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Supplemental Materials

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Study S5

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Similar to Study 5, we examined whether action-goal consistency predicted power

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perception and conferral beyond the main effects of actions and goals by themselves. In this

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study, both goals were financial goals, a common type of goals in self-control conflicts (Veilleux

723

et al., 2018). We manipulated goals and actions orthogonally, so that the target person had one

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particular goal (save money for textbooks vs. save money for dinner) and chose one prize (a

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bookstore gift card vs. a restaurant gift card). Each action aligned with one goal but not the other.

726

We predicted that the choice the target person made should lead to greater power perception and

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conferral if that choice was in line with their stated goal (e.g., choosing a bookstore gift card

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when trying to save money towards buying textbooks) versus not (e.g., choosing a bookstore gift

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card when trying to save money to go out to dinner).

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Method

731

Participants and Design. Our participants were undergraduate students at a large public

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university who took part in studies for course credit. Because the self-control manipulation was

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new and relatively subtle, we decided to collect data over the course of two weeks in the lab. We

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ended up with 699 participants ($M_{age} = 20.99$, $SD_{age} = 2.91$; 288 men, 407 women, 4 identified

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as non-binary). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four groups following a 2 (goal:

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save money for textbooks vs. save money for dinner) \times 2 (action: chose a bookstore gift card vs.

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chose a restaurant gift card) between-groups design. A sensitivity power analysis (Faul et al.,

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2007) suggested that our sample size provided sufficient power (.80) to detect small-to-medium

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sized effects in a 2×2 ANOVA, $f = .11$ (two-tailed).

740

Procedure and Measures. Participants took part in the study online using Qualtrics.

741

First, they read one of four versions of a scenario about Simon, whom they were supposed to

742 imagine was their new friend in college. They were told that Simon participated in many
743 psychology experiments to either *earn money to buy his textbooks* or *earn money to go out for*
744 *dinner* (goal manipulation). They then read that while they were chatting with Simon one day,
745 Simon got an email telling him that he won the lottery for an experiment session, so he could
746 choose between a \$50 gift card for a fancy seafood restaurant and a \$50 gift card for the
747 university bookstore. Simon either chose the *bookstore* or the *restaurant* gift card (action
748 manipulation).

749 To reduce demand effects, we measured the target's perceived self-control ("Simon has
750 good self-control") and perceived goal to earn money to buy textbooks ("Simon has a goal to
751 earn money to buy his textbooks") in a pretest using a separate sample. We measured power
752 perception ($\alpha = .87$), power conferral ($\alpha = .82$), assertiveness ($\alpha = .62$), competence ($\alpha = .92$),
753 morality ($\alpha = .92$), warmth ($\alpha = .91$), and authenticity ($\alpha = .88$) using the same items as in
754 Studies 2a-4.

755 **Results**

756 We ran a 2 (goal) \times 2 (action) ANOVA on each dependent variable. We used
757 independent-samples t-tests to examine simple effects. When Levene's Test suggested
758 heterogeneity of variance ($p < .10$), we instead conducted Welch's t-tests.

759 **Pretest: Manipulation Check.** A separate sample of 301 undergraduate students at a
760 large public university ($M_{\text{age}} = 20.73$, $SD_{\text{age}} = 2.28$, 3 did not report their ages; 117 women, 181
761 men, 1 identified as non-binary, and 2 did not report their gender) participated in the pretest in
762 exchange for course credit. They were randomly assigned to read one of the four versions of the
763 scenario. They then rated whether they believed 1) Simon had good self-control and 2) Simon
764 had a goal to earn money to buy his textbooks (1 = *strongly disagree*, 7 = *strongly agree*).

765 For perceived self-control, an ANOVA revealed a main effect of action, $F(1, 297) =$
766 $90.08, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .23$, and a main effect of goal, $F(1, 297) = 12.51, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .04$. The
767 main effects suggested that Simon was also perceived as having greater self-control when he
768 chose the bookstore (vs. restaurant) gift card and when he had a goal to save money for
769 textbooks (vs. save money for dinner). Most importantly, there was also a significant interaction
770 effect, $F(1, 297) = 35.55, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .11$. When Simon chose the restaurant gift card, he was
771 perceived as having greater self-control when this decision was consistent with his goal (to save
772 money for dinner; $M = 4.20, SD = 1.00$) than when it was inconsistent with his goal (to save
773 money for textbooks; $M = 3.13, SD = 1.37$), $t(122.42) = 5.37, p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 0.89$.
774 Likewise, when the bookstore was chosen, Simon was perceived as having greater self-control
775 when it was consistent with his goal (to save money for textbooks; $M = 5.20, SD = 1.47$) than
776 when it was inconsistent with his goal (to save money for dinner; $M = 4.43, SD = 1.45$), $t(150) =$
777 $3.23, p = .002$, Cohen's $d = 0.53$. This interaction pattern is in line with action-goal consistency
778 being core to self-control (Fujita, 2011; Inzlicht et al., 2014).

779 For the perceived goal to earn money to buy textbooks, as expected, the main effect of
780 goal was significant, $F(1, 297) = 37.21, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .11$. Participants were more likely to
781 think Simon had the goal to earn money to buy textbooks when they were explicitly told he had
782 this goal ($M = 5.17, SD = 1.73$) than when they were told he had a goal to earn money to go out
783 for dinner ($M = 3.35, SD = 1.87$). Unexpectedly, the main effect of action was also significant, F
784 $(1, 297) = 52.13, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .15$, such that participants tended to think Simon had the goal to
785 earn money to buy textbooks if he chose the bookstore gift card ($M = 5.30, SD = 1.60$) rather
786 than the restaurant gift card ($M = 3.21, SD = 1.84$). The interaction was not significant, $F(1, 297)$
787 $= 0.93, p = .334, \eta_p^2 < .01$.

788 **Power Perception and Power Conferral.** For power perception, as predicted, the
789 interaction was significant, $F(1, 695) = 6.16, p = .013, \eta_p^2 = .01$, see Figure S1a. Action-goal
790 consistency increased power perception. When Simon chose the restaurant gift card, he tended to
791 be perceived as more powerful when this choice was consistent with his goal ($M = 3.80, SD =$
792 1.16) than when it was goal-inconsistent ($M = 3.61, SD = 1.18$), but the difference did not reach
793 statistical significance, $t(347) = 1.51, p = .132$, Cohen's $d = 0.16$. When Simon chose the
794 bookstore gift card, he was perceived as more powerful when this choice was consistent with his
795 goals ($M = 4.27, SD = 1.19$) than when it was goal-inconsistent ($M = 4.02, SD = 1.16$), $t(348) =$
796 $2.00, p = .047$, Cohen's $d = 0.21$. The main effects of action, $F(1, 695) = 27.56, p < .001, \eta_p^2 =$
797 $.04$, and goal, $F(1, 695) = 4.02, p = .045, \eta_p^2 = .01$, were also significant. See Table S1 for
798 means and standard deviations in each experimental condition.

799 For power conferral, the action-by-goal interaction was also significant, $F(1, 695) =$
800 $7.29, p = .007, \eta_p^2 = .01$, but the pattern changed slightly (see Figure S1b). Here, when Simon
801 chose the restaurant gift card, participants gave more power to him when this choice was goal-
802 consistent ($M = 4.07, SD = 0.80$) than when it was goal-inconsistent ($M = 3.77, SD = 1.00$), t
803 $(331.51) = 3.08, p = .002$, Cohen's $d = 0.33$. When Simon chose the bookstore gift card, the
804 effect of goal on power conferral was not significant, $t(348) = 0.66, p = .508$, Cohen's $d = 0.07$.
805 The main effect of action was significant, $F(1, 695) = 46.45, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .06$, but the main
806 effect of goal was not, $F(1, 695) = 0.41, p = .523, \eta_p^2 < .01$. See Table S1 for means and
807 standard deviations in each experimental condition.

808

825 **Table S1**


826 *Study 5 means and standard deviations by action and goal*

Action	Goal	Assertiveness	Competence	Morality	Warmth	Authenticity
Bookstore	Save money for textbooks	4.65 (0.89)	4.64 (1.14)	4.39 (1.12)	4.14 (1.10)	4.46 (1.19)
card	Save money for dinner	4.60 (0.92)	4.66 (1.15)	4.24 (1.06)	4.04 (1.10)	4.36 (1.16)
Restaurant	Save money for textbooks	4.10 (0.98)	3.86 (1.25)	3.74 (1.18)	3.93 (1.16)	4.10 (1.32)
card	Save money for dinner	4.38 (0.93)	4.35 (1.09)	4.14 (0.99)	4.15 (0.99)	4.36 (1.14)

827 *Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.*

828 **Figure S1**

829 Power perception (a) and power conferral (b) by goal and action in Study S5.



830

Mediators. Interactions were significant for assertiveness, $F(1, 695) = 5.55, p = .019, \eta_p^2 = .01$, competence, $F(1, 695) = 7.07, p = .008, \eta_p^2 = .01$, morality, $F(1, 695) = 10.79, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .02$, and authenticity, $F(1, 695) = 4.19, p = .041, \eta_p^2 = .01$, and marginally significant for warmth, $F(1, 695) = 3.63, p = .057, \eta_p^2 = .01$. Specifically, when Simon chose the restaurant gift card, he was perceived as more assertive, $t(347) = 2.75, p = 0.006$, Cohen's $d = 0.30$, competent, $t(347) = 3.87, p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 0.41$, moral, $t(337.99) = 3.42, p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 0.37$, authentic, $t(347) = 2.00, p = .046$, Cohen's $d = 0.22$, and marginally warmer, $t(347) = 1.86, p = 0.063$, Cohen's $d = 0.20$, when it was his goal to save money for dinner rather than save money for textbooks. When Simon chose the bookstore gift card, however, the goal he had did not affect how he was perceived on these dimensions, $ts < 1.23, ps > .221$, Cohen's $ds < 0.14$.

Additionally, there were some significant main effects of action. Specifically, when Simon chose the bookstore gift card, he was perceived as more assertive, $F(1, 695) = 30.47, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .04$, competent, $F(1, 695) = 40.07, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .05$, moral, $F(1, 695) = 30.95, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .04$, authentic, $F(1, 695) = 8.07, p = .005, \eta_p^2 = .01$, and marginally warmer, $F(1, 695) = 3.28, p = .071, \eta_p^2 < .01$. The main effect of goal was never significant, $Fs < 1.50, ps > .221, \eta_p^2s < .01$. See Table S13 for detailed ANOVA results.

Mediated Moderation Analyses. We ran the same mediated moderation analysis as in Study 5, except we additionally included authenticity. Action was the independent variable (0 = chose a restaurant gift card, 1 = chose a bookstore gift card), and goal (0 = save money for dinner, 1 = save money for textbooks) was the moderator. Again, we estimated the effect by running 5000-sample bootstrapping. See Table S2 for the 95% confidence intervals for all indirect effects of the action-by-goal interaction on perceived power, Table S3 for all indirect

effects of the action-by-goal interaction on power conferral, and Figure S8 for a detailed illustration of the results. We discuss only the bold paths in Figure 1 of the main text and additional significant indirect effects below.

Table S2

95% confidence intervals for all indirect effects of action-by-goal interaction on perceived power in Study S5

Mediator	95% CI
Assertiveness	[0.01, 0.15]
Competence	[0.03, 0.25]
Morality	[-0.04, 0.16]
Warmth	[-0.000, 0.22]
Authenticity	[-0.05, 0.05]

Table S3

95% confidence intervals for all indirect effects of action-by-goal interaction on power conferral in Study S5

Mediator(s)	95% CI
Assertiveness → Perceived Power	[0.001, 0.03]
Competence → Perceived Power	[0.01, 0.06]
Morality → Perceived Power	[-0.01, 0.03]
Warmth → Perceived Power	[-0.000, 0.05]
Authenticity → Perceived Power	[-0.01, 0.01]
Perceived Power	[-0.03, 0.08]
Assertiveness	[0.01, 0.11]
Competence	[0.01, 0.15]
Morality	[0.01, 0.18]
Warmth	[-0.06, 0.02]
Authenticity	[-0.04, 0.04]

Note. → indicates serial mediation.

We found some significant indirect effects that were consistent with the bold paths in Figure 1. Replicating Studies 2a-5, the action-by-goal interaction had a positive indirect effect on power conferral through assertiveness and then perceived power, and a positive indirect effect on

power conferral through competence and then perceived power. Replicating Studies 2a-3 and Study 5, the action-by-goal interaction also had a positive indirect effect on power conferral through morality.

We also found significant indirect effects other than the bold paths. Similar to Study 5, the action-by-goal interaction had a positive indirect effect on power conferral through assertiveness. Similar to Studies 2a, 2b, and 4, the action-by-goal interaction had a positive indirect effect on power conferral through competence.

To better compare the results to previous studies and to facilitate meta-analysis, we additionally conducted the same mediation analyses as in previous studies and as depicted in Figure 1 by recoding the separate goal and action variables into one self-control variable, which became the independent variable. Self-control was coded as 1 when the goal and the action were aligned (e.g., the goal was to save money for textbooks and the action was chose a bookstore gift card) and as 0 when they were not (e.g., the goal was to save money for textbooks but the action was chose a restaurant gift card). The pattern of results was consistent with the mediated moderation model. See Table 2 for the 95% confidence intervals for all indirect effects of self-control on perceived power, Table 3 for all indirect effects of self-control on power conferral, and Figure S9 for a detailed illustration of the results.

Discussion

Study S5 provided evidence that self-control, operationalized as aligning one's action with one's goal, gives rise to power, above and beyond the effects of the specific actions and goals. That is, when a target person performed a particular action, the target was perceived as more powerful and given more power when that action was consistent with the target's stated goals. However, this pattern was only significant for one of the two actions, and which action

that was varied for power perception versus conferral. Only choosing a bookstore gift card was perceived as signaling more power when it was goal-consistent than when it was not, and only choosing a restaurant gift card led to more power conferral when it was goal-consistent than when it was not.

The findings provided partial support for our predicted pattern. Whether Simon's goal was in line with his action or not affected power conferral and the mediators when Simon chose the restaurant gift card but not when he chose the bookstore gift card. Our manipulation check indicated that the effect of goal-action alignment on perceived self-control was smaller when the action was choosing the bookstore (vs. restaurant) gift card, perhaps because saving money for textbooks is a chronically active goal for our sample. When the action was choosing the bookstore gift card, the effect of goal on perceived self-control may have been too weak for us to detect the effect of self-control on power conferral and the mediators. However, this could not explain the pattern of results for power perception. Whether Simon's goal was in line with his action or not affected perceived power significantly only when he chose the bookstore gift card, but not when he chose the restaurant gift card. We are uncertain what could have caused the difference. It is possible that when Simon chose the restaurant gift card over the bookstore gift card, he appeared to be a norm violator and thus more powerful. Therefore, when he also had a goal to save money for textbooks, the effect of norm violation and low self-control may have canceled out each other. However, the main effect of action suggests that Simon was perceived in general as less powerful when he chose the restaurant rather than the bookstore gift card, which does not support the norm violation explanation. Given the puzzling nature of this specific pattern of partial significance, we later conducted Study 5, a preregistered study with a similar design but a stronger self-control manipulation.

The difficulty we had in manipulating self-control by manipulating goal-action alignment suggests that people hold a variety of lay beliefs about goals, actions, and self-control. We found that participants tended to assume that targets' actions reflected their true goals. For example, our pretest data indicated that even when explicitly told that the target's goal was to save money for dinner, participants inferred that the target had a goal to save money for textbooks when the target chose the bookstore gift card. We also found that people inferred the target's level of self-control based on their action alone. In fact, in our pretest data the target's action ($\eta_p^2 = .23$) was a stronger predictor of their perceived self-control than their action-goal alignment ($\eta_p^2 = .11$). Study S5 was therefore a conservative test of the effect of self-control, defined as action-goal alignment, on power. Nevertheless, our findings supported two key bases of the current research. First, greater goal-action consistency led to greater perceived self-control (as shown in our pretest data). Second, power perception and conferral were not just influenced by an action itself, but also by action-goal consistency.

Our mediated moderation analyses partially supported the bold paths in Figure 1. Replicating Studies 2a-5, targets whose action and goal were aligned (versus not aligned) were seen as both more assertive and more competent, which led participants to perceive these targets as more powerful and then to be more willing to give them power. Replicating Studies 2a-3 and 5, targets whose action and goal were aligned (versus not aligned) were seen as more moral, which directly led participants to be more willing to give them power. Inconsistent with the bold paths, perceived competence (similar to Studies 2a, 2b and 4) and perceived assertiveness (similar to Study 5) directly led participants to be more willing to give power to the targets.

Results after Data Exclusions

Study 1 Results After Data Exclusions ($N = 197$)

(These analyses exclude the four participants who correctly guessed our research purpose.) The target was perceived as more powerful ($\alpha > .90$) when displaying high ($M = 4.95$, $SD = 1.09$) rather than low ($M = 4.53$, $SD = 1.23$) self-control, $t(196) = 4.65$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 0.33$. The target with high self-control was also conferred more power, getting on average 5.59 votes ($SD = 2.02$), which is significantly above 5, the expected number in an equal split, $t(196) = 4.12$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 0.29$. Within-group mediation analysis with 5000-sample bootstrapping (MEMORE macro; Montoya & Hayes, 2017; Model 1) showed that perceived power mediated the effect of self-control on power conferral, 95% CI = [0.51, 1.35].

Study 2a Results After Data Exclusions ($N = 192$)

(These analyses exclude 6 participants who provided irrelevant responses, 22 who could not recall any relevant incident, and 4 who provided answers that did not align with their assigned condition.)

Manipulation Check. Participants who described an incident when their colleague exhibited high self-control ($M = 6.05$, $SD = 0.92$) rather than low self-control ($M = 4.31$, $SD = 1.35$) perceived their colleague as having more self-control, $t(154.82) = 10.29$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 1.51$, indicating our manipulation was successful.

Power Perception and Conferral. Participants perceived their colleague as more powerful after they recalled an incident in which this colleague exhibited high self-control ($M = 5.44$, $SD = 1.07$) rather than low self-control ($M = 4.05$, $SD = 1.44$), $t(162.59) = 7.51$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 1.10$. Likewise, participants were more willing to give power to a colleague when they recalled an incident in which this colleague exhibited high self-control ($M = 5.76$, $SD =$

1.20) rather than low self-control ($M = 3.96$, $SD = 1.61$), $t(162.91) = 8.67$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 1.27$.

Mediators. Participants in the high (vs. low) self-control condition rated their colleague higher on assertiveness, $t(165.90) = 5.93$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 0.86$, competence, $t(156.08) = 7.18$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 1.05$, morality, $t(149.24) = 7.32$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 1.07$, warmth, $t(190) = 5.65$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 0.82$, and authenticity, $t(172.87) = 5.68$, $p < .001$, Cohen's $d = 0.83$. See Table S4 for means and standard deviations by experimental conditions.

Table S4

Study 2a means and standard deviations of mediators by self-control conditions (after data exclusion; $N = 192$)

Self-control	Authenticity	Assertiveness	Competence	Morality	Warmth
Low ($N = 90$)	5.01 (1.31)	4.65 (1.19)	4.97 (1.19)	4.75 (1.36)	4.70 (1.20)
High ($N = 102$)	6.00 (1.08)	5.57 (0.91)	6.04 (0.83)	5.98 (0.88)	5.63 (1.10)

Note: The numbers in the parentheses are standard deviations.

Fluency of Recall. The fluency of recalling high self-control incidents ($M = 5.41$, $SD = 1.67$) was not significantly different from that of recalling low self-control ones ($M = 5.02$, $SD = 1.77$), $t(190) = 1.57$, $p = .119$, Cohen's $d = 0.23$. The previous findings still held when we controlled for ease of recall in ANCOVAs and when we regressed the dependent variables on the self-control conditions, with ease of recall as a covariate. See Tables S8 and S9 for the detailed results.

Mediation Analyses. See Table S5 for the 95% confidence intervals for all indirect effects of self-control on perceived power and Table S6 for all indirect effects of self-control on power conferral. We discuss only the bold paths and additional significant indirect effects below.

Table S5

95% confidence intervals for all indirect effects of self-control on perceived power in Studies 2a and 2b (after data exclusion)

Mediator	Study 2a	Study 2b
Assertiveness	[0.19, 0.62]	[0.13, 0.29]
Competence	[0.12, 0.72]	[0.05, 0.24]
Morality	[-0.14, 0.63]	[-0.06, 0.08]
Warmth	[-0.21, 0.20]	[-0.04, 0.03]
Authenticity	[-0.13, 0.27]	—

Table S6

95% confidence intervals for all indirect effects of self-control on power conferral

Mediator(s)	Study 2a	Study 2b
Assertiveness → Perceived Power	[0.11, 0.42]	[0.09, 0.24]
Competence → Perceived Power	[0.08, 0.45]	[0.04, 0.19]
Morality → Perceived Power	[-0.09, 0.43]	[-0.04, 0.06]
Warmth → Perceived Power	[-0.13, 0.14]	[-0.03, 0.02]
Authenticity → Perceived Power	[-0.09, 0.17]	—
Perceived Power	[0.01, 0.39]	[-0.06, 0.13]
Assertiveness	[-0.43, -0.10]	[-0.21, -0.03]
Competence	[0.02, 0.49]	[0.13, 0.47]
Morality	[-0.01, 0.70]	[0.004, 0.20]
Warmth	[-0.04, 0.36]	[-0.06, 0.05]
Authenticity	[-0.15, 0.25]	—

Note. → indicates serial mediation.

We found some significant indirect effects that were consistent with the bold paths in Figure 1. Self-control had a positive indirect effect on power conferral through assertiveness and then perceived power, and a positive indirect effect on power conferral through competence and then perceived power. However, inconsistent with the bold paths, the indirect effect of self-control on power conferral through morality was not significant.

We also found significant indirect effects other than the bold paths. Self-control had a positive indirect effect on power conferral through competence, and a negative indirect effect on power conferral through assertiveness.

Study 2b Results After Data Exclusion ($N = 418$)

(These analyses exclude 30 participants who stated they were not able to recall relevant information about their colleagues.)

Manipulation Check. The effect of our self-control manipulation was significant, $F(2, 415) = 24.74, p < .001, \eta^2 = .11$. Participants in the high self-control ($M = 6.14, SD = 0.88$) and baseline conditions ($M = 5.83, SD = 1.14$) perceived their colleagues as having more self-control than those in the low self-control condition ($M = 5.18, SD = 1.36$; high – low: 95% CI = [0.64, 1.29], $p < .001$; baseline – low: 95% CI = [0.33, 0.98], $p < .001$). Participants in the high self-control condition perceived their colleagues as having marginally more self-control than those in the baseline condition (high – baseline: 95% CI = [-0.001, 0.62], $p = .051$). Thus, we had evidence for the effectiveness of our low self-control manipulation, but weaker evidence for our high self-control manipulation.

Power Perception and Conferral. Target self-control had a significant effect on power perception, $F(2, 415) = 10.23, p < .001, \eta^2 = .05$. Replicating Study 2a, participants perceived their colleague as more powerful when they recalled their colleague exhibiting high ($M = 5.57, SD = 1.20$) rather than low self-control ($M = 4.82, SD = 1.54$; high – low: 95% CI = [0.36, 1.14], $p < .001$). Participants in the high self-control condition perceived their colleague as more powerful than those in the baseline condition ($M = 5.18, SD = 1.34$; high – baseline: 95% CI = [0.02, 0.76], $p = .038$). Participants in the low self-control condition perceived their colleague as marginally less powerful than those in the baseline condition (low – baseline: 95% CI = [-0.75, 0.02], $p = .072$).

The effect of self-control on power conferral was also significant, $F(2, 415) = 14.97, p < .001, \eta^2 = 0.07$. Replicating Study 2a, participants were more willing to give power to a

colleague when they recalled an incident in which this colleague exhibited high self-control ($M = 6.73$, $SD = 1.71$) rather than low self-control ($M = 5.08$, $SD = 3.00$; high – low: 95% CI = [0.94, 2.35], $p < .001$). Participants in the high self-control condition gave more power to their colleague than those in the baseline condition (high – baseline: 95% CI = [0.05, 1.40], $p = .031$). Participants in the low self-control condition gave less power to their colleague than those in the baseline condition ($M = 6.00$, $SD = 2.55$; low – baseline: 95% CI = [-1.62, -0.22], $p = .006$).

Mediators. Replicating Study 2a, self-control condition had significant effects on assertiveness, $F(2, 415) = 13.67$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .06$, competence, $F(2, 415) = 9.82$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .05$, morality, $F(2, 415) = 7.79$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .04$, and warmth, $F(2, 415) = 4.52$, $p = .011$, $\eta^2 = 0.02$. Compared with the low self-control condition, colleagues in the high self-control condition were rated as more assertive, 95% CI = [0.37, 0.97], $p < .001$, competent, 95% CI = [0.25, 0.81], $p < .001$, and moral, 95% CI = [0.21, 0.84], $p < .001$. Colleagues in the baseline condition were also rated as more assertive, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.65], $p = .014$, competent, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.62], $p = .013$, and moral, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.66], $p = .021$, than those in the low self-control condition. Colleagues in the baseline condition were also rated as less assertive, 95% CI = [-0.60, -0.03], $p = .028$, but similarly competent and moral ($ps > .05$ in Tukey's HSD tests) compared to those in the high self-control condition. See Table S7 for means and standard deviations by experimental conditions.

Table S7

Study 2b means and standard deviations of mediators by self-control conditions (after data exclusion; $N = 418$)

Self-control	Perceived self-control	Perceived power	Power conferral	Assertiveness	Competence	Morality	Warmth
--------------	------------------------	-----------------	-----------------	---------------	------------	----------	--------

Low (N = 124)	5.18 (1.36) ^a	4.82 (1.54) ^a	5.08 (3.00) ^a	4.99 (1.13) ^a	5.62 (1.24) ^a	5.53 (1.29) ^a	5.14 (1.58) ^a
Baseline (N = 151)	5.83 (1.14) ^b	5.18 (1.34) ^a	6.00 (2.55) ^b	5.35 (1.09) ^b	5.96 (0.89) ^b	5.88 (1.08) ^b	5.47 (1.27) ^{ab}
High (N = 143)	6.14 (0.88) ^b	5.57 (1.20) ^b	6.73 (1.71) ^c	5.66 (0.90) ^c	6.15 (0.81) ^b	6.05 (0.89) ^b	5.62 (1.12) ^b

Note: For each dependent variable, values marked by different letters are different at $p < .05$ in Tukey's HSD tests.

Fluency of Recall. Self-control condition also had a significant effect on the fluency of recall, $F(2, 415) = 8.43, p < .001, \eta^2 = .04$. Participants found it easier to recall their colleagues' high self-control incidents ($M = 5.06, SD = 1.72$; high – low: 95% CI = [0.17, 1.20], $p = .005$) and typical days ($M = 5.23, SD = 1.77$; baseline – low: 95% CI = [0.34, 1.35], $p < .001$) than low self-control incidents ($M = 4.38, SD = 1.84$). The high self-control and baseline conditions did not differ significantly (high – baseline: 95% CI = [-0.65, 0.33], $p = .714$). However, the main findings still held when we controlled for ease of recall in ANCOVAs and when we regressed the dependent variables on the self-control conditions, with ease of recall as a covariate. See Tables S8 and S9 for the detailed results.

Mediation Analyses. See Table S5 for the 95% confidence intervals for all indirect effects of self-control on perceived power and Table S6 for all indirect effects of self-control on power conferral. We discuss only the bold paths and additional significant indirect effects below.

We found some significant indirect effects that were consistent with the bold paths in Figure 1. Self-control had a positive indirect effect on power conferral through assertiveness and then perceived power, and a positive indirect effect on power conferral through competence and then perceived power. In addition to these serial mediations, self-control had a positive indirect effect on power conferral through morality.

We also found significant indirect effects other than the bold paths. Self-control had a positive indirect effect on power conferral through competence, and a negative indirect effect on power conferral through assertiveness.

Tables for Additional Results

Table S8

Main effects of self-control in ANCOVAs controlling for ease of recall in Studies 2a and 2b

Dependent variable	Study 2a		Study 2a (post-exclusion)		Study 2b		Study 2b (post-exclusion)	
	<i>F</i> (1, 221)	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1,189)	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (2, 444)	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (2, 414)	η_p^2
Self-control	51.53***	0.19	109.82***	0.37	12.66***	0.05	22.00***	0.10
Perceived power	32.79***	0.13	58.18***	0.24	5.32**	0.02	8.51***	0.04
Power conferral	33.56***	0.13	77.11***	0.29	7.43***	0.03	13.44***	0.06
Assertiveness	21.00***	0.09	35.27***	0.16	9.51***	0.04	12.80***	0.06
Competence	34.41***	0.13	55.10***	0.23	3.77*	0.02	7.83***	0.04
Morality	27.31***	0.11	55.43***	0.23	3.43*	0.02	6.72**	0.03
Warmth	14.69***	0.06	30.13***	0.14	2.13	0.01	3.78*	0.02
Authenticity	15.81***	0.07	32.04***	0.14	—	—	—	—

Note: + $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table S9

Coefficients and standard errors of self-control in regressions controlling for ease of recall in Studies 2a and 2b

Dependent variable	Study 2a	Study 2a (post-exclusion)	Study 2b			Study 2b (post-exclusion)		
	high vs. low	high vs. low	high vs. low	baseline vs. low	high vs. baseline	high vs. low	baseline vs. low	high vs. baseline
Self-control	1.28 (0.18)***	1.74 (0.17)***	0.35 (0.07)***	0.45 (0.15)**	0.27 (0.12)*	0.47 (0.07)***	0.63 (0.15)***	0.33 (0.12)**
Perceived power	1.03 (0.18)***	1.40 (0.18)***	0.26 (0.08)**	0.20 (0.17)	0.34 (0.15)*	0.35 (0.09)***	0.28 (0.18)	0.41 (0.15)**
Power conferral	1.23 (0.21)***	1.80 (0.21)***	0.59 (0.15)***	0.56 (0.33) ⁺	0.61 (0.26)*	0.81 (0.15)***	0.83 (0.34)*	0.75 (0.25)**
Assertiveness	0.69 (0.15)***	0.91 (0.15)***	0.27 (0.06)***	0.27 (0.13)*	0.29 (0.12)*	0.33 (0.06)***	0.35 (0.14)*	0.32 (0.11)**
Competence	0.83 (0.14)***	1.09 (0.15)***	0.17 (0.06)**	0.16 (0.13)	0.17 (0.10) ⁺	0.25 (0.06)***	0.28 (0.13)*	0.21 (0.10)*
Morality	0.88 (0.17)***	1.23 (0.16)***	0.18 (0.07)**	0.22 (0.14)	0.14 (0.12)	0.26 (0.07)***	0.33 (0.15)*	0.18 (0.11)
Warmth	0.64 (0.17)***	0.92 (0.17)***	0.17 (0.08)*	0.22 (0.17)	0.14 (0.14)	0.23 (0.08)**	0.32 (0.18) ⁺	0.17 (0.14)
Authenticity	0.68 (0.17)***	0.98 (0.17)***	—	—	—	—	—	—

Note: ⁺ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table S10*Study 3 ANOVA results*

Dependent variable	Self-control		Decision speed		Interaction	
	<i>F</i> (1,398)	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1,398)	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1,398)	η_p^2
Perceived power	22.44***	0.05	1.24	< 0.01	0.24	< 0.01
Power conferral	12.57***	0.03	0.07	< 0.01	0.23	< 0.01
Assertiveness	60.35***	0.13	0.22	< 0.01	0.37	< 0.01
Competence	24.24***	0.06	2.12	0.01	1.58	< 0.01
Morality	26.09***	0.06	1.02	< 0.01	0.62	< 0.01
Warmth	8.52**	0.02	5.04*	0.01	1.82	< 0.01
Authenticity	41.01***	0.09	3.21 ⁺	0.01	2.04	0.01

Note: ⁺ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table S11*Study 4 ANOVA results*

Dependent variable	Self-control		Decision speed		Interaction	
	<i>F</i> (1,397)	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1,397)	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1,397)	η_p^2
Perceived power	12.67***	0.03	0.02	< 0.01	1.87	< 0.01
Power conferral	10.12**	0.02	1.15	< 0.01	1.1	< 0.01
Assertiveness	89.28***	0.18	0.01	< 0.01	1.21	< 0.01
Competence	14.83***	0.04	0.68	< 0.01	0.72	< 0.01
Morality	13.63***	0.03	3.43 ⁺	0.01	0.48	< 0.01
Warmth	0.004	< 0.01	4.81*	0.01	0.04	< 0.01
Authenticity	27.41***	0.06	2.29	0.01	0.96	< 0.01

Note: ⁺ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table S12*Study 5 ANOVA results*

Dependent variable	Action		Goal		Interaction	
	<i>F</i> (1, 798)	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1, 798)	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1, 798)	η_p^2
Perceived power	74.96***	0.09	28.86***	0.03	48.39***	0.06
Power conferral	63.45***	0.07	23.24***	0.03	55.63***	0.07
Assertiveness	264.38***	0.25	165.23***	0.17	215.67***	0.21
Competence	57.47***	0.07	49.82***	0.06	75.81***	0.09
Morality	24.75***	0.03	24.34***	0.03	40.47***	0.05
Warmth	0.37	< 0.01	0.41	< 0.01	1.81	< 0.01

Note: + $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Table S13*Study S5 ANOVA results*

Dependent variable	Action		Goal		Interaction	
	<i>F</i> (1, 695)	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1, 695)	η_p^2	<i>F</i> (1, 695)	η_p^2
Perceived power	27.56***	0.04	4.02*	0.01	6.16*	0.01
Power conferral	46.45***	0.06	0.41	< 0.01	7.29**	0.01
Assertiveness	30.47***	0.04	0.25	< 0.01	5.55*	0.01
Competence	40.07***	0.05	0.03	< 0.01	7.07**	0.01
Morality	30.95***	0.04	1.5	< 0.01	10.79**	0.02
Warmth	3.28 ⁺	< 0.01	0.73	< 0.01	3.63 ⁺	0.01
Authenticity	8.07**	0.01	0.7	< 0.01	4.19*	0.01

Note: + $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Confirmatory Factor Analyses

Distinction between Perceived Power and Power Conferral

To examine discriminant validity, for each study that used multiple-item measures for both perceived power and power conferral, we compared two CFA models (Wang & Eastwick, 2020): a two-factor model in which the perceived power items and the power conferral items loaded onto their respective latent construct, and a single-factor model where all items loaded onto the same latent construct. Nested chi-square tests showed that the two-factor models always had a significantly better fit than the single-factor models. See Table S14.

Table S14

Examining discriminant validity of perceived power and power conferral measures with confirmatory factor analysis

Study	Two-factor model				Single-factor model				Comparison
	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR	$\Delta\chi^2(1)$
Study 2a	0.96	0.94	0.13	0.04	0.92	0.88	0.18	0.06	78.77***
Study 2b	0.97	0.95	0.10	0.04	0.85	0.79	0.21	0.07	318.40***
Study 3	0.98	0.96	0.08	0.04	0.89	0.85	0.17	0.06	170.82***
Study 4	0.99	0.98	0.06	0.03	0.88	0.83	0.19	0.07	255.45***
Study 5	0.99	0.99	0.05	0.02	0.87	0.83	0.19	0.07	936.09***
Study S5	0.98	0.97	0.07	0.04	0.79	0.71	0.21	0.09	571.35***

Note: CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker–Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual. *** $p < .001$. Study 5 used a different measure of power conferral than the other studies (see Appendix C of the main text).

Discriminant Validity of Other Mediators

We also conducted confirmatory factor analyses to examine the discriminant validity of the mediators assertiveness, competence, morality, warmth, and authenticity.

In studies that measured authenticity, we compared alternative models with a five-factor model in which assertiveness, competence, morality, warmth, and authenticity each loaded onto a separate latent construct. To test the possibility that we only measured valence or positivity with these measures, we compared the five-factor model with an alternative single-factor model where all items loaded onto a single latent construct. To show the importance of treating the two facets within each person perception dimension separately, we compared the five-factor model with an alternative three-factor model where assertiveness and competence items loaded onto one latent construct (agency), and morality and warmth items loaded onto another latent construct (communion). Due to possible conceptual overlap between authenticity and assertiveness, and between authenticity and morality, we also tested two four-factor models: one that loaded authenticity and assertiveness onto the same latent construct and another that loaded authenticity and morality onto the same latent construct. Nested chi-square tests showed that the five-factor models always had a significantly better fit than the alternative models. See Table S15.

Table S15

Factor structure of mediators in studies that measured authenticity

Model	Model fit				Comparison	
	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR	$\Delta\chi^2$	<i>df</i>
Study 2a						
single-factor model	0.81	0.79	0.14	0.08	557.64***	10
three-factor model	0.90	0.88	0.10	0.06	153.52***	7
four-factor model 1	0.88	0.86	0.11	0.08	229.37***	4
four-factor model 2	0.92	0.90	0.09	0.06	60.61***	4
five-factor model	0.93	0.92	0.09	0.06		
Study 3						
single-factor model	0.85	0.83	0.12	0.06	718.76***	10

three-factor model	0.91	0.90	0.10	0.06	176.11 ^{***}	7
four-factor model 1	0.91	0.90	0.10	0.06	207.47 ^{***}	4
four-factor model 2	0.92	0.90	0.10	0.05	157.59 ^{***}	4
five-factor model	0.93	0.92	0.09	0.05		
Study 4						
single-factor model	0.80	0.78	0.14	0.09	961.70 ^{***}	10
three-factor model	0.86	0.84	0.12	0.09	478.11 ^{***}	7
four-factor model 1	0.89	0.88	0.11	0.07	179.75 ^{***}	4
four-factor model 2	0.90	0.88	0.10	0.07	162.07 ^{***}	4
five-factor model	0.91	0.90	0.10	0.07		
Study S5						
single-factor model	0.84	0.82	0.12	0.07	1403.20 ^{***}	10
three-factor model	0.92	0.91	0.08	0.06	331.41 ^{***}	7
four-factor model 1	0.93	0.92	0.08	0.05	232.32 ^{***}	4
four-factor model 2	0.93	0.92	0.08	0.05	221.86 ^{***}	4
five-factor model	0.95	0.94	0.07	0.05		
Study 6						
single-factor model	0.81	0.79	0.11	0.07	501.87 ^{***}	10
three-factor model	0.87	0.85	0.09	0.07	232.04 ^{***}	7
four-factor model 1	0.90	0.88	0.08	0.06	107.97 ^{***}	4
four-factor model 2	0.90	0.89	0.08	0.06	67.40 ^{***}	4
five-factor model	0.92	0.91	0.08	0.05		

Note: CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker–Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual. ^{***} $p < .001$. The comparison was with the five-factor model. Four-factor model 1 loaded assertiveness and authenticity onto the same latent construct. Four-factor model 2 loaded morality and authenticity onto the same latent construct.

In studies that did not measure authenticity, we compared a four-factor model where assertiveness, competence, morality, and warmth each loaded onto its own latent construct with

two alternative models. In the first alternative model, all items loaded onto a single latent construct (valence/positivity). In the second alternative model, assertiveness and competence items loaded onto one latent construct (agency) whereas morality and warmth loaded onto another latent construct (communion). Nested chi-square tests showed that the four-factor models always had a significantly better fit than the alternative models. See Table S16.

Table S16

Factor structure of mediators in studies that did not measure authenticity

Model	Model fit				Comparison	
	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR	$\Delta\chi^2$	<i>df</i>
Study 2b						
single-factor model	0.75	0.71	0.15	0.10	871.28***	6
two-factor model	0.84	0.82	0.12	0.09	340.39***	5
four-factor model	0.90	0.88	0.10	0.08		
Study 5						
single-factor model	0.85	0.83	0.13	0.08	1273.70***	6
two-factor model	0.90	0.89	0.10	0.07	523.86***	5
four-factor model	0.94	0.93	0.08	0.05		

Note: CFI = comparative fit index; TLI = Tucker–Lewis index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean square residual. *** $p < .001$. The comparison was with the four-factor model.

Additional Details for Mediation Models

Model Syntax (in *lavaan*)

Mediation Analyses in Studies 2a, 3, 4, 6, and Meta-analysis.

```
' # direct effect
powerConferral ~ e*selfControl
powerPerception ~ c*selfControl
# mediator
Assertiveness ~ a1*selfControl
Competence ~ a2*selfControl
```

```

Morality ~ a3*selfControl
Warmth ~ a4*selfControl
Authenticity ~ a5*selfControl
powerPerception ~ b1*Assertiveness + b2*Competence +
    b3*Morality + b4* Warmth + b5*Authenticity
powerConferral ~ d1*Assertiveness + d2*Competence +
    d3*Morality + d4*Warmth + d5*Authenticity + d6*powerPerception
# correlations
Authenticity ~~ Assertiveness + Competence + Warmth + Morality
Assertiveness ~~ Competence + Warmth + Morality
Competence ~~ Warmth + Morality
Warmth ~~ Morality
# indirect effect
ab1 := a1*b1
ab2 := a2*b2
ab3 := a3*b3
ab4 := a4*b4
ab5 := a5*b5
ab1d6 := a1*b1*d6
ab2d6 := a2*b2*d6
ab3d6 := a3*b3*d6
ab4d6 := a4*b4*d6
ab5d6 := a5*b5*d6
cd6 := c*d6
ad1 := a1*d1
ad2 := a2*d2
ad3 := a3*d3
ad4 := a4*d4
ad5 := a5*d5
# total effect
totalP := c + (a1*b1) + (a2*b2) + (a3*b3) + (a4*b4) + (a5*b5)
totalC := e + (a1*d1) + (a2*d2) + (a3*d3) + (a4*d4) + (a5*d5) + (c*d6) +
    (a1*b1*d6) + (a2*b2*d6) + (a3*b3*d6) + (a4*b4*d6) + (a5*b5*d6)
,

```

Mediation Analyses in Studies 2b and 5.

```

' # direct effect
powerConferral ~ e*selfControl
powerPerception ~ c*selfControl
# mediator
Assertiveness ~ a1*selfControl
Competence ~ a2*selfControl
Morality ~ a3*selfControl
Warmth ~ a4*selfControl
powerPerception ~ b1*Assertiveness + b2*Competence + b3*Morality + b4*Warmth
powerConferral ~ d1*Assertiveness + d2*Competence + d3*Morality + d4*Warmth +

```

```

    d5*powerPerception
# correlations
Assertiveness ~ Competence + Warmth + Morality
Competence ~ Warmth + Morality
Warmth ~ Morality
# indirect effect
ab1 := a1*b1
ab2 := a2*b2
ab3 := a3*b3
ab4 := a4*b4
ab1d5 := a1*b1*d5
ab2d5 := a2*b2*d5
ab3d5 := a3*b3*d5
ab4d5 := a4*b4*d5
cd5 := c*d5
ad1 := a1*d1
ad2 := a2*d2
ad3 := a3*d3
ad4 := a4*d4
# total effect
totalP := c + (a1*b1) + (a2*b2) + (a3*b3) + (a4*b4)
totalC := e + (a1*d1) + (a2*d2) + (a3*d3) + (a4*d4) + (c*d5) +
          (a1*b1*d5) + (a2*b2*d5) + (a3*b3*d5) + (a4*b4*d5)
,

```

Mediated Moderation Analyses in Study 5.

```

' # direct effect
powerConferral ~ e1*action + e2*goal + e3*action:goal
powerPerception ~ c1*action + c2*goal + c3*action:goal
# mediator
Assertiveness ~ a11*action + a12*goal + a13*action:goal
Competence ~ a21*action + a22*goal + a23*action:goal
Morality ~ a31*action + a32*goal + a33*action:goal
Warmth ~ a41*action + a42*goal + a43*action:goal
powerPerception ~ b1*Assertiveness + b2*Competence +
                  b3*Morality + b4*Warmth
powerConferral ~ d1*Assertiveness + d2*Competence +
                  d3*Morality + d4*Warmth + d5*powerPerception
# correlations
Assertiveness ~ Competence + Warmth + Morality
Competence ~ Warmth + Morality
Warmth ~ Morality
# index of mediation
a13b1 := a13*b1
a23b2 := a23*b2

```

```

a33b3 := a33*b3
a43b4 := a43*b4
a13b1d5 := a13*b1*d5
a23b2d5 := a23*b2*d5
a33b3d5 := a33*b3*d5
a43b4d5 := a43*b4*d5
c3d5 := c3*d5
a13d1 := a13*d1
a23d2 := a23*d2
a33d3 := a33*d3
a43d4 := a43*d4

```

Mediated Moderation Analyses in Study S5.

```

' # direct effect
powerConferral ~ e1*action + e2*goal + e3*action:goal
powerPerception ~ c1*action + c2*goal + c3*action:goal
# mediator
Assertiveness ~ a11*action + a12*goal + a13*action:goal
Competence ~ a21*action + a22*goal + a23*action:goal
Morality ~ a31*action + a32*goal + a33*action:goal
Warmth ~ a41*action + a42*goal + a43*action:goal
Authenticity ~ a51*action + a52*goal + a53*action:goal
powerPerception ~ b1*Assertiveness + b2*Competence +
  b3*Morality + b4*Warmth + b5*Authenticity
powerConferral ~ d1*Assertiveness + d2*Competence +
  d3*Morality + d4*Warmth + d5*Authenticity + d6*powerPerception
# correlations
Authenticity ~~ Assertiveness + Competence + Warmth + Morality
Assertiveness ~~ Competence + Warmth + Morality
Competence ~~ Warmth + Morality
Warmth ~~ Morality
# index of mediation
a13b1 := a13*b1
a23b2 := a23*b2
a33b3 := a33*b3
a43b4 := a43*b4
a53b5 := a53*b5
a13b1d6 := a13*b1*d6
a23b2d6 := a23*b2*d6
a33b3d6 := a33*b3*d6
a43b4d6 := a43*b4*d6
a53b5d6 := a53*b5*d6
c3d6 := c3*d6
a13d1 := a13*d1

```

a23d2 := a23*d2


a33d3 := a33*d3

a43d4 := a43*d4

a53d5 := a53*d5


,

Figure S2 Mediation Model for Study 2a.




Note. Unstandardized coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Figure S3. Mediation Model for Study 2b.




Note. Unstandardized coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Figure S4. Mediation Model for Study 3.




Note. Unstandardized coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Figure S5. Mediation Model for Study 4.




Note. Unstandardized coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Figure S6. Mediated Moderation Model for Study 5.




Note. Unstandardized coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Figure S7. Mediation Model for Study 5.




Note. Unstandardized coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Figure S8. Mediated Moderation Model for Study S5.




Note. Unstandardized coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Figure S9. Mediation Model for Study S5.



Note. Unstandardized coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

Figure S10. Mediation Model for Study 6.



Note. Unstandardized coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.

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