |
| Δ*R2* |  | | | .001 | | |
| Δ*F* |  | | | *F*(1, 254) = 0.28 | | |

*Note*. Gender system confidence was mean-centered prior to conducting analyses.

† *p* < .10. \* *p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S11

*Results of the Linear Regression Predicting Normative Collective Action Intentions with Adjustment Variables with the Influential Case Included (Study 3)*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictor variable | *B* | β | 95% CI |
| Intercept | 5.81\*\*\* |  | [5.63, 5.99] |
| Gender system confidence | -0.39\*\*\* | -.26 | [-0.60, -0.19] |
| Gender system confidence2 | -0.01 | -.01 | [-0.13, 0.11] |
| Age | -0.51 | -.06 | [-1.54, 0.53] |
| Education | -0.08 | -.03 | [-0.35, 0.20] |
| Social conservatism | -0.06 | -.07 | [-0.18, 0.06] |
| Economic conservatism | -0.14\*\* | -.19 | [-0.24, -0.05] |
| *R2* | .17 | | |
| *F* | *F*(6, 247) = 8.29\*\*\* | | |

*Note*. Gender system confidence, age, education, social and economic conservatism were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Age divided by 100. Influential case included (Cook’s D < 0.50). When the influential case identified for analyses without demographics is excluded, the quadratic effect is still negative but not significant, *B* = -.10 [-0.24, -0.03], β = -.09, *p* = .127.

\*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S12

*Results of the Linear Regression Predicting Non-normative Collective Action Intentions with Adjustment Variables (Study 3)*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictor variable | *B* | β | 95% CI |
| Intercept | 2.45\*\*\* |  | [2.21, 2.69] |
| Gender system confidence | -0.21\*\*\* | -.11 | [-0.48, 0.07] |
| Gender system confidence2 | 0.07 | 0.06 | [-0.09, 0.23] |
| Age | -1.12 | -.10 | [-2.49, 0.25] |
| Education | 0.09 | .03 | [-0.27, 0.46] |
| Social conservatism | 0.01 | .01 | [-0.15, 0.17] |
| Economic conservatism | -0.21\*\* | -.21 | [-0.33, -0.08] |
| *R2* | .08 | | |
| *F* | *F*(6, 247) = 3.71\*\* | | |

*Note*. Gender system confidence, age, education, social and economic conservatism were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Age divided by 100. No influential cases identified (Cook’s *D* < 0.10).

\*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S13

*Results of a Binomial Logistic Regression Predicting Participation in the Demonstration with Adjustment Variables (Study 4)*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictor variable | *B* | *OR* | *OR* 95% CI |
| Intercept | 2.14\*\*\* | 8.51 |  |
| System confidence | -0.22 | 0.81 | [0.54, 1.20] |
| System confidence2 | -0.41\* | 0.66 | [0.47, 0.93] |
| Age | 6.53\*\* | 687.50 | [9.10, 51921.86] |
| Gender | 0.06 | 1.065 | [0.38, 3.01] |
| Social conservatism | 0.11 | 1.12 | [0.87, 1.43] |
| Economic conservatism | -0.11 | 0.90 | [0.69, 1.17] |
| Nagelkerke’s *R2* | .14 | | |
| -2 log-likelihood | 177.39 | | |

*Note*. System confidence, age, social and economic conservatism were mean-centered prior to conducting analyses. Age divided by 100. Gender coded -0.5 for men and 0.5 for women.

\* *p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S14

*Human Development Index, Gini coefficient and the Type of Political Regime for 60 Countries Participating in the 6th Wave of the World Values Survey (Study 5)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Country | WVS Year | HDI | HDI year | Gini | Gini year | Political Regime |
| Algeriaabc | 2014 | 0.736d | 2014 | 35.3g | 1995 | Authoritarian regime |
| Argentinaabc | 2013 | 0.833d | 2013 | 42.3g | 2013 | Flawed democracy |
| Armeniaabc | 2011 | 0.723d | 2011 | 31.3g | 2011 | Hybrid regime |
| Australiaabc | 2012 | 0.932d | 2012 | 34.9g | 2010 | Full democracy |
| Azerbaijanabc | 2011-2012 | 0.7435ce | 2011/2012 | 16.6g | 2005 | Authoritarian regime |
| Bahrain | 2014 | 0.824d | 2014 | – | – | Authoritarian regime |
| Belarusac | 2011 | 0.793d | 2011 | 26.5g | 2011 | Authoritarian regime |
| Brazilabc | 2014 | 0.755d | 2014 | 52.9g | 2013 | Flawed democracy |
| Colombiaabc | 2012 | 0.715d | 2012 | 53.5g | 2012 | Flawed democracy |
| Cyprusabc | 2011 | 0.852d | 2011 | 32.6g | 2011 | Flawed democracy |
| Chileabc | 2011 | 0.821d | 2011 | 50.8g | 2011 | Flawed democracy |
| China | 2012 | 0.718d | 2012 | 42.1g | 2010 | Authoritarian regime |
| Ecuadorab | 2013 | 0.730d | 2013 | 47.3g | 2013 | Hybrid regime |
| Egypt | 2012 | 0.688d | 2012 | 30.8g | 2008 | Hybrid regime |
| Estoniaabc | 2011 | 0.849d | 2011 | 32.7g | 2011 | Flawed democracy |
| Georgiaabc | 2014 | 0.754d | 2014 | 40.0g | 2013 | Hybrid regime |
| Germanyabc | 2013 | 0.915d | 2013 | 30.1g | 2011 | Full democracy |
| Ghanaabc | 2011 | 0.566d | 2011 | 42.8g | 2005 | Flawed democracy |
| Hong Kongabc | 2013 | 0.908d | 2013 | 53.7h | 2011 | Flawed democracy |
| Indiaabc | 2012/2014 | 0.6045df | 2012/2014 | 33.9g | 2009 | Flawed democracy |
| Iraqabc | 2013 | 0.657d | 2013 | 29.5g | 2012 | Hybrid regime |
| Japanabc | 2010 | 0.884d | 2010 | 32.1g | 2008 | Full democracy |
| Jordan | 2014 | 0.748d | 2014 | 33.7g | 2010 | Authoritarian regime |
| Kazakhstanabc | 2011 | 0.772d | 2011 | 27.4g | 2011 | Authoritarian regime |
| Kuwait | 2013 | 0.816d | 2013 | – | – | Authoritarian regime |
| Kyrgyzstanabc | 2011 | 0.639d | 2011 | 27.8g | 2011 | Hybrid regime |
| Lebanon | 2013 | 0.768d | 2013 | – | – | Hybrid regime |
| Libya | 2013 | 0.738d | 2013 | – | – | Hybrid regime |
| Malaysiaabc | 2011 | 0.772d | 2011 | 46.3g | 2009 | Flawed democracy |
| Mexicoabc | 2012 | 0.754d | 2012 | 48.1g | 2012 | Flawed democracy |
| Moroccoabc | 2011 | 0.621d | 2011 | 40.7g | 2007 | Authoritarian regime |
| Netherlandsabc | 2012 | 0.920d | 2012 | 28.0g | 2012 | Full democracy |
| New Zealandabc | 2011 | 0.907d | 2011 | 36.2h | 1997 | Full democracy |
| Nigeriaabc | 2011 | 0.499d | 2011 | 43.0g | 2009 | Authoritarian regime |
| Pakistanabc | 2012 | 0.532d | 2012 | 29.6g | 2010 | Hybrid regime |
| Palestineabc | 2013 | 0.679d | 2013 | 34.5g | 2009 | Hybrid regime |
| Peruabc | 2012 | 0.728d | 2012 | 45.1g | 2012 | Flawed democracy |
| Philippinesabc | 2012 | 0.657d | 2012 | 43.0g | 2012 | Flawed democracy |
| Polandabc | 2012 | 0.838d | 2012 | 32.4g | 2012 | Flawed democracy |
| Qatar | 2010 | 0.844d | 2010 | – | – | Authoritarian Regime |
| Romaniaabc | 2012 | 0.788d | 2012 | 27.3g | 2012 | Flawed democracy |
| Russiaabc | 2011 | 0.790d | 2011 | 41.0g | 2011 | Authoritarian regime |
| Rwandaabc | 2012 | 0.476d | 2012 | 51.3g | 2010 | Authoritarian regime |
| Singapore | 2012 | 0.905d | 2012 | 46.3h | 2013 | Hybrid regime |
| Sloveniaabc | 2011 | 0.877d | 2011 | 24.9g | 2011 | Flawed democracy |
| South Koreaabc | 2010 | 0.886d | 2010 | 30.2h | 2013 | Full democracy |
| South Africaabc | 2013 | 0.663d | 2013 | 63.4g | 2011 | Flawed democracy |
| Spainabc | 2011 | 0.870d | 2011 | 36.1g | 2011 | Full democracy |
| Swedenabc | 2011 | 0.903d | 2011 | 27.2g | 2011 | Full democracy |
| Taiwan | 2012 | – | 2012 | 33.8h | 2012 | Flawed democracy |
| Thailandabc | 2013 | 0.724d | 2013 | 39.3h | 2012 | Flawed democracy |
| Trinidad and Tobagoabc | 2010 | 0.772d | 2010 | 40.3g | 1992 | Flawed democracy |
| Tunisiaabc | 2013 | 0.720d | 2013 | 35.8g | 2010 | Hybrid regime |
| Turkeyabc | 2011 | 0.751d | 2011 | 40.0g | 2011 | Hybrid regime |
| Ukraineabc | 2011 | 0.738d | 2011 | 24.6g | 2011 | Hybrid regime |
| United Statesabc | 2011 | 0.911d | 2011 | 40.5g | 2010 | Full democracy |
| Uruguayabc | 2011 | 0.784d | 2011 | 43.4g | 2011 | Full democracy |
| Uzbekistanac | 2011 | 0.661d | 2011 | 35.3g | 2003 | Authoritarian regime |
| Yemenabc | 2013 | 0.498d | 2013 | 35.9g | 2005 | Authoritarian regime |
| Zimbabweabc | 2011 | 0.474d | 2011 | 50.1h | 2006 | Authoritarian regime |

Note. HDI = Human Development Index. Political regime based on the Economist Intelligence Unit data corresponding to the year of WVS survey.

a Country included in the main text descriptive analysis

b Country included in the main text analyses of collective action.

c Country included in the main text analyses of voting.

d United Nations Development Programme estimate.

e The average of values for 2011 (0.742) and 2012 (0.745).

f The average of values for 2012 (0.600) and 2014 (0.609).

g World Bank estimate.

h Central Intelligence Agency estimate (World Bank estimate unavailable).

Table S15

*Individual-level and Societal-Level Predictors of Collective Action (no adjustment variables, 53 countries; Study 5)*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictor variable | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| Intercept | 1.53 (0.03)\*\*\* | 1.57 (0.05)\*\*\* | 1.35 (0.06)\*\*\* | 1.33 (0.06)\*\*\* |
| *Individual level effects* |  |  |  |  |
| SC |  | -0.01 (0.01) | 0.18 (0.04)\*\*\* | 0.13 (0.05)\*\* |
| SC2 |  |  | -0.04 (0.01)\*\*\* | -0.03 (0.01)\*\*\* |
| *Societal level effects* |  |  |  |  |
| Political regime type |  |  |  | 0.09 (0.14) |
| SC × Political regime type |  |  |  | 0.28 (0.09)\*\* |
| SC2 × Political regime type |  |  |  | -0.06 (0.02)\*\*\* |
| *Variance* |  |  |  |  |
| IL variation of DV | 0.246 (0.009)\*\*\* | 0.243 (0.009)\*\*\* | 0.242 (0.009)\*\*\* | 0.242 (0.009)\*\*\* |
| SL variation of DV | 0.063 (0.012)\*\*\* | 0.104 (0.021)\*\*\* | 0.142 (0.035)\*\*\* | 0.140 (0.04)\*\*\* |
| SL variation in IL effect of SC |  | 0.007 (0.002)\*\*\* | 0.078 (0.018)\*\*\* | 0.066 (0.017)\*\*\* |
| SL variation in IL effect of SC2 |  |  | 0.002 (0.001)\*\*\* | 0.002 (0.001)\*\* |
| -2 loglikelihood | 109476.92 | 108734.40 | 108491.34 | 108460.91 |

*Note*. SC = System confidence. System confidence was grand-mean centered prior to conducting analyses. Unstandardized coefficients reported. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. Political regime type coded 1 for full democracies and 0 for other systems. Out of 60 countries participating in the 6th wave of WVS 7 (Bahrain, Belarus, Kuwait, Qatar, Singapore, Uzbekistan, Egypt) were excluded. Only adult (≥ 18) respondents included. Missing data handled with multiple imputation (20 imputed datasets). ICC (Model 1) = .20, 95% CI [.14, .27].

\*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S16

*Individual-Level and Societal-Level Predictors of Collective Action (No Multiple Imputation, 48 Countries; Study 5)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictor variable | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 |
| Intercept | 1.55 (0.04)\*\*\* | 1.56 (0.04)\*\*\* | 1.57 (0.04)\*\*\* | 1.60 (0.04)\*\*\* | 1.53 (0.04)\*\*\* |
| *Individual level effects* |  |  |  |  |  |
| SC |  | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.01 (0.01) | -0.004 (0.013) | 0.003 (0.01) |
| SC2 |  |  | -0.04 (0.01)\*\*\* | -0.03 (0.01)\*\* | -0.02 (0.01)† |
| Gender |  |  |  | -0.07 (0.004)\*\*\* | -0.07 (0.004)\*\*\* |
| Age |  |  |  | -0.05 (0.01)\*\*\* | -0.05 (0.01)\*\*\* |
| Education |  |  |  | 0.04 (0.001)\*\*\* | 0.04 (0.001)\*\*\* |
| Political conservatism |  |  |  | -0.02 (0.001)\*\*\* | -0.02 (0.001)\*\*\* |
| *Societal level effects* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political regime type |  |  |  |  | 0.33 (0.03)\*\*\* |
| HDI |  |  |  |  | 0.48 (0.32) |
| Gini |  |  |  |  | 0.01 (0.003)\* |
| *Cross-level interactions* |  |  |  |  |  |
| SC × Political regime type |  |  |  |  | -0.03 (0.03) |
| SC2 × Political regime type |  |  |  |  | -0.06 (0.02)\*\* |
| *Variance* |  |  |  |  |  |
| IL variation of DV | 0.249 (0.001)\*\*\* | 0.245 (0.001)\*\*\* | 0.244 (0.001)\*\*\* | 0.230 (0.001)\*\*\* | 0.230 (0.001)\*\*\* |
| SL variation of DV | 0.065 (0.013)\*\*\* | 0.065 (0.013)\*\*\* | 0.070 (0.015)\*\*\* | 0.068 (0.014)\*\*\* | 0.040 (0.008)\*\*\* |
| SL variation in IL effect of SC |  | 0.008 (0.002)\*\*\* | 0.008 (0.002)\*\*\* | 0.007 (0.002)\*\*\* | 0.007 (0.002)\*\* |
| SL variation in IL effect of SC2 |  |  | 0.003 (0.001)\*\*\* | 0.003 (0.001)\*\*\* | 0.002 (0.001)\*\* |
| Deviance (-2 loglikelihood) | 96829.08 | 96192.86 | 95239.47 | 76766.04 | 76737.39 |

*Note*. SC = System confidence. Gender coded -.50 for men and .50 for women. Age divided by 100. Political regime type coded 1 for full democracies and 0 for other systems. Continuous individual and societal-level predictors were grand-mean centered prior to conducting analyses. Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard errors reported in the parentheses. Missing data handled with ML estimation. ICC (Model 1) = .21, 95% CI [.14, .27].

† *p* < .10. \* *p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S17

*Individual-Level and Societal-Level Predictors of Collective Action (Different Reference Categories for Political Regime Types, 48 Countries; Study 5)*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Reference category |  |
| Predictor variable | Authoritarian regime | Hybrid regime | Flawed democracy |
| Intercept | 1.42 (0.09)\*\*\* | 1.39 (0.05)\*\*\* | 1.57 (0.05)\*\*\* |
| *Individual level effects* |  |  |  |
| SC | 0.001 (0.02) | 0.02 (0.03) | -0.01 (0.02) |
| SC2 | -0.03 (0.01)\* | -0.01 (0.02) | -0.02 (0.01)† |
| Sex | -0.08 (0.01)\*\*\* | -0.08 (0.01)\*\*\* | -0.08 (0.01)\*\*\* |
| Age | -0.06 (0.04) | -0.06 (0.04) | -0.06 (0.04) |
| Education | 0.04 (0.004)\*\*\* | 0.04 (0.004)\*\*\* | 0.04 (0.004)\*\*\* |
| Political conservatism | -0.02 (0.003)\*\*\* | -0.02 (0.003)\*\*\* | -0.02 (0.003)\*\*\* |
| *Societal level effects* |  |  |  |
| Authoritatian regimes |  | 0.03 (0.09) | -0.15 (0.11) |
| Hybrid regime | -0.03 (0.09) |  | -0.18 (0.08)\* |
| Flawed democracy | 0.15 (0.11) | 0.17 (0.08)\* |  |
| Full democracy | 0.46 (0.15)\*\* | 0.49 (0.11)\*\*\* | 0.32 (0.09)\*\*\* |
| HDI | -0.02 (0.37) | -0.002 (0.37) | -0.02 (0.37) |
| Gini | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) | 0.004 (0.003) |
| *Cross-level interactions* |  |  |  |
| SC × Authoritarian regime |  | -0.02 (0.04) | 0.01 (0.03) |
| SC × Hybrid regime | 0.02 (0.04) |  | 0.03 (0.04) |
| SC × Flawed democracy | -0.01 (0.03) | -0.03 (0.04) |  |
| SC × Full democracy | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.04 (0.04) | -0.01 (0.03) |
| SC2 × Authoritarian regime |  | -0.02 (0.02) | -0.01 (0.02) |
| SC2 × Hybrid regime | 0.02 (0.02) |  | 0.01 (0.02) |
| SC2 × Flawed democracy | 0.01 (0.02) | -0.01(0.02) |  |
| SC2 × Full democracy | -0.04 (0.02)\* | -0.06 (0.02)\*\* | -0.05 (0.02)\*\* |
| *Variance* |  |  |  |
| IL variation of DV | 0.232 (0.008)\*\*\* | 0.232 (0.008)\*\*\* | 0.232 (0.008)\*\*\* |
| SL variation of DV | 0.034 (0.006)\*\*\* | 0.034 (0.006)\*\*\* | 0.034 (0.006)\*\*\* |
| SL variation in IL effect of SC | 0.005 (0.001)\*\*\* | 0.005 (0.001)\*\*\* | 0.005 (0.001)\*\*\* |
| SL variation in IL effect of SC2 | 0.002 (0.000)\*\* | 0.002 (0.000)\*\*\* | 0.002 (0.000)\*\*\* |
| Deviance (-2 loglikelihood) | 94141.74 | 94139.60 | 94133.85 |

*Note*. Gender coded -.50 for men and .50 for women. Age divided by 100. Continuous individual and societal-level predictors were grand-mean centered prior to conducting analyses. Unstandardized coefficients reported. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. Missing data handled with multiple imputation (20 imputed datasets).

† *p* < .10. \* *p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S18

*Individual-Level and Societal-Level Predictors of Voting (No Adjustment Variables, 57 Countries; Study 5)*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictor variable | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
| *Individual level effects* |  |  |  |  |
| SC |  | 0.40 (0.04)\*\*\* | 0.37 (0.04)\*\*\* | 0.32 (0.04)\*\*\* |
| SC2 |  |  | -0.04 (0.03) | 0.00 (0.03) |
| *Societal level effects* |  |  |  |  |
| Political regime type |  |  |  | 1.09 (0.31)\*\*\* |
| SC × Political regime type |  |  |  | 0.33 (0.07)\*\*\* |
| SC2 × Political regime type |  |  |  | -0.29 (0.10)\*\* |
| Thresholds |  |  |  |  |
| Cut 1 | -1.80 (0.14)\*\*\* | -1.80 (0.06)\*\*\* | -1.77 (0.09)\*\*\* | -1.68 (0.13)\*\*\* |
| Cut 2 | -0.44 (0.14)\*\* | -0.42 (0.04)\*\*\* | -0.39 (0.08)\*\*\* | -0.29 (0.12)\* |
| *Variance* |  |  |  |  |
| SL variation of DV | 1.04 (0.26)\*\*\* | 1.13 (0.27)\*\*\* | 1.18 (0.28)\*\*\* | 0.99 (0.23)\*\*\* |
| SL variation in IL effect of SC |  | 0.08 (0.02)\*\*\* | 0.07 (0.02)\*\*\* | 0.05 (0.01)\*\*\* |
| SL variation in IL effect of SC2 |  |  | 0.04 (0.01)\*\* | 0.03 (0.01)\*\*\* |
| -2 loglikelihood | 141635.59 | 140274.04 | 140178.11 | 140151.49 |

*Note*. SC = System confidence. System confidence was grand-mean centered prior to conducting analyses. Unstandardized coefficients reported. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. Political regime type coded 1 for full democracies and 0 for other systems. Out of 60 countries participating in the 6th wave of WVS three (Bahrain, Egypt and Ecuador) were excluded. Only adult (≥ 18) respondents included. Missing data handled with multiple imputation (20 imputed datasets). ICC (Model 1) = .24, 95% CI [.15, .33].

\*\* *p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S19

*Individual-Level and Societal-Level Predictors of Voting (No Multiple Imputation, 49 Countries; Study 5)*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Predictors | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 | Model 5 |
| *Individual level effects* |  |  |  |  |  |
| SC |  | 0.43 (0.05)\*\*\* | 0.41 (0.04)\*\*\* | 0.35 (0.05)\*\*\* | 0.29 (0.05)\*\*\* |
| SC2 |  |  | -0.06 (0.03) † | -0.05 (0.04) | 0.003 (0.03) |
| Gender |  |  |  | -0.09 (0.04)\* | -0.09 (0.04)\* |
| Age |  |  |  | 0.36 (0.03)\*\*\* | 0.36 (0.03)\*\*\* |
| Education |  |  |  | 0.08 (0.02)\*\*\* | 0.08 (0.02)\*\*\* |
| Political conservatism |  |  |  | 0.04 (0.01)\*\*\* | 0.04 (0.01)\*\*\* |
| *Societal level effects* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Political regime type |  |  |  |  | 0.87 (0.46)† |
| HDI |  |  |  |  | 0.44 (1.40) |
| Gini |  |  |  |  | 0.02 (0.01)† |
| *Cross-level interactions* |  |  |  |  |  |
| SC × Political regime type |  |  |  |  | 0.30 (0.09)\*\* |
| SC2 × Political regime type |  |  |  |  | -0.24 (0.10)\* |
| Thresholds |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cut 1 | -1.99 (0.14)\*\*\* | -1.99 (0.08)\*\*\* | -2.02 (0.06)\*\*\* | -2.28 (0.09)\*\*\* | -2.01 (0.17)\*\*\* |
| Cut 2 | -0.58 (0.14)\*\*\* | -0.55 (0.06)\*\*\* | -0.58 (0.03)\*\*\* | -0.74 (0.08)\*\*\* | -0.46 (0.16)\*\* |
| *Variance* |  |  |  |  |  |
| SL variation of DV | 0.91 (0.20)\*\*\* | 0.94 (0.20)\*\*\* | 0.99 (0.22)\*\*\* | 0.92 (0.18)\*\*\* | 0.80 (0.15)\*\*\* |
| SL variation in IL effect of SC |  | 0.10 (0.02)\*\*\* | 0.09 (0.02)\*\*\* | 0.10 (0.03)\*\*\* | 0.09 (0.03)\*\*\* |
| SL variation in IL effect of SC2 |  |  | 0.04 (0.02)\*\* | 0.03 (0.01)\*\* | 0.03 (0.01)\* |
| Deviance (-2 loglikelihood) | 116841.90 | 114676.94 | 114589.87 | 90107.23 | 90089.60 |

*Note*. SC = System confidence. Gender coded -.50 for men and .50 for women. Age divided by 100. Political regime type coded 1 for full democracies and 0 for other systems. Continuous individual and societal-level predictors were grand-mean centered prior to conducting analyses. Unstandardized coefficients reported. Standard errors reported in the parentheses. Missing data handled with ML estimation. ICC (Model 1) = .22, 95% CI [.14, .29], *p* < .001. Because there was no convergence for Models 4 and 5 when MLR estimator was used, we applied ML estimators in these two cases.

† *p* < .10. \* *p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.

Table S20

*Individual-Level and Societal-Level Predictors of Voting (Different Reference Categories for Political Regime Types, 49 Countries; Study 5)*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  |  | Reference category |  |
| Predictor variable | Authoritarian regime | Hybrid regime | Flawed democracy |
| *Individual level effects* |  |  |  |
| SC | 0.30 (0.08)\*\*\* | 0.28 (0.14)\* | 0.31 (0.07)\*\*\* |
| SC2 | 0.02 (0.05) | -0.12 (0.06)† | 0.003 (0.05) |
| Sex | -0.09 (0.04)\* | -0.09 (0.04)\* | -0.09 (0.04)\* |
| Age | 0.35 (0.03)\*\*\* | 0.35 (0.03)\*\*\* | 0.35 (0.03)\*\*\* |
| Education | 0.08 (0.02)\*\*\* | 0.08 (0.02)\*\*\* | 0.08 (0.02)\*\*\* |
| Political conservatism | 0.03 (0.01)\*\*\* | 0.03 (0.01)\*\*\* | 0.03 (0.01)\*\*\* |
| *Societal level effects* |  |  |  |
| Authoritatian regimes |  | -0.73 (0.33)\* | -1.00 (0.29)\*\* |
| Hybrid regime | 0.64 (0.34)† |  | -0.15 (0.34) |
| Flawed democracy | 0.91 (0.38)\* | 0.54 (0.37) |  |
| Full democracy | 1.44 (0.57)\* | 1.14 (0.53)\* | 0.73 (0.43)† |
| HDI | -0.98 (1.74) | -2.06 (1.61) | -1.42 (1.60) |
| Gini | 0.01 (0.02) | 0.00 (0.02) | 0.01 (0.01) |
| *Cross-level interactions* |  |  |  |
| SC × Authoritarian regime |  | 0.01 (0.17) | -0.01 (0.10) |
| SC × Hybrid regime | -0.01 (0.16) |  | -0.02 (0.16) |
| SC × Flawed democracy | 0.01 (0.10) | 0.03 (0.16) |  |
| SC × Full democracy | 0.28 (0.10)\*\* | 0.29 (0.17)† | 0.27 (0.09)\*\* |
| SC2 × Authoritarian regime |  | 0.14 (0.08)† | 0.02 (0.06) |
| SC2 × Hybrid regime | -0.14 (0.07)\* |  | 0.12 (0.07)† |
| SC2 × Flawed democracy | -0.02 (0.06) | 0.12 (0.09) |  |
| SC2 × Full democracy | -0.30 (0.09)\*\*\* | -0.16 (0.14) | -0.28 (0.10)\*\* |
| Thresholds |  |  |  |
| Cut 1 | -1.40 (0.33)\*\*\* | 0.28 (0.14)\* | -2.18 (0.19)\*\*\* |
| Cut 2 | 0.10 (0.32) | -0.12 (0.06)† | -0.67 (0.19)\*\*\* |
| *Variance* |  |  |  |
| SL variation of DV | 0.67 (0.13)\*\*\* | 0.67 (0.14)\*\*\* | 0.66 (0.13)\*\*\* |
| SL variation in IL effect of SC | 0.07 (0.02)\*\*\* | 0.07 (0.02)\*\*\* | 0.07 (0.02)\*\*\* |
| SL variation in IL effect of SC2 | 0.02 (0.01)\*\*\* | 0.02 (0.01) | 0.02 (0.01)\*\* |
| Deviance (-2 loglikelihood) | 113953.05 | 113975.62 | 113960.17 |

*Note*. Gender coded -.50 for men and .50 for women. Age divided by 100. Continuous individual and societal-level predictors were grand-mean centered prior to conducting analyses. Unstandardized coefficients reported. Robust standard errors reported in the parentheses. Missing data handled with multiple imputation (20 imputed datasets).

† *p* < .10. \* *p* < .05. \*\**p* < .01. \*\*\* *p* < .001.