Supplementary Information for

How expertise mediates the effects of numerical and textual communication on individual and collective accuracy

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Effects on standardized individual prediction values

Table S1 shows the results from OLS regression of standardized prediction values on the specified subject features (Models 1-3) and a multilevel regression with random coefficients for subjects and questions (Model 4). Models 5-6 also include expertise interacted with the anchor values, while models 7-8 include expertise interacted with reasoning skill. Note that these interactions are significant for expertise but not reasoning skill.

				Dependent v	variable:				
				Raw Prediction	on Value				
		OLS	r	linear nixed-effects		OLS	OLS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	
Anchor Value	0.326***	0.247^{***}	0.266***	0.278^{***}	0.172^{***}	0.238***	0.258^{***}	0.227^{**}	
	(0.027)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.080)	
Anchor ²	-0.004	-0.004	0.002	-0.005	-0.017	0.038	-0.018	0.059	
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.048)	
Anchor ³	-0.020**	-0.019^{**}	-0.012	-0.011	0.011	-0.024	-0.010	0.017	
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.021)	(0.011)	(0.025)	
Question Order		0.007**	0.007**	0.008**					
		(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)					
Confidence			0.055***	0.052***					
			(0.014)	(0.014)					
Self-judged 'Expertise'			0.004	0.003					
		0.011**	(0.017)	(0.017)					
Anchor Value * Order Taken		0.011**	0.007	0.007					
		(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	0.0004	0.000			
Expertise (accuracy)					0.0004 (0.019)	-0.020			
Apphor * Exportion					(0.019) -0.113^{***}	(0.022) -0.050			
Anchor * Expertise					(0.032)	(0.044)			
Anchor ² * Expertise					(0.032)	(0.044) 0.053^*			
Anchoi Expertise						(0.033)			
Anchor ³ * Expertise						(0.028) -0.033^{**}			
						(0.016)			
Reasoning skill						(0.010)	0.018	0.034^{*}	
							(0.017)	(0.019)	
Anchor * R. Skill							0.006	0.022	
							(0.025)	(0.034)	
Anchor ² * R. Skill							(01020)	-0.036^{*}	
								(0.020)	
Anchor ³ * R. Skill								-0.013	
								(0.011)	
Constant	-0.001	-0.054**	-0.204^{***}	-0.192^{***}	0.010	-0.013	-0.046	-0.079^{*}	
	(0.016)	(0.027)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.042)	(0.046)	
Observations	2,800	2,800	2,262	2,262	1,252	1,252	1,325	1,325	
R ²	0.070	0.074	0.083	2,202	0.094	0.098	0.072	0.075	
Adjusted R ²	0.069	0.072	0.080		0.090	0.093	0.069	0.070	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2.000		2.000	4,975.201	2.000	2.000	3.000	0.0.0	
Bayesian Inf. Crit.				5,038.165					

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Note that in these and the following models, N may be reduced due to only a subset of subjects either completing the reasoning task, or answering sufficient questions to allow for an accuracy-based expertise measure; N is further reduced in the split-sample models.

Effects on individual prediction accuracy

Table S2 shows the results from OLS and multilevel regression of standardized prediction accuracy (squared error, inverted) on the specified subject features. Linear mixed-effects models contain random effects for individuals and questions.

			Dej	pendent variable	:			
			Accuracy (squared error, re	versed)			
	OLS		linear mixed-effects		OLS		linear mixed-effects	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5) High	(6) Low	(7)	
Anchor Shown	0.238^{***} (0.069)	0.239^{***} (0.062)	0.251^{***} (0.077)	0.468^{***} (0.177)	0.179 (0.139)	0.351^{**} (0.149)	0.159 (0.138)	
Question Order	0.020***	0.014**	(0.017) (0.012) (0.008)	(0.117) 0.012 (0.008)	0.038	0.041	0.041**	
Reason Shown	(0.007) 0.007	(0.007) -0.004	0.035	0.315^{*}	(0.025) 0.099 (0.128)	(0.029) 0.401^{***}	(0.017) 0.152 (0.137)	
Reason Requested	(0.069) -0.185^{**}	(0.062) -0.117^{*}	(0.077) -0.109 (0.082)	(0.177) -0.103 (0.082)	(0.138) 0.111 (0.148)	(0.149) -0.539^{***}	(0.137) -0.170^{*}	
Confidence	(0.074) 0.113^{***}	(0.067) 0.040	(0.082) 0.050 (0.037)	(0.082) 0.048 (0.027)	(0.148) 0.121^*	(0.160) 0.161^{**}	(0.097) 0.076^{*}	
Self-judged 'Expertise'	(0.032) -0.170^{***} (0.039)	(0.031) -0.143^{***} (0.037)	(0.037) -0.056 (0.046)	(0.037) -0.058 (0.046)	(0.064) -0.081 (0.088)	(0.068) -0.123 (0.076)	(0.042) -0.076 (0.051)	
Time Taken	(0.039) 0.343^{***} (0.041)	(0.037) 0.219^{***} (0.040)	(0.040) 0.201^{***} (0.047)	(0.040) 0.201^{***} (0.047)	(0.088) 0.291^{***} (0.085)	(0.070) 0.559^{***} (0.089)	0.259** (0.056)	
Reasoning Ability	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.037) (0.037)	(0.0017) 0.203^{***} (0.065)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Anchor Shown * R. Ability			(0.001)	(0.000) (0.100) (0.074)				
Reason Shown * R. Ability				(0.071) -0.129^{*} (0.074)				
Expertise				(0.014)			0.216^{**} (0.100)	
Anchor Shown * Expertise							(0.100) -0.091 (0.103)	
Reason Shown * Expertise							(0.103) -0.073 (0.103)	
Constant	-2.791^{***} (0.213)	-2.078^{***} (0.330)	-2.292^{***} (0.377)	-2.547^{***} (0.394)	-3.177^{***} (0.529)	-4.247^{***} (0.543)	(0.103) -2.686^{**} (0.455)	
Observations R ²	4,467 0.026	4,467	2,384	2,384	1,021 0.023	997 0.065	2,026	
Adjusted R ² Akaike Inf. Crit.	0.024	19,302.680	9,842.834	9,848.650	0.016	0.058	8,704.086	
Bayesian Inf. Crit.		19,373.130	9,906.376	9,923.745			8,777.066	

Although it was not originally part of our experimental design, our results illuminate one way in which expertise causally determines success. Note that time taken is strongly associated with accuracy ($\beta = 0.34$, p < 0.001), though this association is somewhat weaker for experts. In general, of course, it is unclear whether time taken causes success, or is merely a correlate of it, but we also noted that asking subjects to provide a reason ("Reason Requested") both increases the time taken on a task, and decreases accuracy for the low-expertise subjects (low: $\beta = -0.54$, p < 0.001; high: $\beta = 0.11$, p = 0.453). This treatment was randomized per subject and functions as a handy instrument for time taken. By examining the effect on accuracy of requesting a reason with and without controlling for time taken, we find that for experts, requesting a reason increases the time they spend on a problem, and that extra time (instrumented by the requested reason) boosts their accuracy; however, this effect is offset by the request itself, which seems to harm accuracy. For non-experts, while the request similarly boosts time taken and thereby accuacy, the directly harmful effect is larger, with a conditionally negative effect of the request when controlling for time taken. These results are in line with work finding that explicit reflection can lead to lower accuracy , but our results also suggest that this direct reasoning cost is higher for lower-expertise subjects, and in fact if you take into account the additional time reasoning requires, the net benefit may be positive for higher-expertise subjects. In sum, experts are more sensitive to the quality of the information they receive, are more likely to discount low-quality information, and are only benefited by being forced to take more time or reason explicitly, while the opposite holds for non-experts. In practice, these findings suggest an accuracy-maximizing strategy of eliciting predictions and reasons from experts (who are not harmed by the request) and delivering that information preferentially to non-experts (who benefit most).

Effects of reason content on individual accuracy

Table S3 shows the effects of various NLP content on individual accuracy, also subdivided by expert (High) and non-expert (Low) subjects and interacted with expertise (Int). Table S4 shows the effect of a reason's rated accuracy. Rating values are the mean of all subjects who saw that reason, which generally ranges between 1 and 10 subjects. Table S5 shows the effects of the unseen anchor value made by the author of a treatment reason.

		Dependent	variable:	
		MSE Acc	uracy	
	All	High	Low	Int
Num. Words	0.006	-0.018	0.018^{*}	-0.004
	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Avg. Word Length	-0.003	-0.009^{*}	0.002	-0.010**
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Includes Numbers	0.284**	0.757***	0.152	1.044***
	(0.131)	(0.284)	(0.216)	(0.288)
Repeated CAPS	-0.143	0.375	-0.168	0.197
	(0.267)	(0.659)	(0.405)	(0.362)
Has questions	-0.076	0.081	-0.714	-0.433
•	(0.255)	(0.568)	(0.452)	(0.402)
Includes URL	0.426**	0.154	0.393	0.552
	(0.172)	(0.387)	(0.272)	(0.385)
Expertise	· · · ·	. ,	· · · ·	0.034
·				(0.104)
Avg. Word Length * Expertise				-0.003
3 3				(0.007)
Includes Numbers * Expertise				0.458**
				(0.209)
Includes URL * Expertise				0.104
				(0.290)
Constant	-1.282^{***}	-0.928^{***}	-1.290^{***}	-1.033***
	(0.113)	(0.242)	(0.183)	(0.191)
Observations	2,249	468	536	861
R ²	0.007	0.024	0.021	0.029
Adjusted R ²	0.004	0.012	0.009	0.018
Note:		*r	o<0.1; **p<0.0	5: ***p<0.01

				Dependent va	ariable:			
				Raw Predic	tion			
	(1) All	(2) High	(3) Low	(4) Int	(5) All	(6) High	(7) Low	(8) Int
Reason Quality					-0.003 (0.018)	0.004 (0.034)	-0.022 (0.034)	-0.007 (0.036)
Reason's Prediction	0.069^{***} (0.022)	0.060 (0.046)	0.145^{***} (0.047)	0.033 (0.047)	-0.112^{**} (0.057)	-0.197^{*} (0.114)	0.077 (0.137)	-0.485^{***} (0.135)
Expertise								-0.045 (0.077)
Expertise * R. Prediction				-0.064^{**} (0.031)				-0.457^{***} (0.119)
Expertise * R. Prediction * Rating				(0.00-)				0.143*** (0.043)
R. Prediction * Rating					0.077^{***} (0.022)	0.117^{**} (0.047)	0.029 (0.048)	(0.010) 0.204^{***} (0.051)
Expertise * Rating					(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.001) 0.006 (0.027)
Constant	-0.055^{***} (0.018)	-0.074^{**} (0.035)	-0.029 (0.034)	-0.050^{**} (0.025)	-0.045 (0.051)	-0.078 (0.096)	$0.030 \\ (0.099)$	(0.1020) (0.103)
Observations	2,087	435	494	929	2,047	426	486	912
${\sf R}^2$ Adjusted ${\sf R}^2$	0.005 0.004	0.004 0.002	0.019 0.017	0.014 0.012	0.010 0.009	0.019 0.012	0.023 0.017	0.038 0.030

Table S4. Effects of (unseen) anchor values associated with reasons.

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Effects do not vary with subject pools

Table S5 shows that our estimates do not vary with subject type, which was drawn from two pools, volunteers and Mechanical Turk. Therefore all results shown elsewhere pool all subjects.

	Dependent variable
	MSE Accuracy
nchor Shown	0.242^{***}
	(0.088)
uestion Order	0.012
	(0.008)
eason Shown	0.099
	(0.087)
eason Requested	-0.106
	(0.095)
onfidence	0.053
	(0.037)
xpertise'	-0.004
	(0.054)
me Taken	0.178^{***}
	(0.054)
emale	0.041
	(0.086)
ge	0.003
	(0.004)
ducation	0.017
	(0.030)
nowledge	0.005
0	(0.028)
asoning Ability	0.077**
	(0.039)
lunteer vs MTurk	0.081
	(0.550)
ichor Shown * VvsM	0.037
	(0.188)
xpertise * VvsM	-0.176^{*}
	(0.092)
ason Shown * VvsM	-0.287
	(0.187)
eason Requested * VvsM	-0.019
	(0.199)
me Taken * VvsM	0.091
	(0.113)
onstant	-2.506^{***}
onotant	(0.420)
	. ,
bservations	2,366
kaike Inf. Crit.	9,815.702
yesian Inf. Crit.	9,936.850

Table S5. Effects do not depend on subject type (volunteer vs Mechanical Turk).

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The 16 prediction task questions.

Table S6. Stimuli: 16 prediction questions

Category	Question
politics	What percentage of the votes will Sauli Niinistö receive in the first round of the Finnish Presidential election on January 28, 2018?
politics	What percentage of vote will Nikolas Papadopoulos receive in the Cypriot Presidential election on the 28th of January?
politics	What will be the approval rate for the Russian government at the end of January?
politics	What will Donald Trump's Real Clear Politics average approval rating be on the 21st of January?
entertainment	By how many points will the Knicks defeat the Lakers in the Knicks vs. Lakers NBA game on January 21, 2018? (If the Lakers win, use negative points.)
entertainment	How many awards will "The Shape of Water" win at the 2018 BAFTAs (British Film Awards)?
entertainment	On Spotify's Global Top 50 chart, what place will Ed Sheeran's song "Shape of You" take on the 21st of January?
entertainment	What will the daily box office gross of "Star Wars: The Last Jedi" be in USD on the 21st of January?
economics	What will Amazon's stock price (AMZN) in USD be at the close of trade on the 21st of January?
economics	What will be the value of one bitcoin in USD at 11:59pm on the 21st of January?
economics	What will be the value of one US dollar in South African Rand at 11:59pm EST on the 21st of January?
economics	What will the silver price per ounce be in USD at the close of trade on the 21st of January?
health/weather	How many cases of flu will be recorded in Spain in the third week of January? This will be resolved using http://www.who.int/influenza/gisrs_laboratory/
health/weather	How many cases of MERS-CoV will be found in Asia between the 16th and the 30th of January? This will be resolved using http://empres-i.fao.org.
health/weather	How many earthquakes of magnitude 4.9 or stronger will occur worldwide between the 16th of January and 21st of January?
health/weather	What will the high temperature be in Doha, Qatar on the 21st of January in Fahrenheit?

Differential anchoring effects with questions

Subjects were asked to estimate future numbers or counts for the events shown in Figure S.1. We estimated the multilevel regression model shown in Figure 3, Model 2, with random effects for each question, which are plotted below along with 95% credible intervals. Events fell into four categories (politics, economics, entertainment, and weather/health). Note that anchoring effects appear lowest for economic, health, and sports topics which are presumably easier to estimate via internet search.




Fig. S1. Anchor effect per question from random effects model shown in Figure 3, Model 2.

Measuring expertise

To measure personal traits, we presented subjects with a three-question reasoning quiz and a political knowledge test, and also asked their education level. To measure self-judged ability, we asked subjects their degree of confidence in each question as well as their self-assessed "expertise" in that topic area. And finally, as the most direct measure of each subject's task-specific ability, we assessed each subject's accuracy in the first 50% of the (randomly ordered) prediction questions they were presented with, restricting this to the first half of each individual's responses. The personal traits were all mildly correlated with each other, ranging from 0.09 (reasoning skill and education) to 0.27 (knowledge and education). Similarly, the task-based measure of expertise was correlated similarly with the others (0.07, 0.11, 0.14 for education, knowledge and reasoning skill respectively). However, the self-assessed, per-question measures of confidence and expertise, while correlated at 0.41 with each other, were either uncorrelated or negatively correlated with the other personal traits, a result consistent with some previous work in this area (1, 2).

The negative correlation between accuracy and self-judged "expertise," however, is not a straightforward instance of the well-known Dunning-Kruger effect, where those that are most certain are often least skilled (3). Figure S2 shows that the relationship between true individual-level accuracy and self-judged "expertise" is quite non-linear: among those who consider themselves most expert (> 3 on a 5-point scale), there is a negative, Dunning-Kruger-like relationship between self-judged expertise and actual accuracy; but among those who rate themselves more poorly (< 2), there is a positive relationship. This non-linear relationship may explain some previous contradictory Dunning-Kruger studies (4–6).




Fig. S2. Individual prediction accuracy (expertise) vs mean self-judged 'expertise,' with loess curve. Accuracy is mean squared error between prediction and outcome after standardizing by question, logged and then inverted so that higher values are better.

Simulation of expertise-dependent social communication

Our simulation experiment measures the effects of expertise-dependent sensitivity to peer information on collective accuracy. The pseudo-code is shown below. The number of participants tested N was from the set $\{5,10,100\}$ and the expertise factors tested (Exp) was from the set $\{0,0.25,0.5\}$. Exp determines the total variance in expertise (and hence responsivity to peer information) among individuals in a trial. For each trial, information was exchanged N or 10N times.

- 1. Each individual *i* is assigned expertise e_i uniformly drawn from U[1/2 Exp, 1/2 + Exp]. Note that the mean remains the same for all Exp in $\{0, 0.25, 0.5\}$.
- 2. Each individual is assigned $\sigma_1^2 = 0.5 + (e_i 0.5)/2$ and $\gamma = 1.5 2(e_i 0.5)$. Lower e_i (more expert) will thus have lower σ_1^2 and higher γ . See Equation 3 and following in main text.
- 3. Each individual begins with initial perception p_i drawn from $N(\mu, e_i)$, where μ is drawn from N(0, 1) for each trial.
- 4. For N or 10N steps, repeat:
 - (a) Draw at random receiver i and sender j
 - (b) *i* updates their belief p_i after seeing p_j according to Equation 3.
- 5. Assess aggregate error $(\bar{p_i} \mu)^2$

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