A. Online Appendix

Table A.1: Pairwise robust rank-order test (average *contribution* per group is an independent observation)

| | "No P" | "Immediate | "Delayed | "Delayed | "Delayed | Average |
|---------------|-----------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------------|
| | (14 obs.) | P" | P1" | P2" | P3" | over periods |
| | | (16 obs.) | (21 obs.) | (20 obs.) | (19 obs.) | |
| "No P" | | -6.62*** | -7.71*** | -4.23*** | -2.49** | 1-15 |
| (14 obs.) | | -6.28*** | -6.51*** | -3.97*** | -2.50** | 10-15 |
| "Immediate P" | | | 0.49 | 0.98 | 1.58* | 1-15 |
| (16 obs) | | | 0.25 | 0.87 | 1.41* | 10-15 |
| "Delayed P1" | | | | 0.64 | 1.38* | 1-15 |
| (21 obs.) | | | | 0.71 | 1.16 | 10-15 |
| "Delayed P2" | | | | | 0.71 | 1-15 |
| (20 obs.) | | | | | 0.52 | 10-15 |

The values are the robust rank-order test statistic \dot{U} . *, **, and *** denote $0.5 , <math>0.01 , and <math>p \le 0.01$, respectively (using simulated small sample values - one sided tests - see Feltovich, 2005).

Table A.2: Pairwise robust rank-order test (average *punishment* per group is an independent observation)

| | "Immediate | "Delayed | "Delayed | "Delayed | Average over |
|---------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------------|
| | P" | P1" | P2" | P3" | periods |
| | (16 obs.) | (21 obs.) | (20 obs.) | (19 obs.) | |
| "Immediate P" | | -0.72 | 1.12 | -0.59 | 1-15 |
| (16 obs.) | | -1.16 | -1.20 | -2.01** | 10-15 |
| | | | | | |
| "Delayed P1" | | | 1.89** | 0.04 | 1-15 |
| (21 obs.) | | | 0.61 | -0.90 | 10-15 |
| | | | | | |
| "Delayed P2" | | | | -1.56* | 1-15 |
| (20 obs.) | | | | -1.74** | 10-15 |

The values are the robust rank-order test statistic Ù. *, **, and *** denote $0.5 , <math>0.01 , and <math>p \le 0.01$, respectively (using simulated small sample values- one sided tests - see Feltovich, 2005).

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Table A.3: Pairwise robust rank-order test (average *payoff* per group is an independent observation)

| | "No P" | "Immediate | "Delayed | "Delayed | "Delayed | Average over |
|---------------|--------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|--------------|
| | (14 | P" | P1" | P2" | P3" | periods |
| | obs.) | (16 obs.) | (21 obs.) | (20 obs.) | (19 obs.) | |
| "No P" | | -2.07** | -1.85** | -1.82** | -0.18 | 1-20 |
| (14 obs.) | | -3.06*** | -2.95*** | -2.14** | -0.60 | 10-15 |
| "Immediate P" | | | 0.50 | 0.25 | 1.63* | 1-20 |
| (16 obs.) | | | 1.05 | 1.39* | 2.15** | 10-15 |
| "Delayed P1" | | | | -0.22 | 1.20 | 1-20 |
| (21 obs.) | | | | 0.22 | 1.13 | 10-15 |
| | | | | | | |
| "Delayed P2" | | | | | 1.26 | 1-20 |
| (20 obs.) | | | | | 1.02 | 10-15 |
| | | | | | | |

The values are the robust rank-order test statistic \dot{U} . *, **, and *** denote $0.5 , <math>0.01 , and <math>p \le 0.01$, respectively (using simulated small sample values - one sided tests - see Feltovich, 2005).

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Table A.4: Tobit model estimations (prosocial and antisocial punishment)

| | Coef. (Std. Err.) | Coef. (Std. Err.) |
|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| | Prosocial | Antisocial |
| Treatments | punishment | punishment |
| "Delayed P1" | 0.33 | 0.18 |
| • | (0.29) | (0.64) |
| "Delayed P2" | -0.40 | -2.02*** |
| · | (0.33) | (0.77) |
| "Delayed P3" | 0.58* | 1.18* |
| - | (0.33) | (0.66) |
| Negative absolute deviation | 0.49*** | - |
| | (0.03) | |
| Negative absolute deviation | -0.05 | - |
| x "Delayed P1" | (0.04) | |
| Negative absolute deviation | -0.13*** | - |
| x "Delayed P2" | (0.05) | |
| Negative absolute deviation | -0.04 | - |
| x "Delayed P3" | (0.06) | |
| Positive deviation | - | 0.42*** |
| | | (0.08) |
| Positive deviation x | - | 0.13 |
| "Delayed P1" | | (0.10) |
| Positive deviation x | - | -0.15 |
| "Delayed P2" | | (0.11) |
| Positive deviation x | - | 0.02 |
| "Delayed P3" | | (0.10) |
| Constant | -5.04*** | -5.61*** |
| | (0.83) | (1.82) |
| Age, Man, Economist, | | |
| Experience dummies | Yes | Yes |
| Periods | 1-15 | 1-15 |
| (Period dummies) | (Yes) | (Yes) |
| Observations | 13680 | 13680 |
| Uncensored Obs | 1054 | 267 |
| Pseudo-R ² | 0.24 | 0.21 |

Dep. variable "Prosocial punishment" ("antisocial punishment)" is defined as the number of points received in period t when the individual contributed less (more) than his peer. "Negative absolute deviation" ("Positive deviation") is defined as the negative (positive) difference between an individual contribution and the other's contribution. Note that for a prosocial (antisocial) punishment "Negative absolute deviation" ("Positive deviation") must be larger than 0. The estimation includes observations from Periods 1-15 only (3 observations per individual per period). Finally,*, **, and *** denote $0.5 , <math>0.01 , and <math>p \le 0.01$. Standard errors are clustered across individuals.