**Supplemental Materials**

**Priming Memories of Past Wins Induces Risk Seeking**

**by E. A. Ludvig et al., 2014, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General**

**http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000046**

**Supplemental Results**

*Gender*. Given the gender imbalance in our sample, we sought to ensure that the results were robust across genders. Figure S1 shows how both genders showed the same effects: males picked the risky option 18.0 ± 9.3% of the time more frequently following the 60 prime [*t*(22)=3.81, *p*<.001, Cohen’s *d*=.64], and females picked the risky option 14.8 ± 5.7% more frequently following the 60 prime [*t*(60)=5.15, *p*<.001, d=.57]. Moreover, there were no reliable gender differences in overall levels of risky choice in the no-prime condition [*t*(82)=0.49, *p*=.63, *d*=.12].

*Response Times*. Figure S2 plots response times on decision trials as a function of the priming stimulus. These decision trials were the ones that pitted the safe 40-point door against the risky door that yielded 20 or 60 points with a 50/50 chance. Response times reliably changed based on the prime presented [*F*(4,345)=5.94, *p*<.001, *ηp2*=.067]. After Bonferroni correction, responding after the 60 prime was significantly faster than after no prime, 0 prime, or 80 prime [*p*’s < .05], but not the other conditions (i.e., 20 or 40 prime) [both *p*’s > .5]. Responding after the 80 prime was significantly slower than after all the other primes except for no prime and the 0 prime [*p*’s < .05]. In addition, overall, RT did not reliably differ based on which door was actually chosen [*t*(83)=1.37, *p*=.17, *d*=.12].



*Figure S1*. Mean difference from the no-prime condition (± 95% confidence intervals) for all primes, split by gender. For both genders, the 60 prime led to a large increase in risky choice.

*Macintosh HD:Users:chris:Documents:Research:riskychoice:HF:HF54_priming1:analysis:HF54_RTs_subplot2.pdf*

*Figure S2.* Mean response time (ms) on decision trials as a function of the priming stimulus (left axis) and mean difference from the no-prime condition (right side; ± 95% confidence intervals). Presenting primes relevant to the decision trial (i.e., 20, 40, or 60) speeded responding, whereas presenting irrelevant primes (i.e., 0 or 80) slowed responding. Only the effects of the 60 and 80 primes, however, were statistically significant after Bonferroni correction.