**Supplemental Materials**

**Know thy Enemy: Education About Terrorism Improves Social Attitudes Toward Terrorists**

**by J. Theriault et al., 2016, *JEP: General***

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**Methods**

**Unabridged survey description, Studies 1 & 2.** Pre-class and post-class surveys all began by asking students to provide a 1-2 sentence definition of terrorism, to name up to ten terrorist groups that had performed at least one attack, and to rate their knowledge and interest regarding terrorism (“*knowledge”* and “*interest”;* 1 – “I have no knowledge of/interest in the topic”; 7 – “I have a tremendous amount of knowledge about/interest in the topic”). Next, students completed blocks of questions in a random order about: (1) common motives for individuals and groups to engage in terrorism; (2) whether facts related to terrorists and terrorism are true or false; (3) whether terrorism is effective and whether Al-Qaeda had succeeded; (4) the threat of terrorism to the United States and to the student him or herself; (5) the student’s opinions about the efficacy of government counterterrorism policies; and finally, (6) the student’s attitude toward terrorists (i.e. social affiliation). At the end of the survey, students completed a brief demographic questionnaire and rated the likelihood that they would change their opinions on terrorism (“*openness to change”;* 1 – “very unlikely”; 7 – “very likely”) and the confidence they had in their opinions (“*confidence”*; 1 – “not confident at all”; 7 – “extremely confident”).

**Results**

**Effect of post-class number of terrorist groups named.** As described above, in pre-class and post-class surveys students were asked to name up to ten terrorist groups that had performed at least one attack. These groups were coded by research assistants (unfamiliar with the study hypotheses) for correctness, whether a group was Islamic or Middle Eastern, whether a group was Western, and whether a group was based in the United States. In our dataset for Study 2, we tested the correlations between these measures and average post-class social affiliation (*α* = .79). Post-class social affiliation was correlated with the number of correct groups, *r* = .208, *p* < .001, and the number Middle Eastern groups, *r* = .159, *p* = .004, but not with the number of Western or American groups (Table S9).

We explored whether either correct groups or Middle Eastern groups interacted with treatment, or eliminated the effect of treatment as a covariate when added to our Study 2 random effects model.

Attitude Post = 1 + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester) + (1 + Attitude Pre | Student)

Neither interacted with treatment (correct groups\*treatment, *b* = -0.03, *t*(337.9) = 0.74, *p* = .463; Middle East groups\*treatment, *b* = -0.03, *t*(352.2) = 0.60, *p* = .546), and treatment remained significant when both were included as covariates, *b* = 0.289, *t*(341.3) = 2.31, *p* = .022.

Table S1. Random effects structure in Study 1.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Model #** | **Random effects structure** | **Parameter tested** | **Log-likelihood ratio** |
| 1 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (1 + Treatment + Attitude Pre | Semester) | - | **-** |
| 2 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (1 + Treatment + Attitude Pre || Semester)1 | Parameter correlations within:  (1 + Treatment + Attitude Pre | Semester) | χ2(3) = 5.28, *p* = .152 |
| 3 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (0 + Treatment + Attitude Pre || Semester) | (1 | Semester) | χ2(1) = 0, *p* = 1 |
| 4 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester) | (Treatment | Semester) | χ2(1) = 2.27, *p* = .132 |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Final Model** | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester) | (1 | Student)  (Attitude Pre | Student)  (Attitude Pre | Semester) | χ2(1) = 27.57, *p* < .001  χ2(1) = 7.62, *p* = .006  χ2(1) = 18.56, *p* < .001 |

Following recent recommendations (Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen, 2015), we used log-likelihood ratio tests compare models with, and without a given parameter; correlations within a level were removed to test parameters, but were returned to the final model.

1 The notation “||“ indicates that correlations between parameters are not to be calculated—e.g. (1 + Attitude Pre || School) indicates that by-school random intercepts, and by-school Attitude Pre random slopes should be calculated, but not the correlation between them.

Table S2. Effect of treatment in Study 1.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable of Interest** | **Model Specification / Fixed Effects** | **F test** | ***b* [95% CI]** |
| **Treatment** | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Question + Treatment  Question  **Treatment** | *F*(3, 157.6) = 4.4, *p* = .005  ***F*(1, 52.5) = 7.6, *p* = .008** | Intercept:  2.27, [1.83, 2.71]  Interact: 0.30, [-0.06,0.67]  Like: -0.24, [-0.57, 0.10]  Similar: 0.32, [-0.02, 0.67]  **0.70, [0.21, 1.19]** |
| **Treatment**  Controlling for student year, which biased randomization into treatment and control groups. | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester) + (1 | Professor)  **Fixed effects:** Attitude Pre + Question + Treatment + Student\_Year  Question  Student\_Year  **Treatment** | *F*(3, 157.6) = 4.7, *p* = .004  *F*(1, 58.7) = 0.71, *p* = .583  ***F*(1, 52.8) = 5.3, *p* = .025** | Intercept:  2.30, [1.86, 2.75]  Interact: 0.33, [-0.03, 0.70]  Like: -0.23, [-0.57, 0.10]  Similar: 0.34, [-0.01, 0.68]  Sophomore: -1.74, [-4.24, 0.76]  Junior: -1.46, [-3.95 , 1.05]  Senior: -1.72, [-4.15 , 0.76]  Graduate: -0.85 [-3.82 , 2.22]  **0.76, [0.13, 1.43]** |

All degrees of freedom calculated using the Kenward-Roger approximation method using *lmerTest* (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff, & Christensen, 2015) and *pbkr* packages (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). Confidence intervals are calculated using the bias corrected asymmetry method (bCA; Efron, 1987), with 5000 resamples. All continuous IVs are mean-centered; categorical Ivs are dummy coded.

Table S3. Potential moderators in Study 1.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable of Interest** | **Model Specification / Fixed Effect** | **F test** | ***b* [95% CI]** |
| **Treatment \***  **Knowledge Pre** | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Question + Treatment \* Knowledge Pre  Question  Treatment  Knowledge Pre  **Treatment \* Knowledge Pre** | *F*(3, 157.4) = 4.4, *p* = .005  *F*(1, 51.2) = 6.9, *p* = .012  *F*(1, 50.3) = 0.48, *p* = .492  ***F*(1, 49.5) = 0.88, *p* = .351** | Intercept:  2.29, [1.85, 2.74]  Interact: 0.31, [-0.06, 0.67]  Like: -0.24, [-0.57, 0.10]  Similar: 0.33, [-0.02, 0.67]  0.68, [0.19, 1.17]  0.19, [-0.33, 0.71]  **-0.30, [-0.90, 0.30]** |
| **Treatment \***  **Interest Pre** | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Question + Treatment \* Interest Pre  Question  Treatment  Interest Pre  **Treatment \* Interest Pre** | *F*(3, 157.4) = 4.47, *p* = .005  *F*(1, 49.2) = 7.9, *p* = .007  *F*(1, 48.0) = 0.60, *p* = .441  ***F*(1, 49.3) = 0.29, *p* = .593** | Intercept:  2.23, [1.78, 2.68]  Interact: 0.31, [-0.05, 0.68]  Like: -0.23, [-0.57, 0.10]  Similar: 0.33, [-0.02, 0.67]  0.73, [0.24, 1.23]  0.17, [-0.25, 0.61]  **-0.16, [-0.74, 0.42]** |
| **Treatment \***  **Confidence Pre** | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Question + Treatment \* Confidence Pre  Question  Treatment  Confidence Post  **Treatment \* Confidence Pre** | *F*(3, 150.7) = 3.6, *p* = .015  *F*(1, 48.7) = 6.6, *p* = .013  *F*(1, 43.9) = 0.13, *p* = .716  ***F*(1, 44.3) = 0.19, *p* = .663** | Intercept:  2.29, [1.86, 2.73]  Interact: 0.23, [-0.13, 0.59]  Like: -0.25, [-0.58, 0.09]  Similar: 0.27, [-0.07, 0.60]  0.67, [0.18, 1.16]  -0.07, [-0.43, 0.29]  **0.10, [-0.32, 0.51]** |

All degrees of freedom calculated using the Kenward-Roger approximation method using *lmerTest* (Kuznetsova et al., 2015) and *pbkr* packages (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). Confidence intervals are calculated using the bias corrected asymmetry method (bCA; Efron, 1987), with 5000 resamples. All continuous Ivs are mean-centered; categorical Ivs are dummy coded.

Table S4. Potential confirmation bias in Study 1.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable of Interest** | **Model Specification / Fixed Effect** | **F test** | ***b* [95% CI]** |
| Treatment \*  Attitude Pre | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Question + Treatment \* Attitude Pre  Question  Treatment  Attitude Pre  **Treatment \* Attitude Pre** | *F*(3, 157.1) = 4.3, *p* = .006  *F*(1, 52.2) = 8.9, *p* = .004  *F*(1, 4.4) = 3.8, *p* = .115  ***F*(1, 35.0) = 1.2, *p* = .286** | Intercept:  2.23, [1.78, 2.66]  Interact: 0.31, [-0.05, 0.68]  Like: -0.23, [-0.56, 0.11]  Similar: 0.33, [-0.02, 0.67]  0.76, [0.26, 1.26]  0.30, [0.02, 0.60]  **0.19, [-0.14, 0.54]** |
| Treatment \*  Openness to Change Pre | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Question + Treatment \* Openness to Change Pre  Question  Treatment  Openness to Change Pre  **Treatment \* Openness to Change Pre** | *F*(3, 150.5) = 3.7, *p* = .014  *F*(1, 1, 49.0) = 7.3, *p* = .010  *F*(1, 46.4) = 0.34, *p* = .564  ***F*(1, 47.2) = 0.16, *p* = .690** | Intercept:  2.28, [1.85, 2.71]  Interact: 0.24, [-0.12, 0.59]  Like: -0.24, [-0.57, 0.09]  Similar: 0.28, [-0.06, 0.61]  0.69, [0.21, 1.18]  -0.10, [-0.45, 0.24]  **-0.09, [-0.52, 0.34]** |
| Treatment \*  Political Orientation  1 –  “Very Liberal”  7 –  “Very Conservative” | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Question + Treatment \* Political Orientation  Question  Treatment  Political Orientation  **Treatment \* Political Orientation** | *F*(3, 150.7) = 3.8, *p* = .012  *F*(1, 48.6) = 6.7, *p* = .013  *F*(1, 45.2) = 0.13, *p* = .719  ***F*(1, 45.7) = 0.18, *p* = .674** | Intercept:  2.29, [1.86, 2.73]  Interact: 0.22, [-0.14, 0.58]  Like: -0.24, [-0.58, 0.09]  Similar: 0.30, [-0.05, 0.64]  0.67, [0.18, 1.16]  0.05, [-0.20, 0.29]  **-0.07, [-0.40, 0.25]** |

All degrees of freedom calculated using the Kenward-Roger approximation method using *lmerTest* (Kuznetsova et al., 2015) and *pbkr* packages (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). Confidence intervals are calculated using the bias corrected asymmetry method (bCA; Efron, 1987), with 5000 resamples. All continuous Ivs are mean-centered; categorical Ivs are dummy coded.

Table S5. Random effects structure in Study 2.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Model #** | **Random effects structure** | **Parameter tested** | **Log-likelihood ratio** |
| 1 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (1 + Attitude Pre | Professor) +  (1 + Attitude Pre | Class: Professor)1 +  (1 + Treatment + Attitude Pre | Semester) +  (1 + Attitude Pre | School) | - | **-** |
| 2 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (1 + Attitude Pre | Professor) +  (1 + Attitude Pre | Class: Professor)+  (1 + Treatment + Attitude Pre | Semester) +  (1 + Attitude Pre || School)2 | Parameter correlations within:  (1 + Attitude Pre | School) | χ2(1) = 0, *p* = 1 |
| 3 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (1 + Attitude Pre | Professor) +  (1 + Attitude Pre | Class: Professor)+  (1 + Treatment + Attitude Pre | Semester) +  (1 | School) | (Attitude Pre | School) | χ2(1) = 0, *p* = 1 |
| 4 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (1 + Attitude Pre | Professor) +  (1 + Attitude Pre | Class: Professor)+  (1 + Treatment + Attitude Pre | Semester) | (1 | School) | χ2(1) = 0, *p* = 1 |
| 5 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (1 + Attitude Pre | Professor) +  (1 + Attitude Pre || Class: Professor)+  (1 + Treatment + Attitude Pre | Semester) | Parameter correlations within:  (1 + Attitude Pre || Class: Professor) | χ2(1) = 0.12, *p* = .724 |
| 6 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (1 + Attitude Pre | Professor) +  (1 | Class: Professor)+  (1 + Treatment + Attitude Pre | Semester) | (Attitude Pre | Class: Professor) | χ2(1) = 0, *p* = 1 |
| 7 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (1 + Attitude Pre | Professor) +  (1 + Treatment + Attitude Pre | Semester) | (1 | Class: Professor) | χ2(1) = 0.06, *p* = .803 |
| 8 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (1 + Attitude Pre | Professor) +  (1 + Treatment + Attitude Pre || Semester) | Parameter correlations within:  (1 + Treatment + Attitude Pre | Semester) | χ2(3) = 3.29, *p* = .349 |
| 9 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (1 + Attitude Pre | Professor) +  (0 + Treatment + Attitude Pre || Semester) | (1 | Semester) | χ2(1) = 0, *p* = 1 |
| 10 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (1 + Attitude Pre | Professor) +  (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester) | (Treatment | Semester) | χ2(1) = 2.52, *p* = .113 |
| 11 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (1 + Attitude Pre || Professor) +  (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester) | Parameter correlations within:  (1 + Attitude Pre | Professor) | χ2(1) = 1.92, *p* = .165 |
| 12 | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (1 | Professor) +  (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester) | (Attitude Pre | Professor) | χ2(1) = 0.08, *p* = .772 |
|  |  |  |  |
| **Final Model** | (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) +  (1 | Professor) +  (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester) | (1 | Student)  (Attitude Pre | Student)  (1 | Professor)  (Attitude Pre | Semester) | χ2(1) = 116.6, *p* < .001  χ2(1) = 57.8, *p* < .001  χ2(1) = 14.5, *p* < .001  χ2(1) = 113.7, *p* < .001 |

Log-likelihood ratio tests compare models with, and without a parameter, to test whether it contributes a significant amount of variance (Bates, et al., 2015).

1 The notation “:“ indicates that one level is embedded in another—e.g. (1 | Class: Professor) would calculate random intercepts for classes within professors.

2 The notation “||“ indicates that correlations between parameters are not to be calculated—e.g. (1 + Attitude Pre || School) indicates that by-school random intercepts, and by-school Attitude Pre random slopes should be calculated, but not the correlation between them.

Table S6. Effect of treatment in Study 2.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable of Interest** | **Model Specification / Fixed Effects** | **F test** | ***b* [95% CI]** |
| **Treatment** | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Attitude Pre + Question + Treatment  Attitude Pre  Question  **Treatment** | *F*(1, 2.2) = 175.1, *p* = .004  *F*(3, 972.1) = 10.9, *p* < .001  ***F*(1, 328.8) = 9.0, *p* = .003** | Intercept:  2.14, [1.94, 2.33]  0.51, [0.44, 0.58]  Interact: 0.23, [0.09, 0.37]  Like: -0.10, [-0.23, 0.04]  Similar:0.24, [0.10, 0.38]  **0.34, [0.12, 0.55]** |
| **Treatment**  Excluding students taught by coauthor PK. | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Attitude Pre + Question + Treatment  Attitude Pre  Question  **Treatment** | *F*(1, 1.4) = 99.5, *p* = .030  *F*(3, 755.4) = 8.5, *p* < .001  ***F*(1, 251.1) = 4.9, *p* = .028** | Intercept:  2.08, [1.87, 2.29]  0.49, [0.40, 0.58]  Interact: 0.23, [0.08, 0.39]  Like: -0.09, [-0.24, 0.06]  Similar: 0.22, [0.07, 0.37]  **0.27, [0.03, 0.51]** |
| **Treatment**  Excluding students taught by coauthor PK.  Controlling for pre-existing differences between treatment and wait-list groups:  Age  Gender (Female = 1)  Interest Pre  Political Orientation | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester) + (1 | Professor)  **Fixed effects:** Attitude Pre + Question + Treatment + Age + Gender + Interest Pre + Political Orientation  Attitude Pre  Question  Age  Gender  Interest Pre  Political Orientation  **Treatment** | *F*(1, 1.3) = 86.9, *p* = .035  *F*(3, 731.7) = 8.6, *p* < .001  *F*(1, 239.6) = 7.0, *p* = .009  *F*(1, 242.5) = 1.3, *p* = .258  *F*(1, 256.6) = 2.4, *p* = .121  *F*(1, 242.1) = 4.3, *p* = .040  ***F*(1, 239.7) = 3.9, *p* = .049** | Intercept:  2.15, [1.89, 2.42]  0.48, [0.39, 0.57]  Interact: 0.27, [0.11, 0.42]  Like: -0.07, [-0.22, 0.08]  Similar: 0.23, [0.08, 0.38]  -0.03, [-0.05, -0.01]  -0.14, [-0.38, 0.10]  0.09, [-0.02, 0.20]  -0.09, [-0.17, -0.01]  **0.26, [0.01, 0.51]** |
| **Treatment**  Including by-professor random intercepts. | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester) + (1 | Professor)  **Fixed effects:** Attitude Pre + Question + Treatment  Attitude Pre  Question  **Treatment** | *F*(1, 2.05) = 164.1, *p* = .005  *F*(3, 971.6) = 11.3, *p* < .001  ***F*(1, 57.6) = 2.4, *p* = .124** | Intercept:  2.12, [1.81, 2.42]  0.50, [0.09, 0.37]  Interact: 0.23, [-0.23, 0.04]  Like: -0.10, [-0.23, 0.04]  Similar: 0.24, [0.11, 0.38]  **0.26, [-0.05, 0.57]** |

All degrees of freedom calculated using the Kenward-Roger approximation method using *lmerTest* (Kuznetsova et al., 2015) and *pbkr* packages (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). Confidence intervals are calculated using the bias corrected asymmetry method (bCA; Efron, 1987), with 5000 resamples. All continuous Ivs are mean-centered; categorical Ivs are dummy coded.

Table S7. Potential moderators in Study 2.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Non-Significant Moderators** | | | |
| **Variable of Interest** | **Model Specification / Fixed Effect** | **F test** | ***b* [95% CI]** |
| **Treatment \***  **Opinion Confidence Pre** | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Attitude Pre + Question + Treatment \* Opinion Confidence Pre  Attitude Pre  Question  Treatment  Opinion Confidence Pre  **Treatment \* Opinion Confidence Pre** | *F*(1, 2.2) = 170.9, *p* = .004  *F*(3, 965.7) = 11.0, *p* < .001  *F*(1, 324.8) = 8.6, *p* = .004  *F*(1, 332.7) = 0.05, *p* = .817  ***F*(1, 329.9) = 0.01, *p* = .928** | **Intercept:**  2.13, [1.93, 2.33]  0.51, [0.44, 0.58]  **Interact:** 0.23, [0.09, 0.38]  **Like:** -0.09, [-0.23, 0.04]  **Similar:** 0.24, [0.10, 0.38]  0.33, [0.11, 0.55]  -0.02, [-0.17, 0.14]  **0.01, [-0.18, 0.19]** |
| **Treatment \***  **Knowledge Pre** | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Attitude Pre + Question + Treatment \* Knowledge Pre  Attitude Pre  Question  Treatment  Knowledge Pre  **Treatment \* Knowledge Pre** | *F*(1, 2.3) = 150.2, *p* = .004  *F*(3, 930.1) = 10.0, *p* < .001  *F*(1, 312.5) = 8.8, *p* = .003  *F*(1, 314.0) = 0.03, *p* = .856  ***F*(1, 311.4) = 0.13, *p* = .714** | **Intercept:**  2.13, [1.92, 2.34]  0.50, [0.42, 0.57]  **Interact:** 0.21, [0.07, 0.35]  **Like:** -0.10, [-0.24, 0.03]  **Similar:** 0.23, [0.09, 0.36]  0.35, [0.12, 0.58]  -0.02, [-0.22, 0.18]  **0.05, [-0.19, 0.28]** |

All degrees of freedom calculated using the Kenward-Roger approximation method using *lmerTest* (Kuznetsova et al., 2015) and *pbkr* packages (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). Confidence intervals are calculated using the bias corrected asymmetry method (bCA; Efron, 1987), with 5000 resamples. All continuous Ivs are mean-centered; categorical Ivs are dummy coded.

Table S8. Potential confirmation bias in Study 2.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable of Interest** | **Model Specification / Fixed Effect** | **F test** | ***b* [95% CI]** |
| Treatment \*  Attitude Pre | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Question + Treatment \* Attitude Pre  Question  Treatment  Attitude Pre  **Treatment \* Attitude Pre** | *F*(3, 971.6) = 10.9, *p* < .001  *F*(1, 327.8) = 8.7, *p* = .003  *F*(1, 9.4) = 62.7, *p* < .001  ***F*(1, 165.9) = 0.09, *p* = .767** | Intercept:  2.14, [1.94, 2.34]  Interact: 0.23, [0.09, 0.37]  Like: -0.10, [-0.23, 0.04]  Similar: 0.24, [0.10, 0.38]  0.33, [0.11, 0.55]  0.53, [0.41, 0.65]  **-0.02, [-0.17, 0.12]** |
| Treatment \*  Professor Attitude Pre | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Question + Treatment \* Professor Attitude Pre  Attitude Pre  Question  Treatment  Professor Attitude Pre  **Treatment \* Professor Attitude Pre** | *F*(1, 2.2) = 167.7, *p* = .004  *F*(3, 950.8) = 10.8, *p* < .001  *F*(1, 321.9) = 7.5, *p* = .006  *F*(1, 332.8) = 0.63, *p* = .427  ***F*(1, 342.0) = 0.42, *p* = .518** | Intercept:  2.15, [1.95, 2.35]  0.51, [0.43, 0.58]  Interact: 0.22, [0.08, 0.36]  Like: -0.09, [-0.23, 0.04]  Similar: 0.25, [0.11, 0.39]  0.31, [0.09, 0.53]  0.08, [-0.11, 0.27]  **-0.07, [-0.28, 0.14]** |
| Treatment \*  Openness to Change Pre | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Question + Treatment \* Openness to Change Pre  Attitude Pre  Question  Treatment  Openness to Change Pre  **Treatment \* Openness to Change Pre** | *F*(1, 2.2) = 163.5, *p* = .004  *F*(3, 966.0) = 11.1, *p* < .001  *F*(1, 322.8) = 8.6, *p* = .004  *F*(1, 326.8) = 0.39, *p* = .531  ***F*(1, 324.1) = 1.4, *p* = .246** | Intercept:  2.13, [1.94, 2.33]  0.50, [0.43, 0.57]  Interact: 0.24, [0.10, 0.38]  Like: -0.10, [-0.23, 0.04]  Similar: 0.24, [0.10, 0.38]  0.33, [0.11, 0.54]  0.04, [-0.09, 0.17]  **0.10, [-0.06, 0.26]** |
| Treatment \*  Political Orientation  1 –  “Very Liberal”  7 –  “Very Conservative” | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Question + Treatment \* Political Orientation  Attitude Pre  Question  Treatment  Political Orientation  **Treatment \* Political Orientation** | *F*(1, 2.2) = 170.1, *p* = .004  *F*(3, 971.8) = 11.1, *p* < .001  *F*(1, 324.1) = 10.3, *p* = .001  *F*(1, 322.5) = 1.4, *p* = .246  ***F*(1, 323.1) = 0.01, *p* = .910** | Intercept:  2.11, [1.92, 2.31]  0.50, [0.43, 0.57]  Interact: 0.23, [0.09, 0.37]  Like: -0.10, [-0.23, 0.04]  Similar: 0.24, [0.10, 0.38]  0.36, [0.14, 0.58]  -0.07, [-0.19, 0.05]  **-0.01, [-0.15, 0.14]** |
| Treatment \*  Professor Political Orientation  1 –  “Very Liberal”  7 –  “Very Conservative” | **Random Effects:** (1 + Attitude Pre | Student) + (0 + Attitude Pre | Semester)  **Fixed effects:** Question + Treatment \* Professor Political Orientation  Attitude Pre  Question  Treatment  Professor Political Orientation  **Treatment \* Professor Political Orientation** | *F*(1, 2.2) = 169.4, *p* = .004  *F*(3, 950.9) = 10.8, *p* < .001  *F*(1, 319.2) = 10.8, *p* = .001  *F*(1, 326.2) = 1.4, *p* = .238  ***F*(1, 324.8) = 0.03, *p* = .858** | Intercept:  2.10, [1.89, 2.30]  0.51, [0.44, 0.58]  Interact: 0.22, [0.08, 0.36]  Like: -0.09, [-0.23, 0.04]  Similar: 0.25, [0.11, 0.39]  0.38, [0.16, 0.60]  0.11, [-0.07, 0.29]  **-0.02, [-0.22, 0.18]** |

All degrees of freedom calculated using the Kenward-Roger approximation method using *lmerTest* (Kuznetsova et al., 2015) and *pbkr* packages (Halekoh & Højsgaard, 2014). Confidence intervals are calculated using the bias corrected asymmetry method (bCA; Efron, 1987), with 5000 resamples. All continuous Ivs are mean-centered; categorical Ivs are dummy coded.

Table S9. Post-class Pearson’s correlations among # of reported terrorist groups and social affiliation.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Post-class measure** |  | **Social affiliation** | **Total correct groups** | **Middle Eastern / Islamic groups** | **Western groups** | **American groups** |
| **Social affiliation (α = .79)** | Pearson's r  p-value | —  — | 0.208  < .001 | 0.159  0.004 | 0.059  0.282 | 0.032  0.562 |
| **Total correct groups** | Pearson's r  p-value |  | —  — | 0.715  < .001 | 0.385  < .001 | 0.141  0.009 |
| **Middle Eastern / Islamic groups** | Pearson's r  p-value |  |  | —  — | 0.013  0.803 | -0.080  0.138 |
| **Western groups** | Pearson's r  p-value |  |  |  | —  — | 0.695  < .001 |
| **American groups** | Pearson's r  p-value |  |  |  |  | —  — |

**Supplemental References**

Bates, D., Kliegl, K., Vasishth, S., & Baayen, H. (2015). Parsimonious mixed models. *ArXiv e-print; submitted to Journal of Memory and Language, 2015.* arXiv:1506.04967v1

Efron, B. (1987). Better bootstrap confidence intervals. *Journal of the American Statistical Association, 82(*307), 171­–185. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2289144

Halekoh, U., & Højsgaard, S. (2014). A Kenward-Roger approximation and parametric bootstrap methods for tests in linear mixed Models — The R package pbkrtest. *Journal of Statistical Software, 59,* 1–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.18637/jss.v059.i09

Kuznetsova, A., Brockhoff, P. B., & Christensen, R. H. B. (2015). lmerTest: Tests in linear mixed effects models [Computer software manual]. http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=lmerTest. (R Package version 2.0-25).

**Appendix A: Course Readings:**

**P. Krause; Terrorism, Insurgency, and Political Violence; Spring 2015**

**Class Plan**

**WEEK 1: What are Terrorism and Insurgency? Definitions and Cases Across History**

September 1: Defining Terrorism and Insurgency: A New or Old Phenomenon?

September 3: Film “The Weather Underground” Part I

**WEEK 2: Individual Level Causes and Objectives of Terrorism and Insurgency**

September 8: Psychology, Economics, Education

September 10: Film “The Weather Underground” Part II

**WEEK 3: Organizational, Strategic Level Causes and Objectives of Terrorism and Insurgency**

September 15: Religion, Gender, Ideology

September 17: Solidarity, Networks, and Numbers; Organizational Survival and Competition

**WEEK 4: Methods and Mechanisms: Strategies of Terrorism and Insurgency**

September 22: Political Grievances and Occupation; Failed States and State Sponsors

September 24: Strategies of Terrorism and Insurgency- Academics

**WEEK 5: Methods and Mechanisms: Suicide Bombing and WMD**

September 29: Strategies of Terrorism and Insurgency- Practitioners

October 1: Suicide Bombing and Weapons of Mass Destruction in Terrorism and Insurgency

**WEEK 6: Morality and the Media**

October 6: Morality, Emotions, and the Media in Terrorism and Insurgency

October 8: Exam #1

**WEEK 7: The Impact and Effectiveness of Terrorism and Insurgency**

October 13: Individual and Organizational Level Effects: Fear, Casualties, Support, Group Strength

October 15: Strategic Level Effects: Political Concessions, Military Withdrawals, New States

**WEEK 8: Al-Qaeda**

October 20: Al-Qaeda: The Past

October 22: Al-Qaeda: The Present and Future

**WEEK 9: The Boundaries of Terrorism: Nonviolence and State Terror**

October 27: Nonviolence and Non-Lethal Violence

October 29: States and Terrorism: Repression, Mass Violence, and Genocide

**WEEK 10: The Insurgencies in Iraq and Syria**

November 3: The Causes, Dynamics, and Effects of the Insurgencies

November 5: Foreign Fighters, ISIS, and Insurgent Rivalries

**WEEK 11: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency I**

November 10: Exam #2 and “If a Tree Falls”

November 12: How Terrorism and Insurgency End

**WEEK 12: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency II**

November 17: CT and COIN Debates: Hard & Soft Power, Democratization, Threat Inflation

November 19: The Freedom of Speech, Profiling and Airport Security, Torture

**WEEK 13: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency III**

November 24: Drones and Intelligence Agencies

November 26: \*Happy Thanksgiving\*

**WEEK 14: The Boston Marathon Bombings**

December 1: Definitions, Causes, and the Media

December 3: Effects, Community Response, and the Dzokhar Tsarnaev Trial

**WEEK 15: Terrorism, Insurgency, and Political Violence, Now and in the Future**

December 7: Remaining Questions and Lessons Learned

**Readings and Class Schedule**

**Before Classes Begin**

*By Monday, August 31 at noon (the day before the first class meeting), you must email Professor Krause your own 1-2 sentence definition of “terrorism” without consulting any sources. Please send your definition to peter.krause.2@bc.edu with the subject heading “PO352701 Terrorism Definition”. This assignment will be graded for timely completion.*

**WEEK 1: What are Terrorism and Insurgency? Definitions and Cases Across History**

*Key Questions*

How do scholars, governments, the media, and the public define terrorism and insurgency? Are terrorism and insurgency distinct concepts? How are they similar and different? Is terrorism a new or old phenomenon? What are some key cases of terrorism and insurgency?

*Skills Introduced*

Defining and comparing concepts

September 1: Defining Terrorism and Insurgency: A New or Old Phenomenon?

*Required Readings*

* Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Ch. 1, pp. 1-41
* John Gerring, “What Makes a Concept Good? A Critical Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences,” *Polity*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1999), Table 1, pp. 367
* David Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions," *American Political Science Review* Vol. 78, No. 3 (1984) pp. 658-677
* Alexander Spencer and Rohan Gunaratna, “Is the New Terrorism Really New?” in *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism,* Ch. 1*,* pp. 1-34

*Recommended Readings*

* Alison M. Jaggar, “What Is Terrorism, Why Is It Wrong, and Could It Ever Be Morally Permissible?” *Journal of Social Philosophy*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (2005) pp. 202-215
* Colin Beck and Emily Miner, “Who Gets Designated a Terrorist and Why?” *Social Forces* Vol. 91, No. 3, pp. 837-858
* Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoeffler, “The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2004) pp. 777-794
* Alex P. Schmid and Albert J. Jongman, eds., *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2005)
* Martha Crenshaw, “Thoughts on Relating Terrorism to Historical Context,” in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995)
* John Horgan and Michael Boyle, “The Case Against Critical Terrorism Studies,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2008) pp. 51-64

September 3: Film “The Weather Underground” Part I

**WEEK 2: Individual Level Causes and Objectives of Terrorism and Insurgency**

*Key Questions*

Who are the key actors in terrorism and insurgency campaigns?

What are the levels of analysis for examining terrorism and insurgency?

Do mental illness, poverty, a lack of education, ideology, gender, or religion cause terrorism?

How can an individual become radicalized? Is ‘radicalization’ necessary to commit terrorism?

*Skills Introduced*

How to read as a scholar and analyst: Identifying and critiquing arguments What is political science? Understanding variables, theories, predictions, tests, and evidence How to generate theories and hypotheses

September 8: Psychology, Economics, Education

*Required Readings*

* “You Don’t Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows,” “A Declaration of War,” and “Headquarters” in Bernadine Dorhn, Bill Ayers, and Jeff Jones, eds., *Sing a Battle Song: The Revolutionary Poetry, Statements, and Communiqués of the Weather Underground 1970-1974* (New York: Seven Stories, 2006)
* Ehud Sprinzak, “The Psychopolitical Formation of Extreme Left Terrorism in a Democracy: The Case of the Weathermen,” in Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998) pp. 65-85
* Diego Gambetta and Steffen Hertog, “Why Are There So Many Engineers Among Islamic Radicals?” *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 50, No. 2 (2009) pp. 201-230
* James A. Piazza and Karin von Hippel, “Does Poverty Serve as a Root Cause of Terrorism?” in Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Ch. 2, pp. 35-68
* “Global Terrorism Index 2014,” Institute for Economics and Peace, p. 59

*Recommended Readings*

* John Horgan, “From Profiles and Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on  Radicalization into Terrorism,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 618,  No. 1 (2008) pp. 80-94
* Jeff Victoroff, “The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches,” *Journal*  *of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2005) pp. 3-42
* Alan Krueger and Jitka Malečková, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?”  *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (2003) pp. 119-144

September 10: Film “The Weather Underground” Part II

**WEEK 3: Organizational, Strategic Level Causes and Objectives of Terrorism and Insurgency**

*Key Questions*

Are most terrorist attacks committed by unconnected individuals or organizations?

What is collective action and when is it achieved?

When and why does organizations’ pursuit of strength and survival generate violence?

What political environments and government types make terrorism more likely?

Does military occupation cause terrorism?

*Skills Introduced*

Causal Inference: How do we know when X causes Y?

September 15: Religion, Gender, Ideology

*Required Readings*

* Mark Juergensmeyer, “Soldiers for Christ,” in *Terror in the Mind of God*, 3rd Edition, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003) pp. 19-43
* Mark Juergensmeyer, “Zion Betrayed,” in *Terror in the Mind of God*, 3rd Edition, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003) pp. 45-60
* Caron Gentry and Laura Sjoberg, “The Gendering of Women’s Terrorism,” in *Women, Gender, and Terrorism*, Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, eds. (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 2011), pp. 59-70
* Alexis Henshaw, “Taking Female Armed Rebels Seriously,” *The Washington Post* (April 11, 2015)
* Dan Byman, “Five Myths About Violent Extremism,” *The Washington Post* (February 13, 2015)

*Recommended Readings*

* Mia Bloom, *Bombshell: Women and Terrorism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011)
* Alessandro Orsini, *Anatomy of the Red Brigades: The Religious Mindset of Modern Terrorists* (Ithaca: Cornell  University Press, 2009)
* Mattias Gardell, “Crusader Dreams: Oslo 22/7, Islamophobia, and the Quest for a Monocultural  Europe,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2014) pp. 129-155
* James A. Piazza, “Is Islamist Terrorism More Dangerous? An Empirical Study of Group Ideology,  Organization, and Goal Structure,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2009) pp. 62-88
* Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamist Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse,”  *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2007) pp. 394-426
* Cynthia K. Mahmood, *Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militants* (Philadelphia: University of  Pennsylvania Press, 1996)

September 17: Solidarity, Networks, and Numbers; Organizational Survival and Competition  *Required Readings*

* Mancur Olson, “Introduction” in *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*  (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) pp. 1-3
* Marc Sageman, “Joining the Jihad” in *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of  Pennsylvania Press, 2004) pp. 99-135
* Mia Bloom, “Outbidding, Market Share, and Palestinian Suicide Bombing,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.  119, No. 1 (2004) pp. 61-88
* Peter Krause, “The Structure of Success: How the Internal Distribution of Power Drives Armed Group  Behavior and National Movement Effectiveness,” *International Security*, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 72-116

*Recommended Readings*

* Paul Staniland, “States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders,” *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 10, No. 2  (2012) pp. 243-264
* Shawn Flanigan, “Nonprofit Service Provision by Insurgent Organizations: The Cases of Hizballah and  the Tamil Tigers,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 31, No. 6 (2008) pp. 499-517
* Eitan Alimi, "Contextualizing Political Terrorism: A Collective Action Perspective for Understanding the  Tanzim," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2006) pp. 263-283
* Wendy Pearlman, “Spoiling Inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the Collapse of Intrastate  Peace Accords,” *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2008) pp. 79-109
* Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “How to Start a Battalion (In Five Easy Lessons),” *London Review of Books*, Vol. 35,  No. 4 (2013) pp. 13-14

**WEEK 4: Methods and Mechanisms: Strategies of Terrorism and Insurgency**

*Key Questions*

What are the main strategies of terrorism and insurgency?

What is the causal logic of each strategy?

Under what conditions is each strategy most likely to succeed or fail?

Do observers’ assessments of terrorist strategies match with those of the perpetrators?

*Skills Introduced*

Identifying and explaining causal mechanisms

Linking theory and practice

Identifying gaps in scholarship

September 22: Political Grievances and Occupation; Failed States and State Sponsors

*Required Readings*

* Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Ch. 2, pp. 43-62
* Erica Chenoweth, “Terrorism and Democracy,” *The Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 16, pp. 355-375
* Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism* (New York: Cambridge University Press,  2005) pp. 10-15, 21-78

*Recommended Readings*

* Barry Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1993) pp. 27-35
* Paul Stern, “Why Do People Sacrifice for Their Nations?” *Political Psychology*, Vol. 16., No. 2 (1995) pp.  217-235
* Mia Bloom, “Death Becomes Her: Women, Occupation, and Terrorist Mobilization,” *PS: Political Science*  *and Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2010), pp. 445-450
* James A. Piazza, “Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?”  *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 52 (2008) pp. 469-473, 481-485

September 24: Strategies of Terrorism and Insurgency- Academics

*Required Readings*

* Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security* Vol. 31, No. 1  (2006) pp. 56-80
* David Lake, “Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty First Century,” *International*  *Organization*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2002) pp. 15-29
* Stathis Kalyvas, “Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria,” *Rationality and Society*, Vol.  11, No. 3 (1999) pp. 252-259

*Recommended Readings*

* Ian Lustick. "Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Targets and Audiences" in Martha Crenshaw, ed., *Terrorism in Context* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995) pp. 514-533
* Martha Crenshaw, “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Choice,” *Terrorism and Counter Terrorism* Vol. 2, No. 1 (1998) pp. 54-64
* Ignacio Cuenca, “The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (September 2007) pp. 289-206
* Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks,” *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 70, No. 2 (2008) pp. 437-449

**WEEK 5: Methods and Mechanisms: Suicide Bombing and WMD**

*Key Questions*

Are suicide bombing and WMD attacks major threats?

How can we assess intentions vs. capability?

Why do some groups choose to employ these methods and others do not?

*Skills Introduced*

Operationalizing variables and testing predictions

September 29: Strategies of Terrorism and Insurgency- Practitioners

*Required Readings*

* Carlos Marighella, “Problem and Principles of Strategy,” and “Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla,” in James Kohl and John Litt, eds., *Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974) pp. 81-86, 108-133
* Menachem Begin, *The Revolt* (New York: Nash, 1977) pp. 47-58, 76-96
* Mao Tse-Tung, *Basic Tactics* (New York: Praeger, 1967) pp. 51-68
* Abu Bakr Naji, “The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma Will  Pass,” trans. William McCants, pp. 18-20, 28-34
* Ayman Al-Zawahiri letter to Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, July 9, 2005

*Recommended Readings*

* Che Guevara, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (NewYork:Praeger, 1961)

October 1: Suicide Bombing and Weapons of Mass Destruction in Terrorism and Insurgency  *Required Readings*

* Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No.  3 (2003) pp. 343-361
* Scott Atran, “The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism,” *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 29, No. 2  (2006) pp. 127-147
* Lindsey O’Rourke, “Behind the Woman Behind the Bomb,” *The New York Times* (August 2, 2008)
* Matthew Bunn and Susan Martin, “Is Nuclear Terrorism a Real Threat?” in Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism*  *and Counterterrorism*, Ch. 6, pp. 172-199
* Richard Danzig et al., “Aum Shinrikyo: Insights Into How Terrorists Develop Biological and Chemical  Weapons,” *Center for a New American Security* (2012) pp. 9-41

*Recommended Readings*

* Michael C. Horowitz, “Nonstate Actors and the Diffusion of Innovations: The Case of Suicide Terrorism,” *International Organization* Vol. 64, No. 1 (2010) pp. 33-64
* Greg Koblentz, “Pathogens as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare,” *International Security* Vol. 28, No. 3 (Winter 2003/2004) pp. 84-122
* Assaf Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi Jihad, and the Spread of Suicide Attacks,” *International Security* Vol. 33, No. 3 (Winter 2008/2009) pp. 46-78
* Keir Lieber and Daryl Press, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists,” *International Security* Vol. 38, No. 1 (2013) pp. 80-104

**WEEK 6: Morality and the Media**

*Key Questions*

How do feelings of rage, humiliation, fear, depression, revenge, and injustice impact terrorism?

How does the media impact the causes, mechanisms, and effects of terrorism?

How should the media balance profit, the public’s ‘need to know,’ and responsibility to society?

October 6: Morality, Emotions, and the Media in Terrorism and Insurgency

*Required Readings*

* Eamon Collins, *Killing Rage* (London: Granta Books, 1997) pp. 1-29
* Bruce Hoffman, “The Old Media, Terrorism, and Public Opinion,” and “The New Media, Terrorism,  and the Shaping of Global Opinion,” in Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Ch. 6 and 7, pp. 173-228
* Gadi Wolfsfeld et al., “Covering Death in Conflicts: Coverage of the Second Intifada on Israeli and  Palestinian Television,” *Journal of Peace Research,* Vol. 45, No. 3 (2008) pp. 401-417
* Agence France-Presse, “Paris Supermarket Hostages Sue Media Over Live Coverage” (April 3, 2015)

*Recommended Readings*

* Roger Petersen, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe*  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002)
* Fredric Wehrey, “A Clash of Wills: Hizballah’s Psychological Campaigns against Israel in South  Lebanon,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies Vol.* 13, No. 3 (2002) pp. 53-74
* Gabriel Weimann, “The Psychology of Mass-Mediated Terrorism,” *American Behavioral Scientist,* Vol. 52,  No. 1 (2008) pp. 69-86
* James Sheehan et al., “Al-Shabaab’s Propaganda War and Alternative Media” (2012) pp. 29-39

October 8: \*Exam #1\*

**WEEK 7: The Impact and Effectiveness of Terrorism and Insurgency**

*Key Questions*

How many people are killed and wounded by terrorist and insurgent attacks?

Do terrorism and insurgency achieve the personal goals of the attackers?

How does the use of violence impact the strength and survival of organizations?

When and why does the public support terrorism and insurgency?

Do terrorism and insurgency generate political concessions? Do they win wars?

What is the economic and social impact of terrorism and insurgency?

*Skills Introduced*

Conceptualizing and measuring effects

Generating and analyzing competing arguments

Marshaling and analyzing relevant evidence

October 13: Individual and Organizational Level Effects: Fear, Casualties, Support, Group Strength  *Required Readings*

* Jennifer Lerner et al, “Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A National Field Experiment,” *Psychological Science* Vol. 14 No. 2 (2003) pp. 144-150
* Christophe Chowanietz, “Rallying Around the Flag or Railing Against the Government? Political Parties’ Reactions to Terrorist Acts,” *Party Politics* Vol. 17, No. 5 (2011) pp. 673-698
* Glenn Feldman, “Soft Opposition: Elite Acquiescence and Klan-Sponsored Terrorism in Alabama, 1946- 1950,” *The Historical Journal* Vol. 40, No. 3 (1997) pp. 753-777
* David Chalmers, *Backfire: How the Ku Klux Klan Helped the Civil Rights Movement* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003) pp. 137-144

*Recommended Readings*

* “Global Terrorism Index 2014,” Institute for Economics and Peace
* Jodi Vittori, "All Struggles Must End: The Longevity of Terrorist Groups," *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol.  30, No. 3 (2009) pp. 444-466
* Ethan Bueno De Mesquita and Eric Dickson, "The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism,  Counterterrorism, and Mobilization," *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 51, No. 2 (2007) pp. 364-381

October 15: Strategic Level Effects: Political Concessions, Military Withdrawals, New States  *Required Readings*

* Robert Pape, “Learning Terrorism Pays,” in *Dying to Win* (New York: Random House, 2006) p. 40, 61-76
* Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *International Security* Vol. 31, No. 2 (2006) pp. 42-52
* Peter Krause, “The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: A Two-Level Framework To Transform a Deceptive Debate,” *Security Studies* Vol. 22, No. 2 (2013) pp. 259-294
* Timothy Wickham-Crowley, “A Qualitative Comparative Approach to Latin American Revolutions,” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 32, Nos.1 and 2 (January-April 1991), pp. 87-90, 99-105

*Recommended Readings*

* Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence,” *International Organization* Vol. 56, No. 2 (2002) pp. 263-96
* Kelly Greenhill and Solomon Major, "The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords," *International Security* Vol. 31, no. 3 (Winter 2006/07) pp. 7-40
* Kathleen Cunningham, “Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists?” *American Political Science Review* Vol. 105, No. 2 (2011) pp. 275-97
* Max Abrahms and Peter Krause Exchange on Krause’s *Security Studies* Article, *H-Diplo* (2013)

**WEEK 8: Al-Qaeda**

*Key Questions*

What are the origins of Al-Qaeda? What is its ideology and strategy?

What is transnational terrorism and what distinguishes it from other types?

Is Al-Qaeda a unique group, or do they share similarities with other organizations?

Is Al-Qaeda on the ropes, on the rise, or at an impasse? What is its future?

*Skills Introduced*

How to generate and frame general and specific research questions

What is a case? Case selection and research design

October 20: Al-Qaeda: The Past

*Required Readings*

* Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower*, Ch. 5-7, 13-20
* Osama Bin Laden, “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy  Places” (August 23, 1996)

*Recommended Readings*

* “Bin Laden’s Bookshelf” (Collection of Documents Captured During Raid on May 1, 2011)
* Osama Bin Laden, “Letter to the American People” (November 24, 2002)
* Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to*  *September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin, 2005)
* Thomas H. Kean, Lee Hamilton, et al., *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission*  *on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005)
* Peter Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2001)
* Fawaz Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)

October 22: Al-Qaeda: The Present and Future

*Required Readings*

* Daniel Byman, “Buddies or Burdens? Understanding the Al Qaeda Relationship with Its Affiliate Organizations,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2014) pp. 431-470
* Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Lone Wolf Islamic Terrorism: Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (Carlos Bledsoe) Case Study,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2014) pp. 110-128
* “Al-Qaeda’s Use of Female Suicide Bombers in Iraq: A Case Study,” in *Women, Gender, and Terrorism*, Laura Sjoberg and Caron Gentry, eds. (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 2011), pp. 159-175
* Rukmini Callimachi, “Paying Ransoms, Europe Bankrolls Qaeda Terror,” *The New York Times* (July 29, 2014)

*Recommended Readings*

* Anthony Lemieux et al, “Inspire Magazine: A Critical Analysis of its Significance and Potential Impact Through the Lens of the Information, Motivation, and Behavioral Skills Model,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (2012) pp. 354-371
* Risa Brooks, "Muslim 'Homegrown' Terrorism in the United States: How Serious Is the Threat?" *International Security* Vol. 36, No. 2 (2011) pp. 7-47
* William McCants, “How Zawahiri Lost al Qaeda,” *Foreign Affairs* (November 19, 2013)
* Bruce Hoffman, “American Jihad,” *The National Interest* No. 107 (May/June 2010) pp. 17-27
* Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice  between Domestic and Foreign Fighting,” *American Political Science Review* Vol. 107, No. 1 (2013) pp. 1-15

**WEEK 9: The Boundaries of Terrorism: Nonviolence and State Terror**

*Key Questions*

What is the same and different about the causes, mechanisms, and effects of insurgency and civil war as compared to terrorism?

When and why is nonviolence more effective than terrorism and insurgency?

Is there ‘ecoterrorism’ and is it comparable to other forms of terrorism?

Is there “state terrorism”? Should we adjust the common definition of terrorism to include it?

How many civilians do states and non-state actors kill? What are the causes of mass killing by states?

*Skills Introduced*

Comparing cases

October 27: Nonviolence and Non-Lethal Violence

*Required Readings*

* Stefan Leader and Peter Probst, “The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism,” *Terrorism*  *and Political Violence* Vol. 15, No. 4 (2003) pp. 37-58
* Blythe Copeland, “5 Ways Sea Shepherd's Controversial Methods are Changing the World For Whales,”  *Treehugger* (February 23, 2011)
* Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler and Cas Mudde, “Ecoterrorism: Threat Or Political Ploy?” *The Washington Post*  (December 19, 2014)
* Gene Sharp, “The Intifadah and Nonviolent Struggle,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 19, No. 1 (1989) pp.  3-13
* Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent  Political Conflict," *International Security* Vol. 33, No. 1 (2008) pp. 7-44

*Recommended Readings*

* Fabio Rojas, “Social Movement Tactics, Organizational Change and the Spread of African-American  Studies,” *Social Forces* Vol. 84, No. 4 (June 2006) pp. 2139-2158
* Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics*  Vol. 27, No. 2 (1975) pp. 175-200
* Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security*  Vol. 26, No. 1 (2001) pp. 93-128
* Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, “Dilettantes, Ideologues, and the Weak: Terrorists Who Don’t Kill,”  *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2008) pp. 244-260
* Leena Malkki, “Political Elements in Post-Columbine School Shootings in Europe and North America,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (2014) pp. 185-210

October 29: States and Rebel Governance: State Terrorism and Insurgents as State Builders

*Required Readings*

* Ruth Blakeley, “Bringing the State Back into Terrorism Studies,” *European Political Science* Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 2007) pp. 228-236
* Noam Chomsky, “The United States is a Leading Terrorist State,” *Monthly Review*, Vol. 53, No. 6 (November 2001) pp. 1-8
* Paul Staniland, “States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders,” *Perspectives on Politics* Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 2012) pp. 243-264
* Tim Arango, “ISIS Transforming Into Functioning State That Uses Terror as Tool,” *The New York Times* (July 21, 2015)

*Recommended Readings*

* Martha Crenshaw, “The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War,” in *Terrorism in Context* (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2007) pp. 473-513
* Ben Valentino et al., “’Draining the Sea’: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare,” *International Organization* Vol. 58, No. 2 (2004) pp. 375-407
* Alex Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy,” *Civil Wars* Vol. 9, No. 4 (2007) pp. 420-444
* Alexander George, ed., *Western State Terrorism* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
* Paul Wilkinson, “Can A State Be ‘Terrorist’?” *International Affairs* Vol. 57, No. 3 (1981) pp. 467-472

**WEEK 10: The Insurgencies in Iraq and Syria**

*Key Questions*

How and why did the insurgencies in Iraq and Syria begin?

How have the ruling regimes and foreign states responded?

How was ISIS created, and what explains its variation in strategy and effectiveness over time?

What explains the shifting alliances among insurgent groups across time and space?

*Skills Introduced*

Analyzing theories and cases: process-tracing and congruence testing

November 3: The Causes, Dynamics, and Effects of the Insurgencies

*Required Readings*

* Wendy Pearlman, “Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings,” *Perspectives on Politics* Vol.  11, No. 2 (2013) pp. 387-409
* Stathis Kalyvas, "The Paradox of Terrorism in Civil War," *The Journal of Ethics* Vol. 8, No. 1 (2004) pp.  97-138
* James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *The American Political Science Review*  Vol. 97, No. 1 (February 2003) pp. 75-77
* James Fearon, “Obstacles to Ending Syria’s Civil War,” *Foreign Policy* (December 10, 2013)

November 5: Foreign Fighters, ISIS, and Insurgent Rivalries

*Required Readings*

* William McCants, “The Believer: How an Introvert with a Passion for Religion and Soccer Became Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Leader of the Islamic State,” *Brookings*, September 1, 2015
* Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants,” *The Atlantic* (March 2015)
* Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really Wants: The Response,” *The Atlantic* (February 24, 2015)
* Christoph Reuter, “The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal the Structure of Islamic State,” *Spiegel Online*  (April 18, 2015)
* Thomas Hegghammer, “Syria’s Foreign Fighters,” *Foreign Policy* (December 9, 2013)
* “Global Terrorism Index 2014,” Institute for Economics and Peace, pp. 50-52
* Hasnain Kazim, “Interview with an Islamic State Recruiter: ‘Democracy Is For Infidels,’” *Spiegel Online*  (October 28, 2014)
* Roula Khalaf and Sam Jones, “Selling Terror: How ISIS Details Its Brutality,” *Financial Times* (June 17,  2014)
* Ariel Ahram, “Sexual and Ethnic Violence and the Construction of the Islamic State,” Political Violence  @ a Glance (September 18, 2014)

*Recommended Readings*

* Baghdadi’s first speech after declaration of ‘caliphate’” (July 1, 2014) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VOORW63ioY0
* Charlie Winter, “The Virtual ‘Caliphate’: Understanding Islamic State’s Propaganda Strategy,” *Quilliam* (2015)

**WEEK 11: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency I**

*Key Questions*

When, why, and how do terrorism and insurgency end?

What are the objectives and strategies of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency?

November 10: \*Exam #2 and “If a Tree Falls”\*

November 12: How Terrorism and Insurgency End (Proposal Due)

*Required Readings*

* Audrey Kurth Cronin, “How Al Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups,” *International*  *Security* Vol. 31, No. 1 (Summer 2006) pp. 7-48
* John Horgan, *Walking Away From Terrorism* (London: Routledge, 2009) pp. 27-39, 50-62
* Peter Neumann, “Negotiating With Terrorists,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 1 (2007) pp. 128-138
* Efraim Inbar and Eitan Shamir, “Mowing the Grass in Gaza,” BESA Center Paper No. 255, July 2014
* Micah Zenko, “Terrorism is Booming Almost Everywhere But in the United States,” *Foreign Policy* (June  19, 2015)

*Recommended Readings*

* Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida* (Santa  Monica, Calif: RAND, 2008)
* Ben Connable and Martin Libicki, "How Insurgencies End," (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010)

**WEEK 12: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency II**

*Key Questions*

What are the organizations involved in U.S. counterterrorism and counterinsurgency efforts?

Do counterterrorism and counterinsurgency work? Do they have unintended consequences?

*Skills Introduced*

Linking theory and evidence to policy, and vice versa

November 17: CT and COIN Debates: Hard & Soft Power, Democratization, Threat Inflation

*Required Readings*

* John Mueller, “Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol. 17, No. 4 (2005) pp. 487-505
* Richard Betts, Daniel Byman, and Martha Crenshaw, “Comments on John Mueller’s ‘Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism’,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (2005), pp. 507-521
* Ayaan Hirsi Ali, “A Problem From Heaven,” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2015)
* Williams McCants, “Islamic Scripture Is Not the Problem,” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2015)
* Gregory Gause and Jennifer Windsor, “Can Spreading Democracy Help Defeat Terrorism?” in Gottlieb,  *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Ch. 8, pp. 243-275

*Recommended Readings*

* Brigitte Nacos and Michael Rubin, “Counterterrorism Strategies: Do We Need Bombs Over Bridges?” in  Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Ch. 7, pp. 209-242
* Williams McCants and Clint Watts, “U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment,”  *Foreign Policy Research Institute* (December 2012)
* Robert Art and Louise Richardson, eds. *Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past*. (Washington,  D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007)
* Peter Krause and Stephen Van Evera, “Public Diplomacy: Ideas for the War of Ideas,” *Middle East Policy*  Vol. 16, No. 3 (Fall 2009) pp. 106-134
* Cass Sunstein, "Terrorism and Probability Neglect," *The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty* Vol. 26, No. 2/3  (2003) pp. 121-136
* Ami Pedhazur, “Struggling with the Challenge of Right-Wing Extremism in Democracies,” *Studies in*  *Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 24, No. 5 (September 2001) pp. 339-359
* Ian Lustick, *Trapped in the War on Terror* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006)

November 19: The Freedom of Speech, Profiling and Airport Security, Torture

*Required Readings*

* Conor Friedersdorf, “Why the Reaction Is Different When the Terrorist Is White,” *The Atlantic* (Aug 8,  2012)
* Abby Ohlheiser and Elahe Izadi, “Police: Austin Shooter was a ‘Homegrown American Extremist’” *The*  *Washington Post* (December 1, 2014)
* Jonathan Turley, “The Biggest Threat To French Free Speech Isn’t Terrorism. It’s The Government,”  *The Washington Post* (January 8, 2015)
* “Twitter suspends account of Hamas' military wing,” *Haaretz* (January 14, 2014)
* Matthew Yglesias, “Two—But Only Two—Cheers for Blasphemy,” *Vox* (January 8, 2015)
* Charles Kenny, “Airport Security is Killing Us,” *Businessweek* (November 18, 2012)
* Justin Fishel et al, “Undercover DHS Tests Reveal Security Failures at US Airports,” *ABC* (June 1, 2015)
* Michael Posner and Alan Dershowitz, “Is an Outright Ban the Best Way to Eliminate or Constrain  Torture?” in Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Ch.10, pp. 312-344
* John Yoo and David Cole, “ Counterterrorism and the Constitution: Does Providing Security Require a  Trade-off with Civil Liberties?” in Gottlieb, *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, Ch. 11, pp. 345-379

*Recommended Readings*

* James McAllister, Jonathan Kirshner, Austin Long, Robert Pape, Joshua Rovner, “Forum on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Report and the United States’ Post-9/11 Policy on Torture,” H-Diplo | ISSF Forum, No. 5 (2015)
* Ron Hassner, “Fundamentalist Wrath,” *Washington Post* (January 12, 2015)
* Darren W. Davis and Brian D. Silver, “Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the  Terrorist Attacks on America,” *American Journal of Political Science,* Vol. 48, No. 1 (January 2004) pp. 28-46
* Matthew Alexander, *How to Break a Terrorist* (New York: Free Press, 2008)
* Gary Crowdus, “Terrorism and Torture in The Battle of Algiers: An Interview with Saadi Yacef,”  Cineaste Vol. 29, No. 3 (Summer 2004) pp. 30-37

**WEEK 13: Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency III**

*Key Questions*

Is terrorism a significant threat to you, your society, your country, and the world?

How does the U.S. justice system deal with terrorism and terrorist suspects and perpetrators?

What are the tactics of the Department of Homeland Security for counterterrorism?

Is the current U.S. approach to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency the right one?

How should the U.S. balance concerns of security and liberty in dealing with terrorism?

*Skills Introduced*

How to write a research paper

November 24: Drones and Intelligence Agencies

*Required Readings*

* Daniel Byman, “Why Drones Work” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2013)
* Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Why Drones Fail” *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2013)
* Dylan Matthews, “Everything You Need to Know About the Drone Debate, in One FAQ,” *The*  *Washington Post* (March 8, 2013)
* Jeremy Scahill and Ryan Devereaux, “Barack Obama’s Secret Terrorist-Tracking System, By the  Numbers,” *The Intercept* (August 5, 2014)
* Barton Gellman and Laura Poitras, “U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet  Companies in Broad Secret Program,” *The Washington Post* (June 6, 2013)
* Daniel Solove, “Why Privacy Matters Even If You Have ‘Nothing to Hide,’” *The Chronicle of Higher*  *Education* (May 15, 2011)
* Peter Bergen et al. “Do NSA's Bulk Surveillance Programs Stop Terrorism?” *New America* (2014)
* Michael Hirsh, “The Next Bin Laden,” *National Journal* (November 14, 2013)

*Recommended Readings*

* Austin Long, “Whack-a-Mole or Coup de Grace? Institutionalization and Leadership Targeting in Iraq  and Afghanistan,” *Security Studies* Vol. 23, No. 3 (2014) pp. 471-512
* Patrick Johnston, “Does Decapitation Work?: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Targeting in  Counterinsurgency Campaigns,” *International Security* Vol. 36, No. 4 (2012) pp. 47-79
* Jenna Jordan, “When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation,” *Security*  *Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (December 2009) pp. 719-755
* Ronen Bergman, “The Hezbollah Connection,” *The New York Times* (February 10, 2015)
* M.S., “Why We Spy: The War on Terror is Obama’s Vietnam,” *The Economist* (June 10, 2013)

November 26: Have a Happy Thanksgiving!

*Assignment*: Impress your family members with your newfound knowledge about terrorism and political violence, then defeat them in political debates using said knowledge.

**WEEK 14: The Boston Marathon Bombings**

*Key Questions*

How do theory and history help us to explain what happened?

Were these attacks ‘terrorism’? What were the causes of the attacks? How did various types of media cover them?

What aspects of this attack were common, anomalous?

Why did the government and the community react they way that they did? Should anything have been done differently? What should be the outcome of Dzokhar Tsarnaev’s trial?

*Skills Introduced*

How to apply theory to current events

December 1: Definitions, Causes, and the Media

*Required Readings*

* Jess Bidgood, “Link to Marathon Bombing Rattles City Known for Its Tolerance,” *The New York Times*  (June 4, 2013)
* Jim Mackinnon, “Bill Ayers Defends Weather Underground Bombings,” *Akron Beacon* (May 4, 2013)
* Ken Bensinger and Andrea Chang, “Boston Bombings: Social Media Spirals Out of Control,” *The Los*  *Angeles Times* (April 20, 2013)
* “Rolling Stone Defends Cover Featuring Boston Marathon Bombing Suspect,” *CBS News* (July 17, 2013)

December 3: Effects, Community Response, and the Dzokhar Tsarnaev Trial

*Required Readings*

* David Montgomery et al, “Police, Citizens and Technology Factor into Boston Bombing Probe,” *The Washington Post* (April 20, 2013)
* Ayaan Hirsi Ali, “The Problem of Muslim Leadership,” *The Wall Street Journal* (May 27, 2013)
* Wardah Khalid, “Day by Day: An American Muslim's Thoughts After the Boston Attack,” *The Huffington*  *Post* (April 23, 2013)
* Conor Friedersdorf, “Falsely Accused in Boston: 3 Examples and What They Should Teach Us,” *The*  *Atlantic* (April 19, 2013)
* Anonymous Security Professional, “Thoughts on Responding to the Boston Bombings”
* Frank Bruni, “The Lesson of Boston,” *The New York Times* (April 27, 2013)
* Peter Krause, “BC Should Respond to Attacks with Renewed Community Spirit,” *The Heights* (April 15,  2013)
* Austin Tedesco, “Students Organize ‘Last 5’ Walk, Vigil as Memorial Events,” *The Heights* (April 18,  2013)
* Bill and Denise Richards, “To End The Anguish, Drop The Death Penalty,” *The Boston Globe*

*Recommended Readings*

“Why Was Boston Strong? Lessons From the Boston Marathon Bombings” Harvard Kennedy School (April 2014)

**WEEK 15: Terrorism, Insurgency, and Political Violence, Now and in the Future**

*Key Questions*

What are the major lessons we learned in this course? What questions remain unanswered?

What is the future of terrorism, insurgency, and political violence?

*Skills Introduced*

How to read the news

How to generate policy implications

December 7: Remaining Questions and Lessons Learned

*Required Readings*

* Husna Haq, “Why #I’llRideWithYou Worked, and Other Muslims Hashtags Didn’t,” *Christian Science*  *Monitor* (December 15, 2014)
* Arit John, “With the NAACP Bombing, the Media-Coverage Gap Went Viral,” *Bloomberg* (January 8, 2015)
* Linda Robinson, “The Future of Counterterrorism: Fewer Drones, More Partnerships,” *The Washington Post* (October 28, 2013)
* Antonia Blumberg, “Sikhs Mark Anniversary Of Temple Shooting With Community Service,” *Huffington Post* (July 31, 2015)
* One news article of your choice from the past week