**The Geography of Military Occupation and its Effect on Palestinian Community Cohesion, Norms and Resistance Motivation**

Supplementary material

Table S1. *Mediation Analysis of the Impact of Community Cohesion on Nonviolent action tendency and Motivation for Resistance via Solidarity Norms*, *while controlling for National Identification and Collective Efficacy.*

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Solidarity norms | Nonviolent action tendency | Motivation for resistance |
| Female | .054 (.036) | -.110\*\* (.034) | -.101\*\* (.035) |
| Age | .107\*\* (.037) | -.163\*\*\* (.035) | -.007 (.035) |
| Secondary education | .008 (.037) | .089\*\* (.034) | .042 (.035) |
| Direct victimization | -.056 (.038) | .080\* (.036) | .004 (.037) |
| Humiliation | .051 (.037) | .028 (.035) | .114\*\* (.035) |
| Socio-economic exclusion | -.056 (.035) | -.007 (.033) | -.065 (.034) |
| Community cohesion | .086\* (.035) | .080\* (.032) | .069\* (.033) |
| Solidarity norms |  | .110\*\*\* (.032) | -.015 (.033) |
| National identification | .050 (.034) | .028 (.032) | -.046 (.033) |
| Collective efficacy | .008 (.035) | .015 (.032) | .180\*\*\* (.033) |
| Model fit | R-sq=.029, F(9/842)=2.808, p<.01, N=852 | R-sq=.092,  F(10/841)=8.522, p<.001, N=852 | R-sq=.080, F(10/872)=7.565, p<.001, N=883 |
| Indirect effects:  (1) Community cohesion → Solidarity norms → Nonviolent action tendency:  Effect=.009, *SE*=.005, 95 % CI=.001, .020  (2) Community cohesion → Solidarity norms → Motivation for resistance:  Effect=-.001, *SE*=.003, 95 % CI=-.008, .005 | | | |

*Note.* \* *p*<.05, \*\**p*<.01, \*\*\**p*<.001. Standardized coefficients and standard errors in brackets

Table S2.

*Multilevel Models of the Effect of the Proximity to Surveillance Infrastructure (Model 1) and Settlements (Model 2) on Community Cohesion, Norms and Resistance Motivation, with Community-Level Control Indicators*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Community cohesion | | Solidarity norms | | Nonviolent action tendency | | Motivation for resistance | |
|  | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 |
| *Community-level* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Population size | .071 (.056) | .064 (.056) | .064 (.051) | .057 (.050) | -.003 (.059) | -.016 (.064) | -.030 (.059) | -.031 (.058) |
| Number of fatalities | -.113\* (.053) | -.116\* (.053) | -.131\* (.049) | -.145\* (.052) | .178\*\* (.055) | .167\*\* (.059) | .057 (.056) | .061 (.054) |
| Camp | .020 (.051) | .021 (.051) | .066 (.048) | .057 (.050) | -.119\* (.053) | -.122\* (.058) | -.055 (.054) | -.049 (.053) |
| Jerusalem | .024 (.049) | -.040 (.049) | -.127\*\* (.044) | -.154\* (.047) | -.077 (.048) | -.155\*\* (.052) | .126\* (.050) | .098 (.050) |
| Proximity to surveillance | -.105\* (.046) |  | -.099\* (.043) |  | -.162\*\* (.048) |  | -.017 (.049) |  |
| Proximity to settlements |  | -.103\* (.047) |  | .006 (.045) |  | -.107\* (.051) |  | -.070 (.048) |
| *Random effects (SD)* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Individual | .447 | .447 | .612 | .612 | .841 | .840 | .631 | .631 |
| Communal | .096 | .097 | .110 | .126 | .209 | .239 | .155 | .148 |
| *Model fit* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Deviance | 1224.1 | 1224.5 | 1751.4 | 1757.2 | 2317.9 | 2325.0 | 1853.0 | 1850.7 |
| Chi-sq1 (df) | 5.613 (1)\* | 5.231 (1)\* | 5.853 (1)\* | .017 (1) | 11.799 (1)\*\*\* | 4.729 (1)\* | .151 (1) | 2.429 (1) |
| N | 981 | 981 | 938 | 938 | 921 | 921 | 953 | 953 |

*Note.* \* *p*<.05, \*\**p*<.01. Models controlling for the same individual-level variables as shown in Table 2, Manuscript. Standardized coefficients and standard errors are in brackets. 1 Comparison to the model without the indicators of the geography of occupation.

Table S3.

*Multilevel Models of the Proximity to Surveillance Infrastructure (Model 1) and Settlements (Model 2) on Community Cohesion, Norms and Resistance Motivation, among the respondents who never moved.*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Community cohesion | | Solidarity norms | | Nonviolent action tendency | | Motivation for resistance | |
|  | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 | M1 | M2 |
| *Community-level* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Proximity to surveillance | -.112\* (.045) |  | -.139\*\* (.051) |  | -.171\*\* (.051) |  | .008 (.052) |  |
| Proximity to settlements |  | -.096\* (.046) |  | .061 (.055) |  | -.089 (.056) |  | -.125\* (.049) |
| *Random effects (SD)* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Individual | .437 | .437 | .596 | .596 | .839 | .839 | .629 | .629 |
| Communal | .083 | .087 | .160 | .178 | .240 | .275 | .176 | .156 |
| *Model fit* |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Deviance | 919.87 | 921.58 | 1340.8 | 1346.7 | 1823.8 | 1831.6 | 1448 | 1441.5 |
| Chi-sq1 (df) | 6.185 (1)\* | 4.474 (1)\* | 7.250 (1)\*\* | 1.295 (1) | 10.409 (1)\*\* | 2.624 (1) | .025 (1) | 6.483 (1)\* |
| N | 765 | 765 | 729 | 729 | 721 | 721 | 742 | 742 |

*Note.* \* *p*<.05, \*\**p*<.01. Models controlling for the same individual-level variables as shown in Table 2, Manuscript. Standardized coefficients and standard errors are in brackets. 1 Comparison to the model without the community-level indicator.

Table S4.

*Multilevel Models of the Effect of the Proximity to Separation Barrier on Community Community Cohesion, Norms and Resistance Motivation, controlling for Fatalities Before 2002.*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Community cohesion | Solidarity norms | Nonviolent action tendency | Motivation for resistance |
| *Community-level* |  |  |  |  |
| Proximity to separation barrier | -.102\* (.042) | -.164\*\*\* (.043) | -.187\*\*\* (.049) | .060 (.049) |
| Number of fatalities  before 2002 | -.124\*\* (.042) | -.143\*\* (.043) | .006 (.049) | .007 (.049) |
| *Random effects (SD)* |  |  |  |  |
| Individual | .447 | .612 | .840 | .631 |
| Communal | .087 | .122 | .240 | .172 |
| *Model fit* |  |  |  |  |
| Deviance | 1223.5 | 1760.1 | 2328.4 | 1862.6 |
| Chi-sq1 (df) | 5.830 (1)\* | 13.952 (1)\*\*\* | 13.336 (1)\*\*\* | 1.564 (1) |
| N | 981 | 938 | 921 | 953 |

*Note.* \* *p*<.05, \*\**p*<.01. Models controlling for the same individual-level variables as shown in Table 2, Manuscript. Standardized coefficients

and standard errors are in brackets. 1 Comparison to the model without Proximity to separation barrier.